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Chapter One 
1959-1969: The Rise and Fall of Welfare and Treatment 
'We are redefining and we are restating our socialism in terms of the 
scientific revolution ... The Britain that is going to be forged 
in 
the white heat of the technological revolution will be no place for 
restrictive practices or outmoded methods'. 
Harold Wilson to the 
Labour Party Conference, October 1963 
'No no, no no 
No no, no no 
I'm not a juvenile delinquent' 
Frankie Lyman and the Teenagers 1957 
The re-discovery of the class connection 
Above the main entrance of the Central Criminal Court at the Old Bailey are 
carved these words: 
DEFEND THE CHILDREN OF THE POOR AND PUNISH THE WRONGDOER 
This apparently straightforward injunction has proved extraordinarily 
difficult to carry out because in the juvenile courts of England and Wales it 
appears to be the case that the wrongdoers are also the children of the poor. 
This has led many people to speculate about the relationship between crime and 
Social class. 
The issue of social class is always bubbling just beneath the surface of 
any serious discussion of juvenile crime, and this is because the children and 
young people who are processed through the British juvenile courts are drawn 
overwhelmingly from the ranks of the poor. The Ingleby Committee on the working 
of the juvenile court in England and Wales, established in 1956, rediscovered 
the class connection. 
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Ingleby observed that the children and young people who passed through the 
juvenile courts were drawn largely from the most deprived sections of the 
working class. They came from impoverished homes, and their families lived in 
traditionally low-income, crime-prone areas. First, Ingleby suggested that 
delinquency might be an indicator of social deprivation and that this 
deprivation might be prevented by the infusion of welfare resources into 
neighbourhoods which produced high juvenile crime rates. To this end, the report 
advocated the establishment of family advice centres. Second, it alerted us 
to the problem that an over-emphasis upon the social compensation of deprived 
offenders delivered, via the justice system, through the medium of welfare or 
treatment might shade into a denial of the legal rights of the young offender. 
This important consideration was largely ignored in the subsequent debate within 
the Labour Party about the role and function of the juvenile court but it 
emerged again, with much greater force, from a variety of political quarters in 
the mid-1970s1. 
Longford and Psychoanalytic Socialism 
Ingleby had raised the question of social class, social deprivation, and 
its connection with crime. What was cleat, to most observers however was that 
the majority of members of the most deprived segment of society were not 
identifiably criminal. If then the juveniles who appeared before the juvenile 
court were drawn from the most deprived segments of society then either they 
2 were peculiar or they were responding to their deprivation in a peculiar way`. 
The Labour Party reformers opted for the latter view. The hapless subjects of 
the juvenile court were no different it seemed, from their law-abiding 
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neighbours, they merely responded to this shared deprivation in a different way. 
If then this criminality was in fact no more than a particular reaction 
to deprivation, "then 
to respond to the crime rather than the causes of the 
crime was absurd. The Longford Report (Labour Party Study Group, 1964) stated 
the matter thus: 
'No understanding parent can contemplate without repugnance the 
branding of a child in early adolescence as a criminal, whatever 
offence he may have committed. If it is a trivial case, such a 
procedure is indefensible, if a more serious charge is involved this 
is, in itself, evidence of the child's need for skilled help and 
guidance. The parent who can get such help for his child on his own 
initiative can almost invariably keep the child from court. It is 
only the children of those not so fortunate who appear in the criminal 
statistics'. 
Longford's plea is for a set of therapeutic facilities which can be made 
available to the deprived in order to restore their children to social and 
mental health. This plea echoes earlier Labour Party responses to Ingleby. 
The Labour Party rejoinder to Ingleby (Donnison and Stewart 1958, Donnison, 
Jay and Stewart 1962) is essentially concerned with the organisation of a new 
family service. This family service was to be aimed at the small residue of 
families which had slipped through the net of welfare state provision and did 
not slot neatly into the range of needs which existing social work agencies were 
established to meet, and those others who were -'too ignorant or apathetic to 
make use of the services offered to them' (Donnison and Stewart. 1958 p. 3). 
Donnison and Stewart (1958) write: 
'One study after another has shown that the personal social services 
devote most of their resources to a small proportion of their 
clientele, and many of these people need help from several different 
services. ' 
This concentration of helping resources becomes important in terms of 
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delinquency because: 
it is now generally agreed that unhappy and broken homes play 
an important part in producing the delinquents who enter the approved 
school. ' 
(Donnison, Jay and Stewart 1962) 
The approach to the problem of juvenile crime presented here is that of "a 
mopping-up operation. The new family service is to identify, penetrate and 
clear out the last residues of unwarranted social maladjustment. Its 
potential clientele is presented as a kind of proletarian hangover from an 
earlier primitive era whose problems are compounded by official responses to 
their behaviour. 
The problem of juvenile crime as formulated by Donnison, Jay, Stewart and 
the Longford Study Group is a psychological one. Juvenile crime may flow from 
inadequate parenting but it is essentially a problem of lack of access to 
skilled help. What appears to distinguish the deprived from the privileged in 
this account is that while the privileged have information about where to find 
skilled help and the economic wherewithall to pay for it the deprived do not. 
The deprivation the deprived experience is a deprivation of information, a 
deprivation of motivation, and an economic deprivation, the major consequence 
r 
of which appears to be to prevent deprived families from paying or 
psychoanalysis for their errent offspring. This deprivation, it is argued, is 
compounded by the stigmatisation which is the inevitable consequence of a 
court appearance. Such stigmatisation would, it seemed, only serve 'to propel 
the juvenile deeper into a deviant career. 
In the hands of the Fabian reformers the ideas of class and poverty are 
transformed. To understand this transformation it is necessary to know 
something of the 'new-look' labour politics of the early 1960s. 
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A High-tech Decade 
Harold Wilson divined correctly that if Labour was to stand a chance of 
winning the 1964 election it had to modernise itself. 
The world presented by Wilson in the early 1960s was a world in which the. 
white heat of the technological revolution' would eradicate poverty and iron 
out social inequality. Through the expansion of educational opportunity, full 
employment and an enlarged welfare state, opportunity, prosperity and security 
would be created for all. Here was a new style Labour Party with its appeal 
to the new and the old 'working class'. It was going to proceed on the basis 
of consensus. By distributing the rewards of a technologically sophisticated 
society more fairly, social discontent would be quelled and the legitidiacy of 
3 
the new order secured. 
In the murky depths beneath this wave of optimism however poverty was in 
the process of being rediscovered. Brian Abel-Smith and Peter Townsend showed 
us that discrepancies of wealth and opportunity remained as stark in the early 
1960s as they had been in the immediate post-war period, suggesting that the 
welfare state had not done what it was supposed to do ancj, that the new society 
which Wilson and Co. were marketing so successfully was not quite what it 
appeared to be. This rediscovered poverty had to be tackled if the 
Wilsonian dream was to be realised but how could class inequality exist in a 
classless 'meritocratic' society? There was then, a problem of explanation 
and a problem of strategy. 
Whereas the traditional orthodoxy of the Labour Party and the labour 
movement had emphasised the antagonistic relationship between capital and 
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labour this new ideology stressed the idea of a stratifed, open society in 
which distinct class differences had dissolved into a continuum of statuses. 
Traditional class differences were supplanted by a notion of a world of 
opportunities to be grasped by those with sufficient skill and merit. An 
expanded educational system would exploit the abilities of the less fortunate 
and enable those with the talent to participate successfully in the new 
society. The diminishing need for unskilled and semi-skilled labour would be 
parallelled by a spectactular increase in the financial rewards for such 
labour. The British car industry was cited as the example par excellence of 
this tendency. The unskilled worker would be subject to an embourgeoisement 
which would shake him free of his traditional working class lifestyle and 
loyalties4. 
If then, in this new world, there remained those who lived in poverty 
then clearly they did-this because they had failed to, get the message. They 
were in some way unaware of the new educational and occupational opportunities 
and persisted in an essentially pathetic reproduction of lower working class 
lifestyles and behaviour -a sort of 'culture of poverty'. Thus being 
'working class' became synonymous with being a victim of an emsemble of 
problems, deficits and defects which a benign state would have to address and 
eradicate. In the new classless society people who continued to act in 
working class ways were to be educated, helped and cajoled into the new 
meritocratic classless consensus. 
So class was not central to the new politics. Class struggle was no 
longer the motor of social change. Being working class emerged as a 
reprehensible anachronism. People who kept on being it were seemingly 
6 
labouring under a misapprehension. They were, it was argued, located in small 
packets, in localised areas which the new doctrine had failed to penetrate. A 
mopping-up operation was necessary and in the spirit of the times this 
C 
operation had to be scientifically informed and technologically sophisticated''. 
Enter the Eggheads - the Appliance of Science 
With the election of the Wilson administration we witnessed a rare, and 
perhaps never to be repeated, phenomenon because Wilson had gathered around him 
a group of academic social scientists which included Donnison, Jay and Stewart, 
and asked them first to define, and then to devise solutions for, Britain's 
social problems. This was not, of course, original. John F Kennedy had done' 
precisely this at the inception of the American poverty programme in 1960 and 
the British 'poverty programme' bore a resemblance to the Kennedy initiative. 
The idea of a new Camelot in which the fing surrounded himself with the most 
esteemed righters of social wrongs was a mark of the humanistic idealism which 
was the necessary complement to an enlightened 'high tech' administration. 
The endeavour was essentially to de-politicise social issues. It was an 
attempt to remove questions of poverty, educational opportunity and crime from 
the place they had occupied in the old class politics, namely as a 
manifestation of social inequality, and put them-onto the agenda of social 
anomalies to be eradicated by an apolitical process of social engineering. 
This alliance with social science had a profound impact upon Labour Party 
juvenile justice policy in the 1960s6. 
The reformers attempted to reshape our perception of the problem of 
juvenile crime and our ideas about the most appropriate responses to it. This 
attempted transformation had five central features - depoliticisation, 
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decentralisation, preventive intervention, decriminalisation, and treatment. 
Depoliticisation Juvenile crime is transformed from a social evil or a 
manifestation of class inequality into a residual problem which arises as a 
result of rapid social change and resides in families and neighbourhoods which- 
have been unable to avail themselves of the opportunities proffered by a 
prosperous technologically sophisticated society. The problem of juvenile crime 
is subsumed within the larger problem of deprivation. This deprivation is 
defined not as a consequence of objective class inequality but rather as a self- 
perpetuating subjective culture of poverty which is out of tune with political 
reality. Thus juvenile crime emerges as a temporary pathological phenomemon 
amenable to social engineering. 
0 
Decentralisation The power to place a child or young person in a confined space 
against his or her will is taken from the courts. The administration of this 
confinement is taken from the Home Office and placed in the hands of the 
employees of democratically elected local authorities. The young offender is 
restored to their local community and is subject only to,. those constraints which 
will be determined locally with due regard to his or her needs. In effecting 
this change the possibility is opened up of the construction of a localised 
democratically-answerable system of youth control beyond the influence of 
central government crime control policies or strategies. 
Preventive Intervention The role of welfare is transformed from a reactive to a 
pre-emptive one. Welfare resources are to be tar; getted-in upon crime-prone 
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neighbourhoods and families in order to offer them corrective and compensatory 
experiences which will put them in touch with (a) information about resources, 
(b) advice about opportunities and (c) help in the child-rearing task. Welfare 
is to be used as an educative device and its objective is to equip the small 
residue of deviant families with what it takes to participate successfully in 
the mainstream of society. 
Decriminalisation The Fabian transformation of crime into a socially-determined 
pathology renders the category of crime, with its connotations of culpability 
and choice, irrelevant. If then the major mechanism established to deal with 
illegal youthful misbehaviour is still geared to questions of guilt, innocence, 
culpability, and mitigation, it is clearly not only anachronistic but a 
pernicious stigmatising mechanism wherein the problem of juvenile crime is 
actually worsened. It therefore becomes necessary to transform the juvenile 
court into an agency which addresses the real problem of deprivation and 
pathology rather than the false problem of criminality. It follows that the 
juvenile criminal justice system must be decriminalised. 
Treatment If crime is transformed into individual or family pathology the 
juvenile court must be transformed into a diagnostic clinic. If the privileged 
can buy the services of child curers then the state is obliged to provide them 
free for the less well off. Thus it follows that a family service, -employing 
psychologically or psychoanalytically trained professionals who can enter the 
homes and minds of pathological families and children, must become a central 
feature of any official response to juvenile crime. 
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What is being proposed here is a substantial shift in power, away from 
the courts and the legal profession, and towards welfare professionals and 
experts. It is an assault upon the dominance of a system of justice which the 
labour party had traditionally viewed as being in the pay, and working in the 
interests of, the privileged. Beyond the apparent 'scientific' 'rationality'. 
of the reformers proposals lay a deeper political antagonism towards a system 
of justice which was seen to perpetuate social injustice. It was a struggle 
between a new generation of red-brick high"flyers and the Oxbridge old guard. 
A struggle between the traditional ancien regime and the new scientific 
order. 
Welfare v. Justice? 
r 
By 1965 the stage was set for this struggle. The vehicle for the first 
assault was The Child, the Family and the Young Offender', White Paper, 
(1965). The vehicle for the second was the 'Children in Trouble', White 
Paper, (1968). 
For the proponents of a 'welfare' position the objective was to annexe the 
juvenile justice system, and transform it into a mechaniAm which, through the 
infusion of welfare, and the judicious application of treatment simultaneously 
delivered social justice and engendered conformity. For the proponents of a 
'justice' position the objective was to retain control of the juvenile justice 
system in order that by the application of due process of law, the rules of 
evidence, and the principle of proportionality, in which incursions into the 
liberty of the offender would be proportional to the seriousness of the offence, 
formal justice would be done, morality defended, 'and conformity engendered. 
1 () 
,f 
4 
For Longford and the other reformers it was clear that age alone was a 
sufficient reason why children and young people should not be subjected to the 
stigmatising ritual of a court appearance. The 'justice' rejoinder was-that the 
court offered the assurance of objectivity, the protection of due process, and a 
necessary confrontation with morality and responsibility. 
It is important to remember, however, that questions of age and social 
deprivation had already been a consideration in court proceedings for juveniles 
for more than a century. The creation in 1908 of a separate juvenile court had 
been an acknowledgement of this and the establishment in 1933 of approved 
schools was further testimony to this acceptance that children and young people 
in trouble had special needs. 
The argument in juvenile justice in the post-war period prior to the 1960s 
had been about the relationship between the concern for justice and the concern 
for the welfare of the child and the ways in which these concerns might 
complement each other. This political polarisation of 'welfare' and 'justice' 
was peculiar to the 1960s and 1970s. 
Did he jump or was he pushed'? 
The 'justice model' is derived from the utilitarian philosophy of the 
enlightenment and, more specifically from the social contract theories of 
Hobbes, Montesquieu and Rousseau. Together this body of theory is known'as 
classicism: 
The central tenet of classicism was that the rights of men had to be 
protected against the corruption and excesses of existing 
institutions; and these vagiaries were nowhere more evident than in 
the legal systems of eighteenth century Europe. Punishment was 
arbitrary and barbarous, 'due processes'-of law being absent or, 
ignored and crime itself being ill-defined And extensive'. 
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Taylor,, Walton and Young, 1973, p. 1 
Classicism poses a model of an ideal society. In this society a social 
contract has been struck between the government and the governed. This contract 
says that if each citizen relinquishes a small proportion of their personal 
freedom to the government, the government will, in its turn, operate a system of 
justice consistent with the principles of equality before the law and the 
minimisation of interference with individual freedom. It will moreover operate. 
a system of punishment in which penalties are no harsher than is necessary to 
recompense the victim and to deter other potential offenders. Governments act 
rationally on behalf of the people, and the people, being rational, effect a 
rational choice which permits governments to do this. In this ideal and 
rational society crime becomes an irrational act. 
What was quite clear however was that a lot of people in the real world, 
the very poor, in particular, seemed reluctant to honour their end of the social 
contract. The implicit psychological theory which underpinned classicism is 
familiar enough, it also underpins behaviourism. It asserts that human beings 
are motivated by the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Thus a 
system established to discourage crime by increasing its pains and decreasing 
r 
its pleasures, but simultaneously offering all citizens, irrespective of wealth 
and social position, the same level of pain could not cope with those who lived 
in such abject misery that crime, the possibility of the pain of, judicial 
punishment notwithstanding, seemed a preferable option to the pain of living in 
poverty. 
Classicism as a system of abstract thought could not accommodate the 
reality of social inequality. Just as classical economic theory posed a model 
of an ideal, or perfect, economic market, classical criminology posed an ideal 
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or perfect, moral market. Classical economic theory was therefore unable to 
account for instances of 'market imperfection', 'market failure', and 'market 
collapse'. Similarly, classical criminology had no way of accounting for 
imperfections, failures, and collapses occasioned by social inequality in the 
moral market place. 
There were two ways out of this challenge to classicism. One, which had 
extremely radical implications, was that the impoverished could not be bound 
by the social contract because they were severely handicapped in the moral 
marketplace by dint of their poverty. The other, favoured, account was that 
poverty should be seen as a condition which, under certain circumstances, 
constrained the rationality of the poor, and as such limited their culpability 
for their crimes. Indeed, Locke distinguished between 'those members 'of the 
poor who had chosen depravity and those who, because of their unfortunate 
circumstances were unable to live a rational life' (McPherson C B, 1962). Neo- 
classicism was born. 
Neo-classicism emerged as a way of accommodating these unpalatable social 
realities while preserving classicism more or less intact. In this new 
formulation the world was divided up slightly differently. 
'In the neo-classical schema man is still held to be accountable for 
his actions but certain minor reservations-are made, the past history 
and the present situation of the actor are held to affect his 
likelihood to reform' 
Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973, p. 8 
Because the rationality of criminals might be constrained by poverty, 
enfeeblement, madness or immaturity the range of penalties is expanded and a 
movement away from penalties which fit the crime towards a range of penalties 
which fit the criminal is set in train. For neo-classicism the social world 
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still retains its rational centre but on the margins there exist small 
ghettoes of irrationality which the legal system increasingly attempts to 
accommodate by the administrative manipulation of penalties. 
Thus we see the introduction of discharges, probation, and suspended 
sentences on the one hand and the adjustment of existing penalties like fines, 
on the other, in order to accommodate the principles of impaired rationality 
or diminished responsibility. 
The neo-classical revision of the classical schema had a more profound 
impact than this however. Neo-classicism provided an entre for the sciences 
of behavioural determination, and the techniques of behavioural change into 
the sphere of crime and justice. 
Neo-classicism had saved classicist theory from collapse by accommodating 
the problem that inequality might limit freedom of choice. In doing so, it 
acknowledged that certain behaviours were not freely chosen but shaped by 
invisible or barely visible social or psychological forces. What it had not 
done was to explain the nature of this determination of behaviour. As an 
administrative correctionalist criminology neo-classisis. needed (a) an 
explanation of behavioural determinants -*a criminology - and (b) a set of 
techniques whereby the determined criminal actor could be transformed into a 
freely-willing undetermined actor -a social treatment - if the world described 
in classicist theory was to be transformed into a social reality. Thus it was 
neo-classicism, a philosophy and a theory which dominated the sphere of crime 
and justice, which gave the impetus, set the paradigm, and specified the problem 
which the emergent sciences of behavioural determination and techniques of 
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behavioural change in the field of crime and justice were to solve. Indeed, it 
even lent criminology classicism's somewhat simplistic and pessimistic 
psychological theory. 
If this scientific or scientifically-informed endeavour was successful then 
the world of classicism would be realised. If the determinants of criminal 
behaviour were identified, explained, and then cured, then irrational criminals 
could be restored to the rational consensus. 
It was this essential complementarity of welfare and justice which was 
ignored or misunderstood by the protagonists in*'the welfare v. justice debate of 
the 1960s and 1970s. The project of criminology and social treatment was the 
restoration of. the legal subject to rationality. By the early 1960s, Harold' 
Wilson's social scientists had adopted both a theoretical cause and a 
theoretical cure for criminal irrationality. 
Durkheim, Freud and Harold Wilson 
By the 1950s and early 1960s the dominant intellectual influences upon 
criminology social welfare and the practice of child care were those which 
originated in Durk:: heim's sociology and Freud's psychoanalysis. 
Durk"heim's argument with classicism was that it-was a political ideology. 
and not a description of social reality. He castigated classicism because it 
was unscientific and gave a false account of the relationship between 
individuals and the state in capitalist societies. He argued that 
industrialised societies were characterised by a forced division of labour in 
which individual freedom was curtailed by an industrial system which denied 
opportunity to all but the privileged. Instead of a consensus, or in Durkheim's 
phrase a 'conscience collective' society was characterised by a multiplicity of 
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mutually antagonistic groups who were not bound together by an over-arching 
morality or ethic. In these circumstances, as Taylor, Walton and Young have 
argued, three types of deviant will emerge: 
1) The Biological Deviant Who deviates because of situational factors or 
genetic inheritance irrespective of social opportunity. These people would 
deviate under, any social system. 
2) The Functional Rebel Who is in revolt against existing social inequality 
and lack of access to opportunity. These people would not deviate in a 
society in which there was a spontaneous division of labour and individual 
ability, individual utility and not privilege, determined one's social 
position. 
The Skewed Deviant Who is a victim of the 'anomie' or normiessness which 
arises when the forced division of labour negates the possibility of a 
conscience collective and an institutionalised socipl egoism which arises 
out of this 'anomie' and allows free reign to the appetites of the 
individual. 
Taylor, Walton and Young (1973) contend that: 
'fors Dur4:: heim, biological positivism would be the prime explanation of 
deviant motivation only in a perfectly regulated organic society. In 
such a situation, anomie, egoism and the need for functional rebellion 
would not obtain'. 
P" 83 
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The skewed deviant is, in Freud's terms, a victim of an undeveloped 
superego and an inadequate ego which is unable to successfully sublimate the 
primitive drives of the id into socially useful activity. As for the 
functional rebel, Freud (1964) would argue: 
'It goes without saying that a civilisation which leaves so large a 
number, of its participants unsatisfied and drives them into revolt 
neither has nor deserves the prospect of a lasting existence'. 
pp. 15-16 
In arguing thus Freud finds strong resonances with Durkheim. Both Durkheim 
and Freud were critical bourgois thinkers who laid bare the social 
contradictions of industrial society and found within them the social 
determinants of deviant behaviour which lay beneath the classicist facade. 
Importantly however both were intent not only to reveal these contradictions but 
also to specify the conditions under which the contradictions and the 
determinants might be transcended and a rational world, analogous to the world, 
posited by classicism, realised. 
Durkheim's concern is that if actors are to participate in the classicist 
game on equal terms then we must, through social and economic intervention, make 
sure that the board is flat. Freud is concerned that when the board is 
flattened, the pieces will be facing the right way. The ideas of Freud and 
Durkheim had profoundly influenced Harold Wilson's academic social scientific 
policy advisers. Their popularity was due in no small part to the fact that 
they were theories which could be read as being optimistic about, and offering a 
blueprint for, substantial social change without radical political change7. 
Harold Wilson's administration claimed to be completing the work of the 
welfare state. By expanding the personal social 'services it was adding an 
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educational and therapeutic layer to the welfare state and in doing this it 
was bringing into being a society which offered universal material security 
and social support. Through economic intervention anomalies of wealth would 
be ironed out. Through an agreement with the trade unions which Wilson 
himself styled the social contract' industrial strife was to be supplanted by 
industrial harmony. Through the expansion of higher education, the new 
universities, the polytechnics and the open university, citizens who had 
previously been denied opportunity were to be given a fair chance. Through 
the Educational Priority Areas programme and the Community Development 
projects residual pockets of poverty were to be attacked. 
Wilson offered a new enlightenment, a new 'social contract', in which 
human rationality need no longer be constrained by poverty and inequality. He 
seemed to be attempting to bring the ideal classical world of Rousseau into 
being. This was also Durkheim's world of 'organic solidarity' an open, 
meritocratic society with a spontaneous division of labour based upon ability 
and social utility rather than rank. 
It was a world in which the functional rebel and the skewed deviant had 
no reason to deviate. Thus an initiative in the sphere of juvenile justice 
r must be geared to the functional rebel and the skewed deviant whg were 
temporarily out of step with the new enlightenment. The functional rebel 
would be diverted from crime by education and the provision of legitimate 
opportunity. The skewed deviant would receive therapy education and 
opportunity. The biological deviant would be contained by a humane state. 
What is ultimately so astounding about welfarism in the Wilson era is 
that the logical outcome of the 'welfare' endeavour, had it been successful, 
was not simply that the juvenile court would be replaced by the diagnostic 
18 
r 
,0 
4 
clinic, but that the redundant juvenile court would be replaced by the 
diagnostic clinic which, having done its work, would itself become redundant. 
It would become redundant because, in restoring its patients to the rational 
consensus in which crime became an impossible option for the rational actor, 
it would have ushered in the crime-free society. The only people who would 
break laws would be biological deviants who, by definition, could not be 
described as criminal. That was the idea anyway. 
It is strange that governments which claim to be appropriating the future 
on behalf of the people are usually engaged in appropriating the past, albeit a 
mythical past, on behalf of an abstract idea of how the world ought to be. It 
was the fictional individualistic bourgois world of classicism which the Wilson 
government strove to bring into being. Collectivism and socialism had'been 
abandoned along the way. It was a yearning for this fictional world which 
inspired much sociological and criminological theory. These political, 
theoretical, and social endeavours were measured against the mythical 
achievements of a non-existent golden age. 
Reform, Resistance and Pragmatism 04 
The 'justice versus welfare' debate was ultimately a debate about means 
rather than ends. The radicalism of Longford and the Fabians consisted in the 
novelty of the means they wished to employ to engender social conformity amongst 
the young in a rapidly changing advanced industrial society. The dispute was 
between those who believed that social harmony and conformity could be 
engineered and those who believed it would evolve as a result of the operation 
of the hidden hand of social and economic forces and the imposition of 
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penalties. 
Stripped of their philosophical and theoretical trappings the 
parliamentary politics of the 1960s concerned productivity and conformity. 
The problem presented was to engage education, management and the trade unions 
in a co-operative venture to maximise personal and national productivity. 
In a similar vein communities and social welfare agencies were to engage in a 
co-operative endeavour to create social harmony and conformity. The personal 
social services was one of the means whereby available, but non-conforming, 
human resources might be utilised more effectively in the service of an 
expanding economy. 
If one aspect of the Welfare State emphasised care, the other emphasised 
duty, responsibility, conformity, and the avoidance of waste. The protestant 
ethic, with its emphasis upon duty, responsibility and conformity was alive 
and well in the strong strand of grass-roots Methodism in the Labour Party of 
the 1960s. This was an ethic with a double edge, for in as much as it 
advocated a responsible caring society it wanted that society to be populated 
by responsible careful individuals 
Many Labour MF's remained unimpressed by what they saw as the Fabian 
intellectuals' attempt to excuse the bad behaviour of-the young an, 0 thus promote 
the very irresponsibility they claimed to be curing. In a similar vein 
conventional criminology, who's project had been"to identify that. which was 
peculiar about criminals, complained that the proposals of the 'Child; The 
Family and the Young Offender' White Paper (1965) involved an unjustifiable 
lumping together of the deprived with the depaved, which would stigmatise and 
corrupt the poor but virtuous by thrusting them into close association with the 
feckless and the delinquent. Magistrates who would lose their jobs were 
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appalled by the White Paper. The police, who would lose power, were 
antagonistic. The probation service, which would lose clients, was scathing. 
Lawyers who would lose work, were hostile. The bulk of Conservative MPs did not 
understand the White Paper and did not like it either. 
'The Child, the Family and the Young Offender' proposed the abolition of 
the juvenile court and its replacement by a family panel composed of social 
and psychological experts and social workers. The panel was to act as a 
referring agent to a range of specialised treatment facilities. The White 
Paper proposed an expansion in the numbers and types of people who could 
report children and young people to the panel either because of what the 
youngsters were doing or what was being done to them by others. Teachers, 
youth workers, police officers, social workers, and parents would all save 
access to the panel, its expertise, and its resources. The White Paper 
proposed that the age of criminal responsibility be raised from 10 to 14 
years, but that nobody under 18 should enter a prison department 
establishment. 
In Parliament, the White Paper was seen to be going too far too fast and 
foundered as a result of political resistance, but importantly also as a 
result of lack of parliamentary time to navigate a contentious bill towards 
the statute book. Thus in 1965 the government made a strategic withdrawal and 
returned to the drawing board. Interestingly the Kilbrandon Report (1964) which 
proposed similar changes for Scotland was successful and its proposals were 
incorporated into the 'Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968'. This suggests how 
finely balanced the political forces of the time were on the issue of juvenile 
justice, and how the 1965 White Paper, was perhaps as much a victim of bad 
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timetabling or a lack of a sense of political priority on the part of the 
government, as of political resistance. 
The major thrust of 'The Child, the Family and the Young Offender' was its 
attempt to transform the structure of the juvenile criminal justice system of 
England and Wales. The subsequent 'Children in Trouble' White Paper left the- 
structure intact but attempted instead to transform its functioning. 
In its attempt to ensure a smoother passage for its projected reforms at 
the second attempt, the government leant very heavily upon the expertise of the 
Home Office child-care inspectorate and in particular its Chief Inspector Joan 
Cooper and Derek Morrell the Assistant Under Secretary. These two people, 
committed as they were to a treatment orientation, to a belief that social 
deprivation produced juvenile crime, and to deinstitutionalisation, were the 
major architects of the 'Children in Trouble' White Paper (1968) and the 
'Children and Young Persons Bill' (1969). Cooper and Morrell produced a piece 
of legislation which, while acceptable to political, administrative, and 
professional constituencies, retained the more radical features of the earlier 
attempts at reform. 
Within these more modest confines the 1969 Children and Young Persons Act 
(CYPA) attempted to achieve its radical objectives in three ways., First, it. 
created a buffer, between the juvenile court magistrate and the young offender. 
While the act empowered the magistrate to impose care orders and. supervision 
orders on juvenile offender's the social worker was given complete autonomy ins 
the execution of these orders. Thus if the court imposed a care order, the 
social worker would decide whether the child should be removed from their 
home to a 'Community Home' and if so, for how long. Prior to the act the 
magistrate would simply have imposed an Approved School Order and the child 
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would have been escorted from the court to an approved school. Similarly, 
after the act a magistrate could impose a supervision order but the social 
worker would decide what, if anything, the young person had to do in order to 
comply with that order. Prior to the act the magistrate would have imposed a 
probation order and if the child or young person had failed to comply with the 
conditions of that order, which had been specified by the court, then the 
probation officer, an officer of the court, was required to initiate breach 
proceedings in which the offender would be returned to the court and could be 
sentenced both for the breach of the order and for the original offence. This 
change meant that magistrates could have been placed in a position where they. 
served as mere rubber stamps for social workers and their therapeutic 
intentions. 
Second, the act attempted to curtail the magistrate's power to imprison. 
Prior to the act the magistrate had been able to remit juveniles of 15 and 
over to Crown Court for Borstal sentencing. This was done because magistrates 
were not empowered to sentence juveniles to substantial periods of custody. 
Had the 1969 CYPA been fully implemented nobody under 18 could have been 
remitted to Crown Court for Borstal sentencing and the juvenile would therefore 
have had to be dealt with by the penalties available within the juvenile 
court. 
Meanwhile, of course,. the act set the scene for the abolition of the 
other custodial sentencing option available to the juvenile court, the 
detention centre. It did this by stating that as forms of 'Intermediate 
Treatment' (IT) were developed, so the attendance centre (AC) and the 
detention centre (DC) would be phased out. This 'phasing in' of IT and 
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'phasing out' of the AC and the DC was both politically and practically 
necessary. If the 1965 bill foundered because it went too far too fast, the 
1969 act was offering to go quite far but more slowly. Given that IT existed 
in name only, it was also impractical to substitute a non-existent IT for the 
existing ACs and DCs. What is clear- however, is that if the act had been 
fully implemented then this pincer movement would have completely removed the 
juvenile magistrates' power to imprison. 
Third, the act attempted to minimise r_riminalisation'by raising the age 
of criminal responsibility from 10 to 14. This would have brought Britain 
into line with many other European countries, Italy for example raised the age 
of criminal responsibility from 9 in 1867, and its effect would have been to 
reduce substantially the numbers of children passing through the juvenile court. 
The children diverted from the court by this change were to be dealt with within 
the social welfare apparatus instead. 
The 1969 CYPA represented the high-water mark of more than a decade of 
attempts at reform in the juvenile criminal justice system in England and Wales. 
It was an uneasy compromise between the reformers and their opponents. For the 
proponents of a 'welfare' position it constituted a gain, for the 'justice' 
lobby a loss. Seen in retrospect it appears that lire the treaty, of 
Versailles, the attempt to patch up one struggle'sowed the seeds for the 
next. This struggle took place in 1981/2 and resulted in the 1982 Criminal 
Justice Act. 
The 1969 Act may have been a compromise but it attempted to buy time and to 
create the terrain upon which the struggle for reform could continue. It 
offered a large foot in the door for reformers and it probably did as much as it 
could have done given the political climate in which it was born. The 
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pragmatism of, and the confused and disparate motivations behind, this 
legislative endeavour should not however obscure what was truly radical about 
it. Taken together the provisions of the 1969 Act added up to the abolition of 
imprisonment for children and young people and herein lies its claim to 
radicalism rather than mere novelty. 
The most important thing about the act as it emerged, was not the change 
in the balance between 'welfare' and 'justice' within the juvenile criminal 
justice system, but the change in the balance of central and local government 
control over young offenders and the challenge this posed to the prison. This is 
evidenced by the invention of Intermediate Treatment (IT). It was not the case 
that a thing called Intermediate Treatment had been shown to be more effective 
in terms of reconviction, rehabilitation, or resocialisation. The calf to 
replace imprisonment with IT was not based upon the technical superiority of 
this untried response. Indeed, well into the 1970s large and expensive 
conferences continued to founder upon the question 'What is Intermediate 
Treatment? '. The most significant thing about IT was not what it was but what 
it wasn't. What it wasn't was imprisonment. The other significant thing about 
IT was that it was to be operated by Local Authorities. The importance of the 
'Children in Trouble' White Paper (1968) and the CYPA 1969 lies as much in what 
they don't say as in what they do say. What they do not say, but what gives 
them unity and coherence as a legislative endeavour is that in our dealings with 
children and young people in trouble we do not need prisons. Indeed, we need 
them so little that we don't even need to talk about them. The only points at 
which the Bill and the Act come anywhere near a discussion of the prison is 
where they discuss its alternative. In this they avoid the trap of justifying 
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the alternative in terms of the aims and objectives of the prison. 
The 1969 Act was an attempt to keep the abolition of imprisonment for 
children and young people in England and Wales on the political agenda. It 
came at a time when faith in the capacities of governments to effect positive 
and constructive social betterment was waning and it came too late. 
0 
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Notes on Chapter, One 
1 For a discussion of decriminalisation see Bottoms AE (1974) On the 
decriminalisation of the English juvenile court in Hoad R (ed) 
Crime Criminology and Public Policy, London: Heinemann, pp 319-345 and Clarke 
J (1980), Social Democratic Delinquents and Fabian Families in National 
Deviancy Conference, Permissiveness and Control. London: MacMillan, pp 72-95. 
2 The conceptual and practical pitfalls inherent in the attempt to lump together 
the 'depraved and the deprived' are discussed by Hood R and Sparks RF (1970), 
Key Issues in Criminology, who deploy arguments which are subsequently 
developed by those adopting a 'back to justice' position later in the decade. 
Tauraine A alerts us to the emergence of the 'new working class' and the 
decreasing political significance of the 'old working class' in post-war 
Western European politics. It was this group, the technocrats, intellectual 
labour, with no traditional party-political affiliation which the Wilson 
election campaign of 1964 attempted to address with its scientifically-based 
social democratic basis. 
4 The 'embourgeoisement' debate is best exemplified in the work of Goldthorpe H, 
1964, in Social Stratification in Industrial Society in Halmos P, The' 
Development of Industrial Society, Sociological Review, Monograph No. S, 1964, 
pp. 97-122, and Westergaard's (1968) 'Rediscovery of the Cash Nexus'. 
`' It was of course this assumption that both the cause and the location of 
poverty should be sought in 'pockets' which gave the rationale for the 
development of the Educational Priority Area projects and the Community 
Development Projects and Urban Aid later in the decade. 
6 For a fuller discussion of these developments see David P Moynihan (1969), 
Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding. 
7 This relatively optimistic account contested by Townsend P and Abel Smith B 
(see for example Townsend P Sociology and Social Pcilicy (1975) and Westergaard 
(1968) amongst others who pointed to an alternative tendency towards 
polarisation and social conflict and saw a more profound social change as the 
only solution to a worsening situation. In the event they appear to have had 
a better purchase upon reality. 
The inherent 'respectability' and 'utilitarianism' of the social democratic 
politics of the Labour party is tellingly explored by Taylor, Walton and Young 
(1975), Critical criminology in Britain - review and prospects in Criminall 
Criminology. 
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Chapter Two 
1970-1982: The Rise and Fall of Delinquency Management 
The 'Twentieth-century Dream' has had three central interwoven 
strands: 
1. The belief that, through science and technology, we should be 
able to unlock all the secrets of the universe. We should be 
able to 'master' nature, and thus create a materially secure and 
comfortable life for the majority of mankind; 
2. The Utopian belief that, through drastic social and political re- 
organisation, aided by the greater'use, of State planning, we 
should be able to create an entirely new kind of just, fair and 
equal society; 
3. The belief that through the dismantling of all the old repressive 
'taboos' and conventions of the past - whether in social 
attitudes or the arts - individuals would be able to enjoy a much 
greater degree of freedom and self-realisation. 
The importance of the Seventies was that, in each of these great 
avenues of human exploration, they had marked a 'moment of truth', a 
point at which, more obviously and inescapably than ever before, the 
dream ran out' 
Christopher Booker - The Seventies 
'Internal rather than external conflict could be the concern of the 
decade'. 
JW 
Edward Heath to the UN General 
Assembly, 1970 
An Expanded System 
The Labour government through its policies and legislation had laid the 
ground for a new apparatus of juvenile justice, and in the creation of the Local 
Authority Social Services Departments, the Family Service, had brought into 
being a group of professionals who would operate it. In consequence, the the 
Heath government inherited a substantially expanded set of resources with which 
to pursue its law and order policies and to manage its deviant populations. It 
is interesting that while many conservatives in parliament and beyond bemoaned 
the passing of the 1969 Act, the only parts which the Heath government failed to 
implement were those which would have placed limits upon the resources available 
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to deal with young offenders. It did not raise the age of criminal 
responsibility to 14, ensuring that the supply of young deviants to be dealt 
with was not diminished; it did not phase out the Attendance Centre and the 
Detention Centre in favour of the new 'Intermediate Treatment' (IT) as the Act 
had intended; but it placed no impediment in the way of the development of IT. - 
It did not prevent young people under 18 being sentenced to Borstal training by 
the courts, but it gave social workers the discretion to place these young 
people in the revamped approved school - the Community Home (with Education) 
(CHE). In so doing, it substantially increased the numbers of people who could 
decide whether or not a child should be removed from home. 
In the early 1970s we saw the emergence of a juvenile criminal justice 
system which was not, as the Fabian reformers had hoped, transformed, but 
substantially expanded instead. Those elements of the system which had been 
brought into being by the Act were absorbed into a system of juvenile justice 
which retained its traditional commitment to imprisonment as the ultimate 
disciplinary backstop. It was a system in which more things could be done to 
more young criminals more often than at any time since 1908 when a separate 
system of juvenile justice was formally created in England and Wales. The 
cruellest irony for the reformers was that these new system components had been 
devised in an attempt to stop young people being defined as criminal and thus 
projected into a criminal career. By default or design the reforming endeavours 
of the Fabians had been incorporated into a more pervasive and more punitive 
system of juvenile justice. Social welfare and social work had been annexed and 
put into the service of the law and order state. 
The Restructuring of Welfare 
Heath offered a new, harder version of conservatism to match the starker 
economic realities which followed the short-lived economic boom of the 1960s. 
He had promised to control inflation, the unions, public expenditure, and crime 
and, as we now know, he failed spectacularly in each of these endeavours. The 
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election of Heath in 1970 signalled a shift from government by consent to 
government by constraint. There is of course a profound irony in these 
conservative crusades since, despite the fact that they advance behind the 
banner of 'less government', they are always accompanied by increased state 
interference in the lives of the citizen and increased state expenditure. 
Gough I (1979) has noted that despite changing governments and changing 
ideologies, the proportion of the Gross National Product (GNP) expended by 
the state on welfare, crime control, and industry continued to grow during the 
period in question. 
The Growth of Social Expenditure in the UK 
Percentage of GNP at Factor, Cost 
1910 1921 1931 1937 1951 1961 1971 1975 
Welfare - 1.1 1.8 1.8 4.5 0.3 0.1 1.1 
Health 4.1 5.1 6.0 
Justice and Law 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 ' 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.5 
Industry 1.8 4.5 3.2 2.8 6.9 4.9 6.5 8.3 
Sources: A Peacock and D Wiseman 'The Growth of 
Public Expenditure in the UK', 2nd Edition, 
Allen & Unwin 1966, CSO Social Trends HMSO, Gough 
1979, p. 77 
The significance of this increased expenditure in the sphere of juvenile 
justice lies in the ways in which these increased human and material resources 
were deployed within the revamped juvenile criminal justice system. The non- 
implementation of key sections of the 1969 Children and Young Persons Act and 
the implementation of the 1970 Social Services (Reorganisation) Act created new 
relationships between system components. Thus we must speak of a restructuring 
of state welfare expenditure and not merely of its expansion. This 
restructuring of welfare brought the practice of social work into a relationship 
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of uneasy interdependence with the junior penal system. 
The Struggle for the Delinquent Body 
Social work and the junior, penal system constituted the two aspects of 
the expanded juvenile criminal justice system. While the former offered to 
cure the offender in order to restore him to conformity, the latter strove to 
effect a similar change through punishment. If what followed was a struggle 
for the delinquent body, then it was a struggle, which the junior penal system 
won hands down. 
What we now know is that the 1970s witnessed a massive expansion in the 
numbers of children and young people who were imprisoned. Between 1965 and 
1977 the numbers of young people aged 14 to 17 entering the Detention Centre 
rose from 1,404 to 5,757. In the same period the Borstal population remained 
fairly static but the proportion of 15 to 17 year olds in that population rose 
from approximately 12.37. to over 307.. In 1965 21% of convicted young offenders 
aged 14 to 17 were dealt with by police-administered Attendance Centres and 
prison department administered Detention Centres and Borstals. By 1977 this 
proportion had risen to 38% indicating that during a period which saw the 
unparalleled expansion of social work, its significance as a response to 
juvenile crime declined rapidly. This view is further reinforced when we note 
that the proportion of young offenders being supervised in the community by 
probation officers and, in the wake of the implementation of the 1969 Act, 
social workers, dropped from 18.5% of those convicted in the 10-17 age group in 
1965 to 13.5% in 1977 (Pitts, 1979)1. 
When called upon to explain this rapid and spectacular rise in youth 
imprisonment, governments through the 1970s were content to make vague 
references to the 'crime wave'. The 'crime wave' has been a consistent part 
of the British political landscape in the post-war period. Crime waves are 
however elusive things. They are epidemics which always seem to hove shifted 
just at the moment when governments are about to cure them, yet remarkably 
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they never seem to infect a very large number of people. 
The crime wave which was allegedly afflicting Britain in the early to 
mid-1970s was similarly elusive. At a common sense level one would expect an 
increase in the incarceration of the young to be related to an increase in the 
numbers of young people perpetrating serious offences. When we look at the 
incidence of serious offences for which 14 to 17 year olds were convicted in 
the years 1973 and 1977 the period of the 'crime wave' we find little evidence 
for this. 
CONVICTIONS - 14 to 17 year olds, 1973 and 1977 
Offence 1973 1977 
Violence against the person 5 9283 5,184 
Sexual Offences 804 679 
Robbery 1,312 883 
Burglary 23,459 29,357 
Criminal Damage 9,661' 9,546 
Source: Pitts J 1979 
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It is certainly the case that the period witnessed a remarkable increase 
in the proportion of convicted 14 to 17 year olds entering custody under 
sentence. 
Receipts into custody under sentence 
as a percentage of those found guilty 
Year Male Female 
1967 4.8 0.7 
I 
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1970 6.2 0.8 
1973 8.2 0.9 
1976 10.9 1.3 
Source: Prison Statistics 1977 
That this was an indication of hardening reactions rather than worsening 
crime is evidenced by the fact that young people aged 15 to 17 entering borstal 
in 1976 tended to have substantially fewer previous convictions than their older 
contemporaries or their counterparts of a decade before. 
Borstal Admissions 
No. of previous 1966 1972 1976 1976 
convictions All age groups 15/17 years 
0 166 4% 200 47. 255 4% 255 107.. 
1-2 854 207.. 1,121 20% 1,299 , 20% 841 327. 
3-5 1,989 467.. 1,961 36% 2,730 41% 969 37% 
6-10 1,178 277. 1,880 357.. 2,018 307.. 473 18.47. 
11 + 94 2% 165 37. 215 3% 30 1.0%. 
Total 4,281 99/. 5,327 987. 6,580 98% 2,568 98% 
Source: Prison Statistics, 1977 and Spiers S 15 and 
16 year olds in Borstal, Home Of fice, 
Unpublished, 1977 
In 1977 Spencer Millham stated the matter thus: 
'In 1975 ... some 6000 boys aged between 14 and 16 underwent a spell in Detention Centre. During the same year 1,200 boys aged 15 and 16 
were received into Borstal Institutions. This means that during this 
period more children experienced a spell in security than at any time 
since 1908, a fact emphasised more when we link these figures with the 5,40 juveniles remanded to adult prisons or remand centres'. 
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The facts are fairly clear, but the reasons for, this rennaissance of 
juvenile incarceration in the 1970s became a source of considerable _ 
controversy. 
The 'Justice Backlash' Thesis 
David Farrington (1984) maintains that when considering the statistical 
evidence: 
'A plausible interpretation of these figures is that after the 1969 Act 
was introduced in 1971 the magistrates were avoiding sentences-for which 
social workers were responsible. This led to an increase in the more 
lenient sentences, (discharges and fines), and also in the more severe 
institutional sentences'. 
Here Farrington implies that the increased use of custody for juveniles is 
due to the continuing struggle between 'Welfare' and 'Justice', with justice, in 
10 
the form of the juvenile court magistrates using all the means at its disposal 
to impose its solutions upon the problem of juvenile crime. In this account 
greater severity in sentencing or growing authoritarianism on the part of the 
bench is attributable to the struggle for power and control between social work 
and the juvenile bench. The increase in custodial sentencing is seen as a 
consequence of attempts by the bench to minimise the potential role and function 
of social workers in the court. Social workers are left, it seems, to deal with 
. less problematic offenders and to explore 'prevention' with 'pre-delinquents' or 
youngsters with only a minimal involvement in crime rather than take control of, 
and impose 'welfare' solutions upon, 'hard-core' young offenders. This leads to 
a 'spreading of the net' in which new delinquent, or potentially delinquent 
populations are subjected to state intervention, albeit the intervention of the 
relatively benign social worker. 
Farrington suggests that the juvenile bench initiated a division of labour 
in which it dealt with the bulk of offenders who had traditionally inhabited the 
juvenile court while social work was bequeathed a newly identified, less 
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problematic, population. 
Social work is offered its own sub-system as a consolation prize for, not 
gaining control of the whole system. The statistics suggest that the sub-system 
social work: was bequeathed, the system of preventive intervention, supervision, 
care orders and the CHE was a contracting one. 
The Approved School Order, which could only be imposed by a magistrate was 
replaced, upon the implementation of the 1969 CYPA, by the section 7.7 Care 
Order which gave social workers the power to place juveniles in a CHE. Between 
1965 and 1971 the numbers of young people placed in these institutions rose from 
51821 to 7,543. Following the implementation of the Act on 1 January 1971 and 
the transfer of this power from magistrates to social workers the figure dropped 
gradually to 6,033 in 1977 (Pitts J, 1979). As we have already noted the use of 
Supervision Orders underwent a far more dramatic decline in the period following 
the implementation of the CYPA 1969. 
The 'P'rofessional Entrepreneur ism' Thesis 
The 'justice backlash' thesis locates the cause of the explosion in 
juvenile imprisonment in the 1970s in the behaviour of juvenile court 
r 
magistrates. The 'professional entrepreneurism' thesis, by contrast, locates 
the causes of these unprecedented incarcerations in the behaviour of local 
authority social workers who are, it seems, bent upon an attempt. to annexe 
delinquency as their, on exclusive professional domain. 
Gi11er and Morris (1983) have argued: 
'Increasingly, as the mechanisms of these processes are researched and 
investigated, the traditional ascription of responsibility for these 
results to an unsympathetic magistracy or judiciary cannot be substantiated 
.A fuller picture suggests that the benign and helping agencies can, 
and do (often unwittingly), contribute to the production of punitive 
juvenile justice'. 
pp. 151-2 
The research referred to is research into 7.7 Care Orders and the frequency 
with which social workers place juveniles in CHEs, and research into social 
workers' recommendations to magistrates in cases where custodial sentences are 
imposedd (Lupron C and Roberts G, 1982). The former research contends that a 
substantial section of the CHE population should not be so confined since 
according to a strict reading of the conditions of a 7.7 Care Order the order 
should not have been imposed in the first place. The latter research indicates 
a fairly close correspondence, up to 70%, between social workers recommendations 
and magistrates eventual disposals. The implication of this research is that- 
social workers recommendations may have a significant impact upon magistrates' 
decisions. What is obvious, but sometimes overlooked, is that in all cases in 
which a care order or a custodial sentence is imposed, it is the magistrate who 
either imposes the order or sentence, or remits juveniles to a higher court for 
sentencing. 
Morgan (1981) in pursuing the 'professional entrepreneurism' thesis, runs 
the risk of confusing the respective roles of magistrates and social workers in 
precisely this way. In her attempt to implicate social workers as the major 
force behind the growth in incarceration. Morgan's distaste for 'pinko_ 
liberals' and her mistaken belief that secure residential and penal 
establishments are primarily populated by 'dangerous, repeated, or serious 
delinquents' adds fire to her prose; even if it does make for a somewhat 
misleading argument: r 
'It is part of the progressive folklore typified in the Guardian and 
New Society that responsibility for the expansion of secure places or 
'intensive care' is to be laid at the door of the public's and the 
magistrates' intolerance of dangerous, repeated or serious. delinquents. 
Both are accused of converting the care order into an instrument of 
punishment and public protection. However, this ignores the fact that 
transferral within the care system is completely dependent upon the 
evaluations and decisions of its own staff'. 
Morgan, 1981, p. 57 
Here again the argument is actually about care and not imprisonment, and it 
is actually about what happens after a magistrate has imposed a 7.7 Care Order. 
To argue that the imposition of a Care Order by magistrates may make possible, 
or set in train, certain actions or processes which lead to greater levels of 
control is not the same as arguing that social workars carry the major 
responsibility for the initial imposition of controlling orders or, sentences. 
A central problem for the Professional Entrepreneurism thesis is that it 
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fails to account for the diminishing significance of social work and social 
workers in the British juvenile criminal justice system in the 1970s. 
This again is all fairly obvious and yet these arguments are used by the 
proponents of the 'professional entrepreneurism' thesis as a rationale for a 
reversion to a strictly judicial system of juvenile justice from which social 
workers would be effectively banned. 
If one attempts to achieve a synthesis of these two positions in order to 
get closer to the truth, a third thesis suggests itself. 
Tha 'Collusion and Cock-up' Thesis 
This thesis is most clearly stated by Thorpe (et al) (1980) who argue that: 
'It was the decision-makers - policemen, social workers, probation 
officers, magistrates and social services administrators who effectively 
abandoned whatever potential for reform the 1969 Children and Young Persons 
Act contained. Quite simply, cumulatively these disparate bodies of 
professionals made the wrong decisions about the wrong children at the 
wrong time'. 
Thorpe et al, 1980, p. 3 
This is an attractive thesis in its commonsense simplicity but sadly, like 
the other two theses, it ignores government and the role of the state in 
elaborating both an ideology and an apparatus of youth control. It was not 
social workers or magistrates who planned. and built 'thLh new secure units in 
community homes in the 1970s, it was the government. It was not social workers 
or magistrates who expanded the numbers of places in Borstals and detention 
centres, it was the government. It was not social workers or magistrates who. 
from 1972 instituted cutbacks in social welfare expenditure which resulted in 
thousands of young people who were the subjects of supervision orders remaining 
unsupervised, it was the government. Most importantly, it was not social 
workers or magistrates who failed to implement those sections of the 1969 CYPA 
which would have effectively prevented the imprisonment of children and young 
people, it was the Heath, Wilson, Callaghan and Thatcher governments. Parker 
(1980) identifies the increased power given by governments to magistrates as a 
key factor in the move towards greater authoritarianism in the juvenile criminal 
justice system in Britain in the 1970s: 
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The potential social work influence in criminal proceedings ... is not 
crucial however and the probation role in court merely aggravated and 
failed to check the court's punitiveness rather than caused it ... The 
scapegoating of social work has been propagandist, diverting attention away 
from the fact that power is vested in the police and magistrates who have 
been using it in a similar way to produce the punitive disposal patterns of 
the past decade. The critique of the social welfare component of juvenile 
justice by radical criminologists (see Taylor 1978) and liberal reformers 
like Morris and tiller has perhaps colluded with this misrepresentation of 
social work influence in criminal proceedings. Indeed, as the powers of 
lay magistrates and their armoury of disposals via more attendance centres 
and even harsher detention centres are extended, the marginal influence of 
social workers and probation officers will become even more apparent ... 
In part this is made possible by the erosion of due process and its 
restructuring by court workers to allow psqudo legitimacy to extraneous 
social and moral judgements. Furthermore the passive performance of many 
solicitors and probation officers allows this production to continue 
unchecked'. 
p. 259 
Criminologists looking for explanations of the 1970s juvenile imprisonment 
bonanza seem to search endlessly amongst the actors within the system for the 
culprits. it is almost as if government stands like a concerned anxious but 
powerless parent on the sidelines of the juvenile justice system. The target of 
criticism is always these low-level agents of control, the mistakes they made, 
and the unintended consequences of their actions. Similarly the target for 
intervention and change is always the behaviour of these 'zoo-keepers' of 
2 deviance`. The fact that they are employed by somebody to do something and that 
the something which they do fits into a much broader set of political and 
bureaucratic arrangements is ignored. Commenting upon a previous generation of 
criminologists, Matza D (1969) observed that: 0 
'Their contributions were to be absorbed into a tradition of enquiry whose 
first premise was the separation of crime and the state; thus the 
absorption was not without a certain measure of distortion or misfit. Left 
unassaulted, the historic misconception of the positive school - the 
separation of crime and state - could remain the cornerstone of a 
sociological study of deviation that heeded the possibility that the 
correctional system's effects sometimes boomeranged. But as long as the 
misconception was maintained, such a possibility could be regarded as 
easily rectified, instead of a profound irony lodged in the very nature of 
the intimate relation between crime and the state'. 
Matta D, p. 144 
Meanwhile, back at number 10 
a 
Back at number 10 in 1970 the Heath administration was attempting to work 
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out what 'getting tough on law and order' meant. It seemed clear that the moral 
fibre of the country had to be refurbished and that things, particularly 
economic things, were getting out of control, but to identify a problem is not 
to find its solution. Unsurprisingly the Heath administration began to rework 
neo-classicism in order to come up with a criminal justice strategy. 
Whereas the Wilson administration was concerned to identify and eradicate 
the social causes of crime, the criminal justice strategy which emerged from the 
Heath administration emphasised the more efficient, effective, and economic use 
of the apparatus of detection deterrence and rehabilitation. This changed 
strategy reflected not only the radical change in political ideology but also a 
change in the kinds of people who were influencing policy. Harold Wilson had 
surrounded himself with academic experts in psychology, sociology, and social 
policy. Edward Heath tended to turn to barristers, policemen, and accountants 
for his advice. 
As James Q Wilson (1978) has observed, the problem with seeking advice from 
academic sociologists or criminologists is that their stock in trade is the 
pursuit of ultimate causes. He writes: 
'But ultimate causes cannot be the object of policy, efforts precisely 
because, being ultimate, they cannot be changed. 'For example, ' 
criminologists have shown beyond doubt that men commit more crimes than 
women, and younger men more (of certain kinds) than older ones. It is a 
theoretically important and scientifically correct observation. Yet it 
means little for policy-makers concerned with crime prevention, since men 
cannot be changed into women or made to skip over the adolescent years'.. 
p. 50 
While Wilson fails to observe that an understanding of ultimate causes is 
in fact extremely useful to governments which want to effect radical social 
change he expresses very succinctly the spirit o4 scepticism which affected 
governmental crime control strategies through the 1970s. It stands in stark 
contrast with the Wilsonian spirit of optimism of the 1960s. It is pragmatic, 
policy-orientated and concerned with what can be done now rather than what 
should be done eventually. It is part of a broader philosophical gnd 
ideological change which affected reformers and their reactionary adverseries 
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alike and seemed at times as if it would bring the political programmes of the 
right and the left to a point of convergencePT3PT. 
The Heath criminal justice strategy was concerned with the causes of crime 
only to the extent that an understanding of causes would suggest policy 
initiatives which would lead to the more effective containment of crime and 
criminals. 
While accepting the need for 'treatment' for some people the strategy 
retained its commitment to the due process of law and the necessity of 
punishment as a means whereby the rational citizen might be encouraged to 
conform. Young offenders were not seem simply as the victims of deprivation as 
they had been by the Fabians. Some were, but a majority were rational choice: _ 
making individuals for whom the penalty was part of the calculation of the 
advisability of the deviant enterprise. There were therefore two types of 
creature to whom the system must respond. One, whose behaviour was determined 
by factors beyond his control, and another whose actions were freely chosen in 
the knowledge of their likely consequences. Classical actors in a classical 
social drama. 
Any criminal justice strategy therefore needed to contain both that which 
could respond to the actor who's rationality was impäirled by social, emotional 
or material deprivation, and that which could respond to the rational, 
calculating actor. In the hands of the Heath administration neo-classicism cast 
off the radical imbalance placed upon it by the Fabians and reverted'to its more 
traditional form. It was humane where humanity was warranted and severe where 
severity was necessary. It was also potentially very expensive because it would 
require the expansion of both the welfare services and the junior penal system, 
and this posed a serious problem for a government committed to reducing 
government expenditure. This expansion was necessitated because Heath had made 
an election pledge to do what previous post-war governments had failed to do. 
He had pledged that he would do something about the 
. 
crime-wave'. 
'Community Corrections' for a crumbling prison 
i 
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Heath's major initiative in the sphere of justice was embodied in the 1972 
Criminal Justice Act, and the Younger Report (1974). The 1972 Act increased 
minimum penalties for the offences of violent offences while reducing penalties 
for drunks and fine defaulters. 
The Act introduced Community Service Orders and Day Training Centres as 
alternatives to custody for adults and these alternatives were to be supervised 
by the probation service. Power was given to Probation Committees to create 
Bail Hostels, Probation Hostels, and Probation Homes. Simultaneously Mark 
Carlisle, the Home Secretary announced a 30Y. increase in probation officers 
salaries and increased the number of trainee places from 200 for 1972 to 600 for 
1975. At a NACRO AGM in 1972 Carlisle spoke of the probation service as the 
central pillar of government crime control strategies for the next 20 years. 
In 1974 the government introduced the Younger Report - Young Adult 
Offenders. Younger proposed a mode of 'reinforced supervision' in which 
probation officers were to be given the power to return clients to secure 
'houses' in the community for brief spells of custody if they violated the very 
tight conditions of their order. 
The 1972 CJA and the Younger recommendations wer, e'to be the. mechanisms 
whereby the Heath government would develop its community correctional system, a 
system aimed at the efficient, cost-effective management of law-breakers. This 
initiative signalled the beginning of a new era in government responses to 
crime. It marked the advent of 'delinquency management' which was to reach its 
fullest flower in the juvenile criminal justice system a little later in the 
decade. 
The development of a community correctional system was in no small part a 
response to the problem of the prison. British prisons from the early 1960s, at 
least, had been in a state of crisis. They were chronically over-crowded, 
staggeringly expensive, and on the face of it they systematically worsened the 
problem to which they were allegedly a solution. British Home Secretaries in 
the 1970s and 1980s have had a very difficult job. As politicians they have 
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found it politically necessary to pledge themselves to 'no-nonsense get-tough' 
policies on crime and criminals. As administrators of a prison system which 
seems to hover constantly on the verge of collapse however, they have had to 
devise strategies which will save this teetering system from the consequences of 
the success of their 'get-tough' policies. One almost instinctive political 
response to this problem has traditionally been the promise of new prisons. 
New Home Secretaries have entered with the promise of new prisons whilst 
simultaneously bemoaning the necessity for them.. The promise of new prisons is 
couched in humanitarian terms: 'We cannot expect even criminals to live in these 
Victorian conditions'. It is couched in scientific terms: 'Experience and 
research leads us to anticipate a '%% growth in the prison population through the 
1990s'. It is couched in moral terms in which a responsibility to offer 
protection to the community and to respond to the legitimate demands of the 
courts, is emphasised. 
New Home Secretaries tend to ignore, and are as a consequence confounded by 
the only three immutable criminological truths we know, and they are that the 
prison will cost at least half as much again as the figure quoted by the time it 
is built, that it will be full within two years, and that"no old prisons will be 
closed. 
With the 1972 Act, Heath's administration attempted to move beyond this 
time-honoured, but essentially rhetorical response to the problem by instituting 
a system of delinquency management. This development had five essential 
features: Repoliticisation, Bifurcation, The restoration of the prisoner to the 
community, The imposition of the prison upon the community, and Annexation. 
Repoliticisation 
Whereas Harold Wilson's administration attempted to remove crime from the 
political arena and re-describe it as social pathology, Heath restored crime to 
the realm of morality. Wilson's criminals were a residual population of social 
casualties, victims of an inequitable social order which the new socialism had 
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all but vanquished. Heath's crminals were, by contrast, frequently parasites 
and subversives, only a minority of whom were not responsible for their 
behaviour. They were testimony to what happened when an over-developed welfare 
state took away personal responsibility, dignity, and motivation. 
Heath's assault upon crime was an assault upon one crucial aspect of a much 
broader problem which was seen to create not only crime, but industrial strife 
and inflation as well. The broader problem was that too much state intervention 
in the lives of citizens in the post-war period had made us soft and had 
therefore produced the conditions for economic decline. We were living in the 
'something for nothing' society. This was why industry was not competitive. 
This was why our growth rate was so low and our inflation rate so high. We 
needed to 'slim down'. 'Dead wood' had to be 'cut away'. 
Conservative governments in the 1970s and 1980s, however sophisticated they 
might be in other respects, are ensnared by 'conservative theory's' explanation 
of economic decline. This is an explanation which is an article of faith for 
the panty's rank and file. It is an explanation which transforms economic into 
moral problems. Within this theory there is always the mob which is not 
prepared to do a fair day's work for a fair day's päy and constantly threatens 
to wrest the legitimately acquired wealth of the responsible and prosperous away 
from. them either by excessive pay claims or by robbery. Indeed,, many of those 
who write regularly to the Daily Telegraph are either unwilling or Unable to 
draw a distinction between these two activities. 
Conservative assaults upon crime are a powerful political symbol of 
governmental determination to attack the pervasive social malaise of decadence 
which is seen to have afflicted the mob. 'Law and order' means more than law 
and order for Conservative governments, it means 'defending civilisation as we 
know it from anarchic mob rule'. For Conservatives, crime is the symbolic key 
to the problem of economic decline and crime control must always be a-central 
political plank for a Conservative government in periods of economic crisis. 
For Edward Heath the repoliticisation of crime was unavoidable. 
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Bifurcation4 
Bifurcation is a mechanism whereby governments can have their law and order 
cake while they eat their public expenditure one too. The 1972 Criminal Justice 
Act extended penalties for possession and use of firearms and other violent 
offences thus demonstrating a commitment to tough punitive responses. Meanwhile 
it reduced penalties for drunkenness and fine defaulting with the consequence 
that these offenders spent far less time, or indeed no time at all, in jail. A 
bifurcated policy allows governments to get tough and soft simultaneously. It 
requires a redescription of the deviant population in which a few offenders will 
be described as more dangerous and threatending and will therefore be subject to 
higher levels of attention and intervention, while a larger group will be 
redescribed as less threatening and as such not meriting the harsh punishments 
to which they were previously subjected. this clears the way for either taking 
this larger, newly-defined group out of the prison altogether or, at least, 
reducing the sentences that they will receive, thus effectively reducing the 
prison population. 
Bifurcated policies are often part of a strategy to develop non-custodial 
alternatives since if the previously imprisoned group can be redescribed as 
relatively innocuous, judges will, it is argued, be more inclined to return them 
to the community and the community will be more inclined to accept them. Part 
of the purpose of bifurcation then is to move certain categories of offender 
back towards a relative 'normalisation'. These policies are a way in which the 
pressures upon the prison ano the costs of imprisonment are reduced while 
governments may still claim to be getting tough on law and order. 
It goes without saying that those offenders who are selected to undertake 
the harsher punishments feel more than a little aggrieved by bifurcated 
'policies. Since, however, these policies are primarily informed by political 
pragmatism and an attempt to minimise state expenditure, little heed is paid to 
the gross injustices which they require. 
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The restoration of the prisoner to the community 
One of the saddest features of the British penal system is that a 
substantial minority of prisoners are in prison because they have nowhere else  
to live. A few actually commit offences in order to take advantage of the 
comfort and security offered by the prisons. Thus the introduction in the 1972 
CJ Act of Bail Hostels, Probation Hostels and Probation Homes, must be seen as a 
progressive measure whereby. the need for accommodation could be met without the 
necessity of imprisonment. this was an important attempt to restore the 
prisoner to the community6. 
The case of the Community Service Order, and Day Training is slightly 
different. If it could be demonstrated that everybody who was sentenced to 
community service or day-training would otherwise have been imprisoned then one 
might sustain the argument that here was a further example of the restoration of 
the prisoner to the community. If however Community Service and Day Training 
emerged as sentences which subjected offenders who would previously have 
received a lesser penalty to greater levels of surveillance, intervention, and 
control then we would have to conclude that we were witnessing the imposition of 
the prison upon the community. 
The imposition of the prison upon the community 
The reality is that Community Service and Day Training were very ambiguous 
additions to the sentencing repertoire. Research suggests that in as much as 
Community Service has diverted about half of its clients from prison the other 
half would not have received'a custodial sentence anyway. As a decarcerating 
strategy Community Service must thus far be viewed as a 'goalless draw'. 
If community service and Day Training inadvertantly imposed the prison upon 
the community in the form of higher levels of surveillance intervention and 
control, the Younger recommendations strove to introduce a prison regime into 
the community in very explicit ways. One of these ways was to transform the 
probation officer into a peripatetic prison warder and it was this proposal, to 
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annexe the probation service to undertake these new surveillance and control 
functions, which gave rise to the 'screws on wheels' controversy. 
Annexation 
Annexation involves the attempt to annexe agencies, practices and 
practitioners who have a degree of autonomy from central government. in order to 
use them to implement the intentions of central government in very specific 
ways. Had the Younger recommendations been implemented the role of the 
probation officer would have been transformed to resemble that of the American 
parole officer. Younger received support from the upper eschelons of the 
probation service since it offered a further vehicle for expansion of the 
service. The rank and file were almost universally opposed, arguing the case 
for professional autonomy and a committment to the best interest of the client. 
They refused to have their social work-based activity annexed and their 
professional autonomy constrained in the service of such intense levels of 
control and surveillance. 
The National Association of Probation Officers rejoinder to Younger (1975) 
states: r 
'An examination of recent devleopments in the service suggests that a 
corollary of increasing control over the client is increasing control over 
the Probation Officer by management'. 
The Younger report marked the point beyond which probation officers were. 
not prepared to go in helping the government impose the prison upon the 
community. They resisted annexation and so the Younger proposals foundered7. 
'Community Corrections' for a crumbling Borstal8 
While the 1972 Criminal Justice Act and the Yunger Report were not 
concerned specifically with juvenile justice they were designed as a response to 
a crisis in the prison occasioned in no small part by an influx of young 
prisoners under 25 years of age. We have already noted that the Bgrstal changed 
in the period 1965 to 1977 from an institution which catered primarily for the 
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17 to 21 age group to one, which in 1977 had a 15 and 16 year old population of 
at least 30%. This effective annexation of one third of all Borstal places by 
the juvenile criminal justice system meant that an increasing proportion of 
young people of 17 and over were being forced up into the adult system. 
The response of Younger and the 1972 Act was to create a system in which 
the prison was surrounded by a set of ancillary institutions and practices which 
offered differential levels of surveillance and control. This was precisely the 
model which the imposition of the remnants of the 1969 CYPA upon the existing 
juvenile criminal justice system had created. 'By the mid to late 1970s, the 
adult and juvenile justice systems were attempting to develop virtually 
identical strategies in order to manage an expanding population of identified 
young offenders more effectively. While the juvenile system placed greater 
emphasis upon the deprivation of its subjects the mechanisms through which these 
subjects were processed were strikingly similar. 
In the adult system the integration of community corrections and the prison 
was made easier because all the system components came under the control of the 
Home Office. The juvenile justice system by contrast was comprised of: (a) 
r 
prisons controlled by the Home Office, (b) Attendancb centres controlled by 
local education authorities, (c) CHE's, remand and assessment centres and field 
social workers controlled by local authorities and (d) community. correctional 
facilities controlled by local authorities and voluntary organisations. Thus 
the attempt to produce analogous adult and juvenile justice systems required 
central government intervention in the functioning of local authorities and the 
voluntary sector. As the 1970s progressed we witnessed the Heath, Callaghan and 
Thatcher governments attempting to exert more and more control over those 
elements of the juvenile criminal justice system which were the responsibility 
of local authorities and the voluntary sector9. Although there was a change of 
government in 1974 the policies and initiatives of the Heath administration were 
not seriously modified by the Labour administrations of Wilson and Callaghan in 
the period 1974 to 1979. They showed no enthusiasm for attempting to 
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resuscitate the badly mauled 1969 Act. The political tide had turned and the 
spirit of the times was against such idealistic social engineering. Seemingly 
we were all hard-headed delinquency managers now, and besides, being a Labour 
government and a law and order government seemed less contradictory in 1974 than 
it had done in 1969. 10 
We can observe the processes of Repoliticisation, Bifurcation, The 
restoration of the prisoner to the community, The imposition of the prison upon 
the community, and Annexation, at work in the juvenile criminal justice system 
of the mid 1970s. 
Repolitir_isation 
In 1975 the Expenditure Committee on the working of the 1969 Chilären and 
Young Person's Act reported. The preoccupation of the report was political 
rather than financial. It stated that the Act had not been wholly effective in 
'differentiating between children who need care, welfare, better education, and 
more support and the small minority who do need control and an element of 
punishment'. David Farrington (1984) notes: 
'Less than three years after the Act was brought into effect (in December 1973) the House of Commons Expenditure Committee began an inquiry into its 
working ... the inquiry was based on the'ässumption that the Act was not 
working although no evidence was quoted in favour of this. The membership 
of the Committee (set up under a Conservative government) included at least 
two former magistrates and one former manager of an approved school, but. 
nobody with close working or personal connections with the social work 
profession or social service departments'. 
p. 85 
This spectre of a band of sophisticated committed young criminals whom no 
amount of kindness will touch has loomed in the reports of all law and order 
governments, all the manifestos of authoritarian moral crusaders, all the 
speeches of those who wish to make this 'once great country of ours great 
once more', and all the writings of right-wing conspiracy theorists 
They are never named, they are never counted, they are never located in 
time and place, and they are always on the increase. They are the 'hard core', 
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they are that 'certain element', they are the 'trouble makers', they are the 
'ringleaders', they are the ones without whom the others would not do it. They 
have been with us for hundreds of years but they are always a contemporary 
phenomenon. They are the example par excellence of what is going wrong in our 
society. They are the ones which the hard edge of bifurcated crime control - 
policies are going to fix11. 
Bifurcation 
This bifurcation of children and young people in trouble provides evidence 
of governmental toughness while the way is cleared for reshaping child-care and 
custodial provision in response to economic reality. The 1976 White Paper which 
followed the Expenditure Committee Report is a useful illustration of these 
processes at work. There are three significant government decisions in the 
White paper. 
The first is that magistrates should be able in certain cases, to recommend 
to a local authority what it should do with a child including a recommendation 
for secure accommodation (para 27) and that the government would use its powers 
under the 1975 Children Act to make direct grants td local authorities to build 
more secure accommodation in community homes (para 42). This is an attempt to 
resolve the financial problems of local authorities by offering"enhanced 
resources for extending prison-like provision and marks an important central 
government intervention into the sphere of local government. 
The second decision is that the educational welfare service should be 
empowered to take responsibility for children under supervision whose main 
difficulty is their refusal to go to school (para 65). The White Paper 
questions the assumption that persistant truants are in need of care and control 
(para 71). It is interesting to note that a high proportion of children and 
young people in CHEs, at that time had committed relatively few offences but 
were detained primarily on the grounds that they were persistent non-school 
attenders. Had this attempted normalisation and redistribution of truants been 
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successful it would have resulted in a substantial reduction in the demand for 
CHE places thus hastening their eventual demise. This discussion of truancy 
took, place against the backdrop of a burgeoning 'out of school' industry in 
which off-site units and alternatives to formal schooling were mushrooming. 
The third decision requires that non-residential treatment, such as 
intermediate treatment schemes, day care, supervision, and fostering, should be 
given priority by local authorities (para 61). It-is also suggested that local 
authorities should consider using CHEs for day as well as residential care. 
Thus the decarcerating thrust of the second and third decisions should 
theoretically at least more than compensate in financial terms for the increased 
costs necessitated by the first decision. David Ennals, 'the Home Secretary 
speaking in 1977 at a NACRO AGM contrasted the #34,000 spent on 100 children 
engaged in intermediate treatment with the #2000,000 spend on 700 children in 
residential care. Bifurcation holds out the possibility of substantial 
economies which hard-pressed local authorities recoiling from wave after wave of 
government spending cuts were very keen to make. Thus there was a calculating 
edge to the humanitarian endeavour to restore the prisoner to the community. 
I. 
0 
.0 
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'What does this mean in terms of money and other resources? Islington 
councillors and officers were forced last year (1976) into some fresh 
thinking as we were faced with the horrifying cost of residential 
provisions of all sorts. We concluded by agreeing to close two childrens 
homes, change the character of two others and to transfer part of the 
revenue savings into increased votes for the community-based provision of 
fostering and Intermediate Treatment ... Our Intermediate Treatment 
projects vote is increased to #10,000 which we hope will be our 25 percent 
contribution to an Urban Aid grant'. 
Mrs Page, Chair, Islington Social Services 
Committee 1977 (DHSS, 1977) 
Bifurcation may have offered a solution to some financial problems for some 
interest groups in the juvenile criminal justice. system in Britain in the mid- 
1970s but it did not solve the problem at which the policy was aimed, namely the 
problem of a collapsing penal system. There is a recurring problem with 
bifurcated policies of crime control which each government adopting them seems 
to have to discover afresh. Box and Hale (1986) point out the ways in which 
magistrates and judges have routinely subverted government attempts to limit 
incarseration. In the contemporary period, although drunkenness and 
prostitution are no longer imprisonable offences, the bench and the judiciary 
have responded by imposing exorbitant fines and this has resulted in offenders 
being imprisoned for non-payment. The Green Paper on weekend imprisonment drew 
the rejoinder from the Magistrates Association that they would use such 
provision as an additional penalty rather than as an alternative to full-time 
imprisonment. This was the dilemma that Heath and the subsequent labour 
administration faced. They developed bifurcated policies to allow them to 
manage larger populations of delinquents more economically and more effectively 
but were either unwilling or unable to control the major power-holders in the 
system, the bench and the judiciary. 
The problem seems to be that governments have given magistrates and judges 
two messages. Home Secretaries as politicians have said we must get tough, 
while Home Secretaries as penal administrators have said we must limit custodial 
confinement. The bench and the judiciary have always responded to the first 
message and ignored the second. The fate of 'delinquency managers'. large and 
small in the post-1969 period, has been sealed by the legal establishment. 
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The restoration of the prisoner to the community 
At first sight, the fact that in 1976/77 8,000 children and young people . 
participated in schemes of intermediate treatment, the measure which was to 
replace the attendance centre and the detention centre, might lead us to believe 
that we were witnessing decarseration on a large scale. In fact of this 8,000 a 
substantial majority were aged 8 to 15 years and only a small minority were 
subject to a court order. As such they were not a population in any serious 
danger or entering the care of custody systems. By the mid 1970s, IT was being 
used as a catch-all for social compensation, compensatory education, personal 
growth, therapy, outdoor activity holidays for children with no money, and here 
and there and from time to time as an alternative to custody. It is not 
therefore possible to argue that in mid-1970s IT represented a decarcerating 
endeavour. It resembled instead a patchwork of often quite interesting 
explorations in work with deprived, neglected and mildly delinquent children and 
young people. The children who were being decarcerated were those placed in 
residential care for reasons other than delinquency. What frustrated many 
practitioners in the field of Intermediate Treatment was that IT was making no 
effective impact upon the imprisonment of juveniles. This concern was echoed in 
government and resulted in the establishment of a working party at the Personal 
Social Services Council which, in 1977, published 'A Future for Intermediate 
Treatment'. 
The future envisaged by the report coincided at certain points'with the 
ethos and methods of the ill-fated Younger Report (1974). The most significant 
contributions made by the report are the suggested re-introduction of legal 
controls and sanctions into the conditions of an Intermediate Treatment 
requirement imposed upon a juvenile by the court, and the re-definition of IT's 
potential client population. Section 8 of the report is entitled 'Intensive 
Intermediate Treatment. A Provision for the Persistently Delinquent'. 
The report suggests that Intensive IT might well pose an alternative for 
some young people who were at the time languishing in CHEs, borstals, and 
detention centres, and correctly notes that many were there as the result of a 
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tariff system in which a string of minor offences resulted in custodial 
disposals, irrespective of the needs or problems of the child or the suitability 
of his or her home circumstances. Intensive IT, to paraphrase the report, would 
have two components. The child would go from the court to the IT centre where 
he or she would reside for two weeks. During this time the 'programme' for the 
second component, daycare, will be devised and 'the parameters of acceptable 
behaviour and control both during the residential placement and the daily 
programme of intermediate treatment' will be agreed 'by all concerned'. There 
will, the report suggests, probably be a need for some 'preparation of attitude' 
during this residential period. Should this preparation not be wholly 
successful and the subject experience 'problems in his personal, family, or 
school life' or if difficulties are being encountered in meeting the 
requirements of his 'programme' he or she can be taken back into residence for 
'a more total form of care and supervision' to 'provide the support needed'. 
The subjects progress would be supervised by one team member, who would ensure 
the subject's attendance and exert day to day control. 
'A Future for Intermediate Treatment' was produced by a group of people 
noted for their progressive, and indeed, in certain cases radical, views about 
children and young people in trouble and their needs. The report was first and 
foremost however a tactical attempt to get IT off the sidelines and back into 
the law and order game. Intensive Intermediate Treatment was to be the Trojan 
horse which would get radical liberals inside the walls of the law and order 
state. 
The model of IIT developed in the report resembles very closely the 
California Youth Authority Probation Subsidy Project. This was the model which 
had inspired the Younger Report (1974) and found favour with the Heath 
government, since on the face of it, it appeared to be. the perfect mechanism 
whereby one might appear tough while simultaneously., curbing the rush of young 
offenders into the prison'`. One of the central aims of the Probation Subsidy 
project had been to encourage the courts to divert offenders away from the 
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prison to a community project and in so doing, to divert some of the money 
saved, away from the prison in the form of a subsidy to fund the project. The 
project was concerned with changing behaviour. It strove firstly to change the 
behaviour, 0of judges by offering inducements and secondly to change the behaviour 
of offenders by threatening penalties. 
IIT was not going to be sold to children, their families, or their social 
workers on the basis of a voluntary agreement as earlier government 
pronouncements on IT had envisaged. It was going to be sold to juvenile court 
magistrates, and judges. It was to be sold on the basis that if it were to work 
then magistrates must have the power to enforce the conditions of the offenders 
supervision order and that this would involve legal sanctions. The FSSC report 
recommended that the law be changed so that, where a supervision order arose 
from criminal proceedings, the subject could be taken back to court for breaches 
of the conditions'of the order. The 1977 Criminal Law Act gave the courts the 
power to fine a young person for a breach of an intermediate treatment 
requirement, or in the case of a boy, to send him to an attendance centre. 
The anus of intervention switches from the needs of the child or young 
person to his or her social obligations. As part and parcel of this the report 
distances itself from questions of need and therapy and moves instead to a 
paramount concern with behaviour. Nobody is going to be psychoanalysed in IIT, 
they will be too busy pulling up their socks. This marks an important shift 
away from interventions which had implicity or explicity identified the mind as 
the site of change. Now 'it was the body or the actions of the body which came 
increasingly under professional scrutiny. Cohen S (1983) has observed that: 
'Here is where the new behaviourism appears: it offers the modest 
prospect of changing behaviours rather than people, of altering 
situations and physical environments rather than the social order. 
To be sure, the pure Skinnerian model was a highly ambitious one: a 
totally synhronised and predicable environment. But the realists of 
crime control will settle for a derivative pragmatic version, sharing 
with the original a refusal to accept consciousness as a variable. As 
long as people behave themselves, something will be achieved. The 
vision is quite happy to settle for sullen citizens performing their 
duties and not having insights'. 
p. 124 
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The objects of intervention are no longer Longford's psychologically 
impaired working class children. The new offender is the young citizen 
motivated by the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain who has reneged 
on his end of the social contract. The response is to elaborate around the 
offender an apparatus of rewards and punishments which will offer a direct 
lesson in the value of conformity. The object of the reformers endeavours in 
the juvenile criminal justice system in Great Britain in the mid 1970s comes 
once again to resemble the object of the justice system of Great Britain in the 
late 1790s - classical man. Reformers no longer seek the social or 
psychological causes of offending, for in this model there is no mystery 
surrounding deviant motivation. The offender effects choices, possibly upon the 
basis of imperfect information, but choices nonetheless. Young offenders make a 
rational calculation and then act. The task of the delinquency manager is to 
inject a sufficient measure of pain into the equation to dissuade the would-be 
deviant. The task of radical liberal reformers is to annexe what they might of 
the apparatus and minimise the harm done by official intervention in the lives 
of young offenders. The site of reform moves from intervention in the social 
factors which predispose young people to crime, to intervention in the system 
and its apparatus in order to restore the prisoner tb the community. 
The imposition of the prison upon the community. 
We have noted already the ambiguous nature of community correctional 
0 
endeavours, and IIT was, and is, not immune from this ambiguity. The problem 
with Trojan horses, to mix a metaphor, is that they have a nasty habit of 
turning around and biting the hand which carved them. 
The problem once again is that if we wish to take the offender from the 
prison then we have to appear to be taking something of the prison with us into 
the communtiy. As would-be reformers we find ourselves always justifying the 
alternative in terms of the aims and objectives of the prison. We find 
ourselves constructing an alternative which apes the prison in its attempts to 
gain credibility with the bench and the judiciary. We build a bridge over which 
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we hope the prisoners will rush from the prison to the community but we do this 
with no guarantees and no promises from the magistrates, the judges and the 
politicans who have the power to make our ambitions a reality. We undertake our 
endeavours in the shadow of the prison which stands at the end-point of social 
discipline, doors open, anticipating our failure. 
As Intensive Intermediate Treatment developed through the late 1970s the 
population of juveniles in prisons continued to grow. As this population became 
demonstrably less delinquent so the alternative was of necessity applied to even 
less delinquent offenders in an attempt to keep them in the community. In so 
doing the prison was imposed more effectively upon the community. 
Annexation 
0 
From its inception Intermediate Treatment was an instrument whereby central 
government attempted to annexe bits of social welfare, and educational provision 
which had previously had nothing to do with crime and offending, for its own law 
and order purposes. The DHSS booklet (1972, pp. 13-14) identified the object of 
treatment as bringing 'the child into contact with a different environment' to 
help him form new personal relationships', participate its 'constructive 
activities of a social, educational or therapeutic nature', in fact anything 
which would be 'beneficial to his development as an individual and as a member 
of society'. These aims were to be achieved by allowing 'delinquents' to 
participate in activities available to 'normal' children and young people. The 
intention was that participants should be projected into the 'non-deviant' 
world. It was hoped that a broad range, of youth service organisations, 
uniformed and otherwise, further education, outdoör pursuits and sporting 
facilities would be prest into service. The attempt to annexe these previously 
autonomous social recreational and educational resources did not go unresisted 
however and the Community and Youth Service Association rejected IT on the 
N 
grounds that young people might be directed to its members projects or centres 
by the courts. 
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As we have already noted, by 1976 an entire phase of urban aid money, money 
made available as part of the British poverty programme, was re-designated to be 
spent on IT. Here we see a trend which developed throughout the 1970s in which 
central government intervenes to reshape local authority and the voluntary 
sector for the furtherance of central government policies. The funding of 
secure units in local authority community homes is of course the example par 
excellence of this tendency towards centralised control. In a similar way 
established voluntary organisations like Dr Barnados and the Save the Children 
Fund are offered substantial central government money to develop Intensive 
Intermediate Treatment. Meanwhile government funding for voluntary social 
welfare agencies engaged in work which does not involve the management of 
delinquents is steadily reduced. 
The introduction of sanctions for a breach of a supervision order with an 
IT requirement, and the development of secure units implicates professional 
social workers in a far, more controlling role and thus effectively annexes them 
into central government law and order policies. Bernard Davies (1982) has 
observed that: 
'Deliberately and progressively state policy for youkh throughout the '70s 
and '8Os has become more coherent, more firmly the direct responsibility-of 
state agencies exercising state power and implementing state intentions, 
and increasingly concerned with satisfying the needs of the nation rather 
than the needs of young people'. 
By the end of the 1970s the capacity of the juvenile criminal justice 
system to control children and young people in trouble had been enormously 
expanded but it was still not big enough for Margaret Thatcher. 
.0 
0 
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NOTES - Chapter 2 
The period 1964 to 1975 saw an increase of 9011. in the numbers of officially 
recorded 14-16 years old male offenders. In the same period the increase in 
the number of officially recorded female offenders was 175%. Much of this 
increase is however, attributable to the introduction of police Juvenile 
Bureaus and cautioning schemes which had the effect of increasing the 
willingness of police officers to formally identify juvenile offenders, a 
consequence of which was to project them into the juvenile criminal justice 
system, and hence into the purview of local authority social workers. In the 
period 1965 to 1977 the number, of cautions delivered to juveniles in England 
and Wales rose from 30,621 to 111,922. In the Metropolitan Police District 
in was a rise from 07 in 1965 to 1^, 125 n 1975. 
2 Gouldner A (1970) The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology refers to a 'Welfare 
State Sociology', a form of academic endeavour wedded to an unacknowledged 
consensual social-democratic paradigm which repudiates 'theory' in favour of 
the 'facts'. 
`' For a fuller discussion of the development of minimalism and pragmatism see 
Cohen S (1983) Social Control Talks in Garland D and Young P The Power, to 
Punish and Pitts J (1986) Thin4: Limn About Intermediate Treatment in Youth and 
Policy, Autumn. 
4 For a discussion of Bifurcation, its origins and consequencies, see the 
definitive Bottoms AE (1975) Reflections on the Renaissance of 
Dangerousness, Howard Journal. 
c 
`' PentonvilIe Prison in London has a wing set aside for, homeless alcoholic men 
serving short sentences. It tends to function in a similar way to Salvation 
Army Hostels and has a similar ambience. The opus on this wing is upon the 
health and welfare needs of prisoners to the virtual exclusion of the more 
usual disciplinary emphasis of imprisonment. 
6 The key research documei 
Earnshaw I, Payne D and 
London, HMSO, concludes 
its subjects from short 
have been incarcerated. 
r 
it on Community Service Orders - Pease K, Durkin P, 
Thorpe J, 1975, (Home Office Research Study, No. 29), 
that in as much as the CSO may have diverted half of 
prison sentences, the other half would probably not 
7 
The 1970s save the 'radicalisation o+ NAPO through the formation of the NATO 
action group, a socialist caucus. The London branch of NAF'O was perhaps the 
most radical and was expelled in 1975 by the union executive for its 
involvement in the Grunwick dispute. This activated liberated elements in 
the union who demanded reinstatement. At the time of writing the senior 
posts on the NAF'O executive art:., held by action group members. 
g 
For a thorough and telling critique of the development of community cautions 
see Greenberg D (1975) Same Problem in Community Corrections, Issues in 
Criminology, Vol. 1o, No. 1, Sprinc. 
9 This tendency towards the centr, ai. i sa. tion of control during periods in which 
political legitimation is under stress is identified by Habermas J (1973) 
Lpgitim tion Crisis and Davies F iq'g6) Threatening Youth. 
to It is interesting to note that this movement away from 'welfarism' on the 
part of Labour, governments in the 11'970s was paralleled by a radical shift in 
economic policy from the Keynesian expansionism of the 1960s to what looked 
very much like monetarism in the mid- to late 1970s. Indeed the Callaghan/ 
5 AI 
Healy administration of 1976/9 is now viewed as the birthplace of British 
monetarist economic policy. 
The 'Folk Devil' and the Hooligan loom large in the British cultural 
beastiary of Cohen S (1974) Folk Deviis and Moral Panics, Hall S et al (1978) 
Policing the Crisis and Pearson G t! 544) Hooligan. 
12 
Lerman P (1975) in Community Treatment and Social Control reinterprets the 
success story' of the California pror, <<tion subsidy project, suggesting that 
it in fact resulted in the imposition of greater levels of control upon 
relatively unproblematic offenders. This echoes the work of David Greenberg 
(Note B above), Stanley Cohen (Note 3 above) who identify the tendency of 
'community corrections' to spread the net of social control. 
J. 
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Chapter 3 
1982: The Rise of Vindictiveness 
'It's about time we said enough is enough and saw a return to the 
traditional British values of discipline, obedience, morality and 
freedom - 
Freedom from the reds and the blacks and the criminals 
Prostitutes, pansies and punks 
Football hooligans, juvenile delinquents, lesbians and left-wing scum 
Freedom from the niggers and the Pak"is'and... the unions 
Freedom from the gipsies and the Jews 
Freedom from the long-haired layabouts and students 
Freedom from the likes of you' 
'P'ower in the Darkness 
Frightening lies from the other side 
Power in the Darkness 
Stand up and fight for your rights'. 
0 
Power, in the Darkness, Tom Robinson, 1978 
'I call it Sado-Monetarism' 
Dennis Healy, 1983 
Just before the 1979 general election a journalist asked Margaret Thatcher 
what the most important task to be undertaken by a future Conservative 
government would be. Without hesitation she answered that it would be 'the 
restoration of the rule of law'. 'What laws might they be? ' the disingenuous 
reporter enquired. 'The laws we are going to introduce', she replied. This was 
not the'last time that the national interest and the pragmatic concerns of Mrs 
Thatcher and her cabinet colleagues were to be presented as one and the same. 
Margaret Thatcher, the iron lady, as she came to be known, inevitably chose 
law and order as the central motif with which to adorn the rich ideological 
tapestry of her right-wing populism. Within this rhetoric 'lawlessness' was 
presented as both a cause and a consequence of the"aontemporar"y social malaise. 
r 
Stuart Hall (1979) has noted how Thatcherian rhetoric traded upon a widespread 
social anxiety in weaving together the disparate horrors of IRA terrorism, 
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unemployment, mugging, skyjacking, profligate public spending, the red menace, 
football hooliganism and trade unions which held the country to ransom. Her 
appeal was simple but direct; 'do you want a home of your own? ', 'do you want 
the medical treatment you need when you need it? ', 'do you want safe streets? ', 
she asked, and because she had traded upon real anxieties and real desires 
the electorate replied that they did'. 
The juvenile justice policies developed by Wilson and Heath may have had 
their problems and limitations but nobody could argue that they were not 
interesting, innovative, and indeed fairly thoughtful. Wilson showed us what a 
fully-fledge, radical, welfare-orientated policy would look like while Heath 
pioneered an original delinquency management approach which was accepted and 
perpetuated by the subsequent labour administration. Whatever one may have r 
thought about these initiatives one had to acknowledge that they were quite well 
done. We don't have to approve of the direction in which the ship is sailing to 
appreciate that there is a professional hand upon the tiller. If we pursue this 
nautical analogy though, it has to be said that the crew of the Thatcherian law 
and order lugger had apparently dropped all its oars into the water before the 
boat was out of the harbour. 
r 
The election of Margaret Thatcher in-1979 marked the renaissance of- 
amateurism in the sphere"of British juvenile justic policy formulation. It was 
not simply that William Whitelaw the Home Secretary and Patrick Jenkin, the 
Minister of State for Health and Social Security, were amateurish bLit rather 
" 
that the traditional Tory tendency towards a 'common-sense' amateurism in 
matters of crime and poverty was accentuated by the Thatcherian landslide which 
had filled the Tory back-benches with authoritarian right-wing eccentrics whom 
nobody, least of all themselves, had believed would ever be elected. One such 
was Warren Hawksley, elected to represent the Wrekin in 1979, employed by Lloyds 
bank since leaving school, who at the Committee stage of the 1982 Criminal 
Justice Act attempted to reintroduce flogging for the 10 plus age group for an 
offence which he styled 'provocative language': To suggest that Hawksley, who 
was subsequently implicated'in the Conservative party's right-wing entryism 
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scandal, was typical is to overstate the case, but it is important to remember 
that the curfew introduced by the 1982 Act was inserted in the Bill at Committee 
stage as part of a compromise with Hawksley and his supporters, who had brought 
proceedings to a standstill on the provocative language/flogging amendment 
The juvenile justice policies which emanated from Margaret Thatcher's government 
were constructed with more than half an eye to the right-wing eccentrics who 
were the rump of the Thatcher government's parliamentary majority. 
William Whitelaw confronted similar problems to those encountered by Heath 
and the subsequent labour administrations. The difference was that by now, as a 
result of the failure of the bench and the judiciary to co-operate with 
governmental attempts to limit the prison population, the problem was much 
larger. The political problem for the Home Secretary was equally pressing. 
This government had adopted a harder, more radical profile on law and order than 
the Heath government. It was moreover a govenment which was destined for 
historical reasons to measure its success against Heath's failure. The personal 
struggle between Heath and Thatcher manifested itself in many ways and ensured 
that Thatcher would never knowingly be seen to compromise with criminals, 
miners, or scroungers. r 
It became necessary to demonstrate that the government 'was going in hard 
on law and order'. But as usual in the Home Office the Home Secretary was 
sitting amongst election manifestos, demands from sympathetic pressure groups 
like the police federation and the magistrates association, Saatchi and 
Saatchi's-latest poll results, projections of anticipated parliamentary 
majorities on a variety of issues, pay claims from the prison officers 
association and surveyors reports of crumbling walis in top security prisons. 
Amidst this sea of potential troubles William Whitelaw was hurriedly developing 
a criminal justice strategy. 
William Whitelaw had at least seven problems which he had to solve before 
he could publish his Young Offenders - White Paper (1980) and pilot the 
Criminal Justice Act (1982) onto the Statute book. They were: 
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1. How could he deal with a chronically overcrowded prison system which had 
been subject to a series of violent disturbances and in which a race riot 
was anticipated? ' This problem was made no easier by the fact that the 
Conservative commitment to the 'rule of law' led inevitably to a 'hands 
off' policy in relation to any attempt to limit the sentencing powers of 
the bench and the judiciary. 
2. How could he placate and control the substantial majority of right-wing 
authoritarian back-bench eccentrics and a prime minister who seemed to 
believe that hanging, flogging and life sentences constituted reasonable 
responses to norm violation in the final quarter of the twentieth century? 
3. How could he accommodate the demands of the Magistrates Association which 
W 
from 1972 onwards had been promised by successive Conservative Home 
Secretaries a restoration of the powers taken from them by the 1969 CYPA? 
This was particularly problematic since all the evidence suggested that a 
restoration of these powers would lead to substantially increased pressure 
upon residential and penal establishments. 
4. How could he accommodate the demands from the police for the changed 
legislation and stiffer penalties which, they argued, would support them. in 
their attempts to police what they saw as a worsening Law and Order 
situation? 
5. How could he be seen to be getting tough very quickly as the Conservatives 
had promised in their election campaign? 
6. What did 'the restoration of the rule of law' mean anyway and how did one 
set about restoring it? 
7. How could all this be done without incurring an inordinate increase in 
government expenditure? 
r In an attempt to resolve these problems Whitelaw introduced-the 'short 
sharp shock' regime to two detention centres and delegated the drafting of the 
Young Offenders White Paper to one Leon Brittan an ex-barrister who was then a 
39 
Minister of State at the Home Office. He was aided and abetted in this task by 
Robert Sims, formerly of the Council of the Magistrates Association and personal 
Private Secretary to William Whitelaw. 
The White Paper and the subsequent Bill were drafted in a hurry since the 
legislation was eagerly awaited by the government as its major law and order 
initiative. Law and Order was important because even in 1980 the government 
4 
was being conspicuously unsuccessful in its other political endeavours. This 
legislative endeavour initiated a repoliticisation of juvenile crime, the 
restoration of the power of the bench, an attempt to restore some prisoners to 
the community, the imposition of the prison upon the community and the 
annexation of human and material resources by a law and order crusade. 
Y 
Repoliticisation and Moralisation 
The 1979 Thatcher administration not only repoliticised crime and 
punishment but dramatised it to the point where it came to assume an importance 
in the political bestiary akin to that previously only granted to the Warsaw 
pact and the National Union of Mineworkers. Patrick Jenkin, paraphrasing the 
Duke of Edinburgh, at a conference on IT in July 1979, 'directed the attention. of 
participants to: 
'the avalanche of lawlessness threatening to engulf our civilisation'. 
This apocalyptic vision clearly justified the introduction of tougher 
penalties. One supporter of this move, James Anderton, Chief Constable for 
Greater Manchester remarked in June 1979 that we needed, 
0 
'penal work camps where through hard labour and unrelenting discipline they 
(young offenders) should be made to sweat as they have never sweated before 
and remain until their violence has been vanquished by penitent humiliation 
and unqualified repentance'. 
It is interesting that from 1979 onwards Senior Police officers appear to 
be freed from the usual constraints which require public servants to keep their 
opinions to themselves, and are allowed to emerge instead as moral. 
commentators on behalf of the new right. 
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William Whitelaw always seemed embarrassed by the hysteria and vulgarity 
of supporters like Anderton and his cabinet colleagues but in the interests of 
unity he soldiered on until the 1981 Conservative Party Conference where he was 
booed from the stage by a powerful and confident radical right wing for his 
alleged liberalism. 
The sabre-rattling rhetoric, necessitated in part by a need to make 
concessions to the party's right-wing, was-only the surface manifestation of a 
more profound change. Thatcher's administration embraced classicist social and 
economic doctrines with the uncritical enthusiasm of the newly converted. It is 
often suggested that Sir Keith Joseph was the government's intellectual mainstay 
but his increasingly idiosyncratic behaviour during his time in the cabinet 
leads one to doubt that he was the well-spring of the new Tory. dogma. More 
important was the rise of a right-wing intelligentsia in the 1970s which began 
to contest the left/liberal consensus which viewed Keynsian economic 
interventionism and a gradualist policy of redistribution of wealth and 
resources through the medium of taxation and welfare as the only way in which 
liberal democracies in advanced industrial societies might be regulated. 
The new right believed that if the 'hidden hand of the market', currently 
OF 
tied behind the back of the 'body politic', could be'released, and an 
interfering state 'rolled back' then prosperity would be achieved, the virtuous 
rewarded, and cheats and idlers (the mob, organised labour, and criminals) would 
get their just economic deserts. In a similar vein in the sphere of'crime and 
punishment, we see the emergence of the 'new realists', the 'intellectuals for 
law and order' and a genre of social critique, peculiar to the 1970s and 1980s 
which is fiercely, and indeed often vindictively, classicist. It reintroduces 
'wickedness' into the discourse on crime and punishment. Platt and Takagi 
(1981) write: 
'There is a general agreement among the new realists that 'wicked 
people exist. Nothing avails except to set them apart from innocent 
people. And many people, neither wicked nor innocent, but watchful, dissembling, and calculating of their opportunites, ponder our, 
reaction to wickedness as a cue to what they might profitably do. We have trifled with the wicked, made sport of the innocent, and 
encouraged the calculators'. There is also general agreement that the 
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criminal justice apparatus is chaotic and ineffective. For Van den 
Haag, this is the result of a 'worldwide decline in punishment and- 
therewith a respect for law', for Wilson it's a combination of 
ignorance and soft-heartedness; for Morris and Hawkins it's the 
federal government's failure to understand 'predatory crime' as the 
most potent threat to the American way of life. 
pp. 46-7 
The search for the causes of crime is abandoned and the focus for reform 
moves even further away from the social, familial or psychological factors which 
predispose people to'deviation. It moves towards an exploration of the range 
and nature of penalties necessary to regulate pgtentially deviant populations. 
It is interesting that it is these highly (albeit somewhat patchily) educated 
intellectuals for law and order who articulate an anti-intellectual position as 
a rejoiner to the 'pretensions' of liberal reformers and social work 
professionals. They celebrate instead the superiority of the 'common Sense' 
amateurism of ordinary people. Geoff Pearson (1981) in a droll review of 
'Can Social Work Survive? ' by Colin Brewer and June Lait, two 'no nonsense' 
british right-wing intellectuals, writes: ,a 
'Social work is unnecessary and pretentious. It is a treason of the 
clerks against ordinary people and their humble attempts to come to 
terms with life's trials. A professional reason that has been 
committed, moreover, without even so much as a glimmer of professional 
competence or expertise. So explaining to readers of the Daily 
Telegraph (9/2/78) what happens 'when trendy methods fail to cope with 
juvenile delinquents', Mrs Lait concluded that the whole business of 
childcare should be taken away from permissive educationalists and do- 
good social workers, and placed instead 'in the hands of ordinary 
people who have rejected pretentious, self indulgent and unscientific 
theorising in favour of their own good sense'. 
p. 115 
Always this appeal to the common sense of the common folk. It is the 
failure of common sense, the triumph of liberal intellectual modes of child 
rearing, which has led to: 
r 
Morgan, P, 1978, p. 13' 
Here Morgan offers us the syndrome to which Warren Hawksley's 'Provocative 
'the spread of what could be called a delinquent syndrome, a 
conglomeration of behaviour, speech, appearance and attitudes, a frightening ugliness and hostility which pervades human interaction, a flaunting of contempt for other human being, a delight in crudity, 
cruelty and violence, a desire to challenge and. to humiliate, and 
never but never, to please'. 
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Language' and flogging was the commonsense response which ordinary people would 
understand. 
Here was the real backlash against the 1969 CYPA. This was no modification 
or non-implementation it was a rout in which the gains achieved by 'welfare' in 
1969 were to be reversed and a new era of 'the rule of law' was to be brought 
into being. Welfare and treatment all but disappear, delinquency management in 
as much as it is understood remains in disconnected pieces while the reversion 
to due process of law is set in train. Ivan Lawrence QC MP put his finger on 
what was happening when he said of the 1982 Criminal Justice Bill: 
'One of the most important steps in the bill, which I strongly 
welcome, is the reflection of public opinion which says that we are 
fed up with letting sentences be decided by social workers rather than 
the courts ... encouraged by wet socialist intellectuals from all 
over the place'. 
Rutherford A (1986) 
These important steps take us away from professionalism, away from 
intellectualism, and back to a reliance upon the good common sense amateurism of, 
juvenile court magistrates. 
It is interesting that the right-wing at the time of the election of the 
first Thatcher government was unanimous in its view that crime in general and 
juvenile crime in particular was a subversive activity promoted in no small part 
by the insidious and corrosive influence of left-wing teachers and social 
workers. When in 1981 some black and white young people chose to describe 
nationwide rioting as a political uprising the government angrily replied that 
this was nonsense and that they - the rioters - were merely common criminals. 
The Restoration of the Power of the Bench 
In the sphere of juvenile justice "the government's determination to re- 
r 
establish the rule of law was expressed through the restoration and extension'of 
the powers of juvenile court magistrates. As we have already noted the 
magistrates had resented what they saw as the erosipn of their powers and the 
extension of the powers of social workers occasioned by the 1969 CYPA. In 1972 
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Sir Keith Joseph had promised an agitated juvenile bench that something would be 
done. The House of Commons Expenditure Committee, convened in 1973, containing 
two ex-magistrates, one ex-approved school head, and no representatives of 
social work, recommended in its report of 1975 that magistrates be given the 
power to send a juvenile directly into local authority care. The election, in 
1974, of a Labour government meant that this change did not occur, but it was 
clear that a'form of 'secure care order' was high on the legislative agenda of a 
5 future Tory government. 
The 'secure care order' was a resuscitated Approved School Order (ASO). 
The ASO disappeared with the advent of the 1969 CYPA. The Act had meant that 
the Approved School system, a system of residential schools approved by the Home 
Office as suitable establishments in which young offenders could serve their 
sentences had been broken up and control over the schools had passed to local 
authority social services departments. Not only did social workers, and not 
magistrates, have the power to decide whether a child should be sent to what 
were now called 'community homes with education's (CHEs) but the heads of these 
CHEs, not magistrates, would decide whether to accept the child as a 'pupil' or 
not. 
While the question of the 'secure care order' was first and foremost a 
question of the power and supremacy of the bench it was also a question about 
the desire of central government to exert control over the apparatus of justice 
and juvenile incarceration, in the face of a disseminated system in which the 
power resided in the hands of local authority social services department 
personnel. The Thatcher government wished to vouchsafe the operation of the 
juvenile justice system to a juvenile bench which had shown itself to be the 
tried and trusted ally of Conservative governments and could be relied upon'to 
'do the job'. Thus while it was unwilling, and probably. unable, to resume 
control of the Approved School/CHE system, the' implementation of a 'secure care 
order' offered to give the bench powers to require local authority social 
workers to act in the ways that central govenment wanted. Thus the 'secure 
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care order' held the promise for central government that it could utilise 
substantial local government resources in its law and order campaign, and in so 
doing begin to reverse one of the most radical shifts effected by the 1969 CYPA, 
namely the decentralisation of power in the juvenile criminal justice system. 
Section F of the Young Offenders White Paper (1980) states that the 
government intends to seek approval for changes: 
'Where a juvenile already in the care-of a local authority as an 
offender is found guilty of a further imprisonable offence, power for 
the court to add a 'residential care order' with the effect that for a 
fixed period not exceeding six months he is. not to be allowed to 
remain at home'. 
The residential care order went some way to solving two political problems. 
It restored power to the bench and it gave central government both a symbol of 
toughness and greater control over the means whereby they could actually get 
tough. There was however a very serious logistical problem to be overcome. 
The reconviction rates for young people who are the subjects of a care 
order under the offence condition of the 1969 CYPA is about 36% (Cawson P and 
Martell P, 1979). We know that those actually in residential care have a higher 
reconviction rate than those 'at home on trial'. In an exercise undertaken in 
Lambeth in 1981 it was estimated that the introduction of , the 'residential care 
order', or 'charge and control condition' as it was actually called in the act, 
would result in an increase in expenditure of between #650,000 and #1,100,000 in 
Lambeth alone. This calculation was made on the assumption that the young 
people who re-offended but were living at home would be shifted to non-secure 
community home provision at a cost of #300 per week, while the re-offenders in 
non-secure residential provision would be shifted to secure provision at a cost 
of #610 per week. This calculation was made upon'the assumption that adequate 
secure and non-secure residential provision existed, which it didn't, and that 
no additional capital expenditure would be necessary, wich of course, it would. 
It also assumed that each re-offender would only re-offend once a year, which 
was optimistic and it further assumed that local authority residential social 
workers would be prepared to deal with this massive influx of new and reluctant 
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clients, which was similarly optimistic since those interviewed said that they 
wouldn't. The government had set aside only #20,000,000 to meet the extra costs 
which would be incurred by all the local authorities in England and Wales as a 
result of the introduction of the 'Residential Care Order'. The government, or 
more specifically Leon Brittan, had given no thought to the implications for 
capital expenditure on secure provision if this measure were to be taken 
seriously by the bench. The Associaiton of Metropolitan Authorities, the 
Association of Directors of Social Services and Professional Advisers-in the 
Home Office and the DHSS had all warned him of the dangers which lay ahead. 
Brittan however was one of the new breed of politicians upon whom the 
Thatcherian sun had shone. His peculiar distinction was that where other 
mortals took warnings to mean that one should recons ider one's course of action, 
Brittan took them as a challenge. This is possibly the reason why his career as 
a cabinet mi nister was so brief and undistinguished. The juvenile court 
magistrates worked out fairly quickly that they had been short-changed by 
Brittan and the charge and control condition has more or less fallen into 
disuse. 
The 1982 Act had two major objectives. The first was to strengthen the law 
r 
relating to juveniles and young offenders aged 15-21'iri England and Wales. The 
second was to limit the use of imprisonment for this age group. One way of 
limiting imprisonment, a way favoured'by most liberal reformers,. is to simply 
stop locking people up. To do this would require legislative and administrative 
changes which reduce penalties for offences which currently attract prison 
sentences. Alternatively one might follow the example of Holland and set a limit 
upon the number of prison sentences which can be imposed by the courts. This 
limit is determined by the number of prison places. Even if courts impose 
custodial sentences they cannot be executed unless the government is prepared to 
grant a reprieve to those currently in prison. In this way governments can 
exert control over the judges and can of course reduce the prison population 
still further by reducing the number, of prison places (Junger Tas J, 1984). 
In Britain in 1982 the first option, a reduction in penalties, was not 
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politically viable because the act aimed to 'strengthen' responses to adolescent 
offenders, not weaken them. The alternative option of limiting the number of 
prison sentences which could be imposed was however politically unthinkable 
because it would have involved the Thatcher government in what conservatives 
have always tended to describe as 'an unwarranted violation by the State of the' 
independence and impartiality of the Courts'. The fact that this argument is 
fundamentally flawed, since its logical outcome would be that Holland, possibly 
the most liberal nation in Western Europe, was ä. totalitarian dictatorship, does 
not stop law and order Tories using it as a rationale for either doing what they 
want, or doing what they can't avoid doing. The commitment to the restoration 
of the powers of the bench meant that another method had to be found in order to 
limit imprisonment. Thus Arittan and Whitelaw developed a plan to get0the same, 
or indeed increased, numbers of offenders through the system quicker. The 1982 
Act was to penal politics what the F-plan diet was to the slimming business. 
But first they had to lay the ground for this endeavour. 
Overcrowding in British prisons is localised. While in 1982 there were 
empty places in high security category A prisons, Borstals were bulging at the 
seams. The crisis of overcrowding in the prison was a crisis brought about by 
the influx of 15-21 year olds, a crisis precipitated in no small part by the 
non-implementation of the 1969 CYPA. 
The Borstal was created in 1929 by Alexander Patterson as an alternative. to 
imprisonment for young people aged 16-21. Modelled on the British public school 
and staffed by ex-public school housemasters it attempted to offer deprived 
young offenders the kind of opportunities their more privileged counterparts 
would receive as a matter of course. Should we be tempted to grin knowingly 
about the naivete of Patterson's philanthropic vision we might reflect upon the 
fact that throughout the 1930s the reconviction rate of-ex-Borstal boys-remained 
constant at around 30%. In the 1960s the Home Office prison department 
" attempted to effect a closer integration of the Borstal into the mainstream of 
the prison system. This involved a change from a recruitment policy in which 
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staff opted for work in a Borstal to one in which they were drafted in randomly 
to what many saw as a backwater in which careers tended not to develop. 
Possibly as a result of these changes the reconviction rates in the 1960s and 
1970s crept up to around 707. for the Borstal population as a whole and 797. for 
15 and 16 year olds. 
The Home Office account of these developments predictably attributed the 
abysmal r, econviction rates to the 'poor quality of r'eceptions', harking back to 
a golden age when they were being sent a better class of burglar, but 'as Little 
(1962) demonstrated, the decline in the effectiveness of Borstal training 'holds 
true for receptions of a similar quality' (Little A, 1962). 
The 1982 Act gave the final kiss of death to Patterson's dream by repealing 
Section 3 of the 1961 Criminal Justice Act which restricted the powers of the 
courts to imprison young adult offenders in the mainstream of the prison system. 
The return of Borstal staff to uniform in May 1983 with the implementation of 
that part of the Act which redesignated the Borstal as a Youth Custody Centre was 
not just 'get tough' law and order window dressing. It signified the final 
absorption of the Borstal into the mainstream of the prison system. It meant 
that young people in the prison system could be placed in any part of the system 
r 
if overcrowding dictated that this was necessary. The principle which had 
informed the prison system for over 50 years, that 15 to 21 year olds should be 
dealt with differently and in a different place from adult offenders was 
abandoned. The related principle that 15 to 21 year olds committed to prison 
department establishments should all receive some form of trade training and 
education was also ditched. From May 1983 15 to 21 year olds could be committed 
to imprisonment pure and simple. 
With the advantage of, hindsight the may say that the history of the Borstal 
is the history a 50 year endeavour by governments to confound, and then 
annihilate, any traces of progressive reform in the custodial treatment of 
adolescent offenders6. 
" 
These changes made it possible for the Home Secretary to move 15 to 21 year 
olds around the prison system in order to unblock any bottlenecks which might be 
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created by excessive sentencing. It was a move which suggested an uncanny 
prescience on the part of the Home Secretary and it made the day-to-day 
management of prisons much easier. 
The other major consequence of the repeal of Section 3 of the 1961 CJ Act 
was to give power to juvenile court magistrates to impose prison sentences upon- 
adolescents without the need to remit them to crown court for sentencing. 
Farrington (1984) observed that: 
'In a clear movement away from welfare and towards retribution, the 
indeterminate borstal sentence was to be replaced by determinate youth 
custody 'so that the court can mark the seriousness of the offence by 
the length of sentence they impose' (Home Office et al, 1980: 4). This 
represents a considerable increase in power for magistrates since they 
will be able to pass a youth custody sentence of up to the maximum for 
juveniles (one year, if the juvenile has committed two offences) 
rather than remanding juveniles to the crown court for borstal 
sentences. It is also likely to lead to increasing 
institutionalisation of juveniles. When juveniles were remanded to 
the crown court with a recommendation of borstal training, only about 
65% (in 1981) were actually given borstal. This is partly because 
some juvenile offences that seem relatively serious to magistrates seem 
relatively trivial to crown court judges. When the magistrates can 
pass youth custody sentences, the 35% who currently benefit by going' 
to crown court will also receive your custody' 
p. E36 
Between the end of May and the end of July 1983, the first two months after 
the implementation of Youth Custody Sentences (YCS) the'Borstal/Youth Custody., 
population rose from 5,892 to 6,839 (approximately 12%). By the end of its 
first full year of operation, the increase was 65'/.. Clearly more were going 
through but they weren't going through as quickly as had been planned. Many 
juveniles were receiving the maximum sentence of six months or indeed two 
consecutive six month sentences. Even with the possibility of one third of the 
sentence being remitted the log-jam in the system kept growing, causing first 
embarrassment and then panic in the Home Office. Latchmere House, a remand 
facility in London was hastily given over to young offenders serving shorter 
sentences of youth custody. They were locked in cells for up to 23 hours per 
.,. 
day, no training, education, and in some cases exercise, were offered. ' Within 
months Youth Custody had assumed all the worst features of the mainstream of the 
prison system. 
69 
The indeterminate Borstal sentence of six months to two years had allowed 
Borstal. governors and the Home Office a partial means whereby they could control 
overcrowding. Prior to the implementation of the Act the average time spent in 
Borstal had been reduced to between nine and eleven months. Now the Home Office 
reluctantly realised that they had effectively relinquished what little control 
they had ever had over the size of the 15 to 21 year old prison population. 
The plan wasn't working, and it wasn't working because it was based upon 
the erroneous assumption that one could give additional powers to juvenile court 
magistrates and then persuade them to use these powers sparingly. The 
government had attempted to limit custodial sentencing by requiring that before 
a young person could be sentenced to custody it must be stated in open court 
and recorded in the court register that no other sentence is appropriate 
because, the defendant is unwilling or unable to co-operate with a non-custodial 
sentence, or the offence is of such a serious nature or the offender is so 
dangerous, that a custodial sentence is unavoidable. Burney (1985) has shown 
that magistrates and clerks have interpreted these vague conditions in 
remarkable ways, and in many cases the decision in favour of custody is reached 
by the magistrate and the clerk who then work out how theesafeguards can be 
avoided. In some juvenile courts magistrates don't even pretend to be taking 
the safeguards seriously. 
Nonetheless, the government tried to persuade the bench that if they only 
keep the errant adolescents soujourn behind bars brief, then they, the 
government, make this souicurn memorable. It was the short sharp shock of the 
revitalised detention centre which was to make the memory linger on. 
At the Conservative Party Conference in October 1979 William Whitelaw 
n 
announced the introduction of a new experimental regime at New Hall and Send 
detention centres. The centres were opened in 1980. In March 1981 Patrick 
Mayhew, Minister of State at the Home Office, announced that the experiment was 
being extended to two more centres, and significantly, that a number of Borstal 
places were to be converted to the new regime. 
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'Tougher regimes in detention centres' published by the Home Office Young 
Offender Psychology Unit appeared in 1984. It concluded that at New Hall and 
Send: 
'8.24: The purpose of the pilot project was to assess whether young 
offenders can be effectively deterred from committing further offences 
by spending a period of weeks in a detention centre with a more 
rigorous and demanding regime. ' 
'8.21: The introduction of the pilot project regimes had no 
discernible effect on the rate at which trainees were reconvicted. ' 
p. 243 
On the 6th of March, 1985, the new regime was extended to all detention 
centres in England and Wales. 
Just prior to the implementation of the 1982 Act in 1983 the Home Office 
sent a circular to detention centre governors, alerting them to an anticipated 
increase in the 'throughput' of their establishments of 40%. What the 
government had hoped was that magistrates would be attracted by the shorter DC 
sentence, as little as 3 weeks, if it was backed by a tough regime. brittan's 
decision to extend the regime to all DCs in 1985, was taken in the face of 
research commissioned by Whitelaw and undertaken by Home Office personnel which 
demonstrated that the short sharp shock didn't work. It was Brittan's final 
r 
desperate attempt to change the behaviour, of the juvenile bench but he couldn. ', t 
do it. At present Douglas Hurd is contemplating' the introduction of suspended 
sentences for juveniles in an attempt to limit incarceration. This, as Heath 
found to his cost, could have disastrous results, and could project even more 
young people into the prison. It will be a disaster if it is tried because 
whenever juvenile court magistrates are given new powers they use them to exert 
greater control over lesser offenders rather than less control over more serious 
ones. 
The Restoration of the Prisoner to the Community 
On the 26th January 1983 the DHSS published Local Authority Circular 
LAC(83)3. It stated that: 0 
'Under Section 64 of the Health Services and Public Health Act 1968, 
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the Government makes grants to voluntary bodies to support the 
introduction of intermediate treatment facilities that complement 
those provided by local authorities. New money has been made 
available for those grants from 1983/4 in order to help the 
development of more intensive IT programmes designed specifically for 
those young people who would otherwise go to borstal or detention 
centre. These resources can also help authorities to bring forward 
plans which are dependent upon the release of resources currently tied 
up elsewhere, eg, in residential provision earmarked for re- 
deployment'. 
The amount in question was #15,000,000 to be spent over three years and it 
constituted an unprecedented infusion of resources into intermediate 'treatment. 
The 1982 Act had introduced a strengthened form of intermediate treatment, the 
specified Activity Order, which gave the juvenile bench the power to specify the 
duration and content of IT. The government hoped that by increasing the 
magistrates' control over, and hence confidence in, IT, and by establishing a 
network of alternatives to custody of the type described by the PSSC working 
party as 'Intensive Intermediate Treatment' it would be possible to limit 
imprisonment for juveniles. 
This infusion of resources was styled the 'New Initiative' and Leon 
Brittan, in the foreword to 'Criminal Justice', a Home Office working paper 
published in May 1984, expressed the hope that it would create '4,500 additional 
community-based places for the more serious offenders by 1985/6'. While it 
would be churlish to doubt the government's commitment to easing pressure upon 
the prison and residential child-care establishments one cannot escape from the 
central irony of the 'new initiative'. 
The Home Office anticipated that as a result of the implementation of the 
1982 Act the DC population would rise by 40%, or 2,500 prisoners a year. 
Research commissioned by the DHSS and the Home office indicated that the 
introduction of the Residential Care Order could lead to the reception into 
residential care of an additional 1,100 children or young people per year. The 
f. 
Home Office prison building programme indicated that provision was being made 
for an additional 900 Youth Custody prisoners by 1990. These projections were, 
of course, wrong but the anticipated increase in the numbers of children and 
adolescents who would be subject to residential care or custody as a consequence 
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of the changed sentencing powers of the juvenile bench, 4,500, is exactly the 
same as the projected number of places in alternatives to residential care or 
custody which were to be brought into being by the introduction of the Specified 
Activity Order backed by the 'New Initiative'. 
Here was confusion on a grand scale. One piece of legislation which 
simultaneously promoted two diametrically opposed responses to the same 
behaviour by the same group of people. Whatever Brittan thought he was doing he 
was in fact creating 4,500 'alternatives to custody' with no assurances from the 
juvenile bench that they would use them as he intended, a growing body of 
evidence suggesting that they would not, and as we have seen, no effective legal 
safeguards to prevent the abuses which the evidence suggested would inevitably 
occur. Beyond this Brittan was deliberately opening up the possibility that a 
further 4,500 children and young people could be locked up and he was doing this 
in a period in which the juvenile crime rate had remained virtually static for 
several years and the proportion of adolescents in the population was beginning 
to decline sharply. 
In the event the Youth Custody population did not grow by 15% between 198 
and 1990, it grew by 65% between May 1983 and May 1984. The DC population did 
not grow by 40%, it declined. The Residential Care Order all but disappeared. 
It was all a terrible mess, someone had blundered, and this terrible mess was 
handed over to Intermediate Treatment. 0 
The courts were locking up larger numbers of less problematic offenders for 
longer periods. IT had to confront a situation'in which young people'who before 
the Act would not have been considered for an alternative to custody project 
were now in desperate need of one. Once again Welfare in the form of IT was 
handed one population to 'rehabilitate' while justice in the form of the 
juvenile bench punished another. And here again was the dilemma that although 
the New Initiative' threatened to impose the prison. upon the community, the 
$ 
absence of the alternatives financed by the New Initiative' could "lead 
to even 
higher levels of youth imprisonment. 
7 
The Imposition of the Prison upon the Community 
The 1982 Act made it possible for a juvenile court to impose a Community 
Service Order upon a 16 year old defendant. Described by some as 'an 
opportunity to make meaningful reparation to an aggrieved community' and by 
others as 'the chain gang' community service is about as close as you can get to 
being in prison without being in prison. - As we have seen, Community Service, 
from its inception has tended to be imposed upon those who would otherwise have 
received a less serious non-custodial penalty rather than upon those who would 
otherwise go to prison (Pease K et al, 1975). The government had no reason to 
assume that a different pattern would emerge if Community Service were applied 
to a younger age group. With the introduction of Community Service into the 
juvenile criminal justice system we saw yet another means whereby quasi-penal 
control and surveillance could be imposed upon the community7. 
'Night Restriction' or the Curfew forces parents to supervise their own 
children in their own homes. As such it reflects an abiding conservative 
preoccupation with the idea that lawlessness is promoted by the abdication of 
responsibility for control and discipline by teachers and working class 
parents. The curfew requires that the child or young person remain at home 
between 6 pm and 6 am for a period of three months. This effectively turns the 
home into a prison and the parents into gaolers. It does of course help to 
0 'keep the family together' which Mrs Thatcher feels is very important if - 
standards are to be maintained: It remains a moot point, of course, whether in 
forcing a bored adolescent to stay in an overcrowded flat, we are punishing the 
young person or the parents. As Howard Parker (1974) has shown, large low- 
income families, living in overcrowded accommodation depend upon their older 
children spending their leisure time out of the house in order to make 'family 
life' tolerable., It is a question of space and material resources (Parker H, * 
1974). The curfew was to be supervised by social workers and probation 
officers, thus exhuming the spectre of the Younger Report's (1974)"screws on 
wheels'. 
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The other way in which parents were to be made responsible for their 
children's behaviour was by making them ultimately responsible for fines imposed 
upon their children by a juvenile court. Should parents be unable or unwilling 
to do this they could then be prosecuted in the magistrates court for non- 
payment of fines, and if necessary, imprisoned. Thus the attempt to improve the 
quality of working-class parenting threatened to land poor, but innocent, 
parents of juvenile offenders in jail. 
Annexation 
In a speech given by Patrick Jenkin in July 1979, when he was Secretary. of 
State for Social Services he said that: 
The government is prepared to regard child care services as party of 
the national pattern of law and order services and to have the 
priority which that accords it'. 
We have already seen how the charge and control condition strove to annexe 
residential child care provision in order to transform it into part of the 
junior penal system. The curfew attempts to annexe social workers and probation 
officers into the policing, surveillance, and containment of young offenders in 
r 
their own homes. For this reason the National Association of Probation-Officers 
instructed its members not to co-operate with the Night Restriction Order and 
so some might say to its eternal credit, did the Camden branch of the National 
Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO). The strengthening of the 
" 
juvenile magistrates control over IT is a further manifestation of the attempt 
within the 1982 Act to move control of the apparatus of juvenile justice away 
from social workers and back into the hands of the bench and the judiciary. 
This annexation strove to mobilise the resources, skills, initiative and 
energy of a range of local authority and voluntary sector welfare professionals 
for purposes defined by central government. This was attempted, as we have 
seen, in two ways. First, by introducing legislation which changes the power 
relationship between social work and the bench and, local and central government. 
Secondly by redesignating, or transferring, money from one area to another. The 
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life of the Thatcher govenment has seen a steady erosion of government financial 
support for the voluntary sector of social welfare. Government grants given to 
allow voluntary organisation or settlements to experiment with new services or 
new ways of working with people in need have dwindled to virtually nothing. Yet 
the government has repeatedly expressed its support for the voluntary sector. 
The reality is that it will support the voluntary sector to the extent that the 
voluntary sector is prepared to do what the government tells it, and to do, it 
more cheaply than the government could. Thus that part of the voluntary sector 
which is financed by manpower services and the new initiative thrives. A 
substantial part of the income of organisations like NACRO, the Apex Trust, Save 
the Children (UK), Dr Barnardos and some of the settlements is contingent upon 
these organisations running employment projects and providing part of the 
apparatus of the juvenile criminal justice system. 
As Davies amongst others has argued, while the youth service, education, 
the health service and large areas within the voluntary sector have become more 
and more impoverished, those parts of statutory and voluntary welfare which 
meet the government's needs are inundated with embarrassingly large amounts of 
money (Davies B, 1982). r 
An Ideological Victory 
The performance of the Thatcher government in the sphere of criminal 
justice may have been a strategic and administrative disaster but it must be 
counted a political and ideological victory. The government entered vowing to 
arrest the slide into lawlessness but within three years was presiding over 
scenes of civil disorder on a scale never previously witnessed in mainland 
Britain. The spring of 1981 saw rioting, looting, and arson in every major 
British city. With that peculiar ability Margaret Thatcher has to persuade us, 
that the unintended consequences of tier policies are-merely instances of the 
pressing need for those policies, she presented the 1981 riots as a, vindication 
of her strategies on juvenile crime, unemployment and policing. 
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The Wovernment characterised itself as a cleansing crusade which would 
restore Britain to economic and moral health. The infidels were the usual 
suspects - left-wing subversives in education and welfare, miners, gays, black 
people, social security claimants and the unemployed. Identified in this way 
the crusaders took the battle deep into the enemy's territory. 
Operation 'Major', the mass entrapment, by agent provocateurs, of social 
security claimants at Oxford in 1982 signalled an assault upon scroungers but it 
also marked a radical movement beyond what had previously been regarded as 
reasonable police behaviour. Nonetheless it was presented, and largely 
accepted, as an assault by the crusaders on behalf of the poor but virtuous who 
had always paid their own way. The introduction of the Nationality Act was 
resisted by some black people and some left-wingers but few people dwelt upon 
the fact that it actually robbed all of us of our previously inalienable right 
to domicile in Britain. Under the Thatcher government the interests of the 
prime minister and her inner cabinet confidantes and the national interest became 
merged in political rhetoric. Misleading the House of Commons was presented as 
a patriotic duty while the prosecution and imprisonment of civil servants who 
revealed these misdeeds was presented as an assault upon political subversion. 
The police were granted new and more flexible powers in'order to free them to 
get on with the job of rooting out the cancer of crime and disorder. The major 
objections to this came from black people, left-wingers and interestingly the 
police federation which complained that the Police Bill was vague and allowed 
police officer's far, too much leeway in interpreting its meaning. The young 
homeless discovered one morning in 1985 that if they lived in lodgings by the 
seaside or in a major city then they would only be allowed to stay there for 6 
weeks before their, dole money was cut off. This was a sop to those who were in 
work but wanted to be at the seaside. It was all vindictive, petty, but 
corrosive stuff which left its mark upon popular consciousness and desensitised 
the public to the illegalities and excesses which were being perpetrated in its 
name. 4 
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Who Killed Angus Boyd? 
On February the 17th 1984, Angus Boyd was found dead in his cell at 
Glenochil Young Offenders complex in C1ackmannanshire. Angus Boyd's death was 
the fifth at Glenochil in three years. All of the boys had hanged themselves. 
In the year prior to the death of Angus Boyd 171 young men had been placed on 
strict suicide observation at Glenochil. 
Glenochil was the prototype and the model upon which the new 'short sharp 
shock' regimes of the Detention Centre were based. The extension of the tougher 
regime to all detention centres in Britain in March 1985 was undertaken in the 
knowledge that it made no difference to reconviction rates but that where it. had 
been in operation for some time five young people had killed themselves. 
In April 1985 police were called to Aldington detention centre in' Kent to 
investigate allegations of brutality to prisoners. The brutality was revealed 
anonymously by probation officers. Their anonymity was, they believed, 
necessitated by the fear that in revealing criminal offences perpretrated by 
prison officers against prisoners they would be branded by their own employers 
and prison personnel, as trouble-makers. 
'Another probation officer from South London produced case note 
details of a black youth who had been in the centVe for a burglary- 
offence between October and November last year. 
As soon as he arrived he said he was subjected to racial abuse and 
slapped in the face With a ruler. A prison officer then punched him 
in the stomach and too, off his belt and slapped him around the face 
with it'. 
(The Guardian, 26 April 1985) 
In'August 1986 allegations of brutality were made by the mother of a 
prisoner at Send detention centre in Surrey who had seen her son punched and 
kicked as he was being taken away from the building in which their 'visit' had 
taken place. This boy was the son of a naval officer who had been imprisoned in 
Send for, his first offence of stealing a bicycle. 
At the time of the Aldington investiation, Leon Brittan writing in 
Community Care (2 May 1985) claimed that. 0 
'Some commentators have caricatured the new regime as harsh and brutal. That is not so, we have taken steps to ensure that it strikes 
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the rt'oper balance'. 
The government in its pursuit of political credibility for its law and 
order policies and a pragmatic concern to manage the penal population more- 
effectively was prepared to introduce a regime which required prison officers to 
act in a more coercive, controlling and forceful manner. It was prepared to 
take a chance with the rights, civil liberties, and the lives of children and 
young people in order to achieve its political and administrative ends. 
Labour MP Martin O'Neil has campaigned consistently for a public enquiry 
into the Glenochil deaths but the government has refused. In the light of the 
clamour surrounding the deaths of Jasmine BecFford, Tyra Henry and Kimberly 
Carlile at the hands of their parents we are faced with a strange paradox. The 
demand that the professional social workers responsible for the well-being of 
these children should be called to account, occupied the front pages of the 
tabloids for weeks. Meanwhile the issue of Angus Boyd, the other four boys at 
Glenochil, and the young people at Aldington and Send, all victims of non- 
accidental injury and all under the supervision of penal professionals simply 
disappeared from the public eye. Tyra Henry, Jasmine Beckford and Kimberly 
Carlile will never be forgotten but Angus Boyd and the other boys were forgotten 
p 
by the public as surely as the Argentinian young people who died-in the - 
Falklands were forgotten; and this is the true measure of the Thatcher 
administration's ideological victory. 
Harold Wilson had presented juvenile offenders as a pathetic anachronistic 
proletarian residue which could be restored to the conscience collective by the 
judicious application of welfare and treatment. Edward Heath had presented 
juvenile offenders as the 'something for nothing mob' who could be made to shape 
up if they were managed correctly and the right people were given the right 
amount of treatment or punishment. Margaret Thatcher presented juvenile 
offenders as part of a more pervasive 'enemy within'. She established them as a 
force threatening to subvert 'our way of life' and in doing so legitimised and 
turned a blind eye to any response, however extreme, which the body politic or 
its professional representatives deemed fit in order to preserve 'Law and 
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Order'. The Thatcher administration chose to draw no distinction between the 
'rule of law' and 'Law and Order', but as Stuart Hall (191? 2) argued: 
The rule of law is not the same thing as law and orrr-r". Law and 
Order is about effective policing and what is says is if you can 
deliver the goods I am not going to ask too many questions about how 
you do it'. 
(p. 55) 
We must conclude that ultimately Send, Aldington and Glenochil were a price 
that the Thatcher administration was prepared to pay in its attempt to restore 
'Law and Order'. 
0 
0 
0 
8c: 
NOTES - CHAPTER 3 
The compoents of this right-wing populism are discussed in full in 
Policing the Crisis, Hall S et al, 1978. Corrigan F (unpublished) has noted 
that the right-wing populism of Margaret Thatcher successfully annexed themes 
and issues which had traditionally been the domain of the Labour Party. 
2 Paul Cavadino, who served as secretary and adviser to this committee, has 
obsereved that conservative members asked for no information or clarification 
of points of law or matters of fact at any point in the proceedings of the 
committee. 
Thomas JE and Pooley (1980) The Exploding Prison note that prison riots are 
not a new phenomenon but that their frequency and severity has increased in 
the recent period. Perhaps the most serious occurred in Hull in 1976. 
Fitzgerald M and Sim J (1979) British Prisons, suggest that the growth in the 
proportion of 'long-term prisoners in general and lifers in particular' (p. 
89) has been the crucial factor in worsening an already problematic 
situation. 
4 It was drafted in such a hurry that in 1983/4 the clauses in the Bill dealing 
with secure accommodation were withdrawn and redrafted because they were 
unworkable. 
`' As already noted, the evidence suggests that the claim by the magistrates 
that they had been robbed of their powers was, in fact, erroneous since the 
1970s marked a demonstrable expansion of the juvenile court magistrates 
influence in the juvenile criminal justice system of England and Wales. 
6 It is at least plausible to argue that centralisation of control in the 
sphere of juvenile justice is almost always paralleled by lengthening 
sentences and rising reconviction rates. By contrast, decentralisation and 
'informalisation' seem to reverse this process. See Matthews R and Pitts J 
(1987) Disconnecting Juvenile Justice (forthcoming) Papier presented at 
British Criminology Conference, July 1987, Sheffield. 
7 The introduction of the CSO for 16 year olds and the expansion of the 'short- 
sharp-shock: ' regime to all DC, serve as good examples of the ways in which 
the first Thatcher administration developed policy in the face. of pre- 
existing evidence which indicated that the initiatives adopted would be 
unsuccessful. The basis for these developments was almost wholly, 'and 
consciously, ideological. 
ei. 
REFERENCES 
Anderton J (1979), Speech to Manchester, Lunch Club, 14 June 
Burney E (1985), Sentencing Young People, Gower 
Cawson P and Martell P (1979), Children Referred to Closed Units, DHSS, London 
Cornish DB and Clarke RVG (1975), Residential Treatment and its Effects on 
Delinquency, Home Office 
Davies B (1982) Restructuring Youth Policies in Britain - The State Were In, 
National Youth Bureau, Leicester 
DHSS (1983), Local Authority Circular LAC(83)3 Further Development of 
Intermediate Treatment (IT), 26 January 
Farrington D (1984), in Klein W Western Systems of Juvenile Justice, Beverly 
Hills 
Hall S (1979), The Great Moving Right Show in Marxism Today, January 
Hall S (1982), Policing for the Future, speech given to Changing P'olicing': 
A Conference based on the Scarman Report, University of London 
Home Office (1980), Young Offenders 
Home Office (1980), Young Offenders 
Home Office (1982), Criminal Justice Act 
Home Office (1984), Criminal Justice, May, London 
Home Office (1984), Tougher Regimes in Detention Centres, rLondon 
Jenkin P (1979), Opening Address to Getting On with Intermediate Treatment 
Conference, City Hall, Sheffield, 9 July 
Junger Tas J (1984) in Klein W Western Systems of Juvenile Justice, Beverly 
Hills 
Little A (1962), Borstal SIICCesS and the Quality of Borstal Inmates, British 
Journal of Criminology 
Morgan P (1978), Delinquent Fantasies, Maurice Temple Smith, London 
Pearson 6 (1981), Review in Critical Social Policy, Vol No. 1, Summer 
Pitts J and Robinson T (1981), Young Offenders in Lambeth, London Intermediate 
Treatment Association, London 
Platt T and Takagi P (1981), Intellectuals for Law and Order -A Critique 
of the New 'Realists' in Platt T and Takagi P Crime and Social Justice, Macmillan, London 
Parker H (1974), A View from the Boys -A Sociology of Down-town Adolescents, David and Charles 
Pease K, Durkin F, Earnshaw I, Payne D and Thorpe J (1975), Community Service 
E2 
Orders (H ne Office Research Study, No. 29), London, HMSO 
Rutherford A (1986), Gr, owinn Out of Crime, Penguin, London, p. 64 
r 
. ,. j 
v 
0 
83 
h. e+ 
Chapter 4&. 
The Professional Response 1.1969-1975 - The Era of Optimism 
'They start as crusades '- Howard Becker, 
It is ironical that governments which want more law and order usually want 
to spend less public money. They are usually particularly keen to spend less 
public money on welfare services but come reluctantly to realise that if they 
want more law and order then they actually have to increase expenditure on 
welfare. A further irony is that this results in the creation of more jobs for 
people who either do not share their views, or are actively engaged in attempts 
to subvert authoritarian government policies 
i. 
0 
A law and order government creates, by default, the space in which 
radical welfare or a radical social work: may flourish. Looked at another way, 
the growth of radicalism at the welfare end of the justice system is made 
possible by the rise of authoritarian law and order governments. The problem 
for these governments is to re-shape welfare in such a way that it may 
complement their law and order policies. The problem for radicals is to keep 
the space they inhabit sufficiently flexible and ambiguous in order, that they. 
can develop radical initiatives within it`. 
The tensions between the ambitions of governments and the ambitions of 
those charged with the care and control of children and young people'in trouble 
finds expression in the practices which evolve in the wake of legislative or 
policy changes. This tension is nowhere more evident than in the field of 
intermediate treatment (IT). In the period from 1969 IT has provided the stage 
upon which the tensions, conflicts and absurdities in the politics of juvenile 
crime have been played out. 
The most important thing that ever happened to IT was something which 
didn't happen. As a result of they non-implementation of key sections of the 
1969 CYPA IT did not replace the Attendance Centre and the Detention Centre and 
young people aged 15 to 17 were not prevented from being sentenced to Borstal 
,,. 
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training. In 1969 a Labour government had placed IT at the centre of its 
abolitionist juvenile justice strategy. By 1971 IT had lost all its political 
support, all its power, and most of its friends. If IT was going to take 
children and young people out of residential and penal institutions then it 
would have to do this on the basis of influence alone. But as Spencer Millham 
(1977) pointed out, the politics of influence were unlikely to shift IT's most 
intractable adversary, the residential tradition. 
'I would stress to you that the residential tradition is very strong. 
It has been going for nearly 300 years and it is not going to be 
shifted by a few murmurs about Intermediate Treatment, particularly 
when children are often popped into institutions by an administrative 
elite who have been educated in similar places and whose idea of 
adolescent heaven is a whiff of Lifebuoy soap and sweaty socks. Nor 
will it disappear just because you can demonstrate the abilities of 
IT. In the old approved school system demonstrations that the failure 
rates were enormous or that the institutions had a host of other 
difficulties were irrelevant for policy, simply because residential 
institutions have one enormous advantage over community care. Behind 
their walls the children are not visible, and if they run away and 
cause trouble, they are obviously extremely difficult -a view which 
justifies institutional practice. In contrast, if an offender placed 
on a community project misbehaves, people see this as your fault. Far 
from justifying your position, the problems which the adolescent poses 
reproach the intervention. I think this is a very important 
difference between institutional care and intermediate treatment'. 
." (p. 23) `' 
Non-implementation had left IT without a power base. It had no legal, 
political, or, administrative purchase upon the key decision-makers in the 
juvenile criminal justice system. IT emerged from the 1969 CYF'A as an empty. 
space somewhere between probation and incarceration in which somebody, who could 
imagine what IT could do and be, was hopefully going to do something. Unlike 
more established practices within social welfare, which were merely required to 
adapt their existing practices to the requirements of the 1969 Act, IT's first 
job was to invent itself. 
On one hand, IT didn't look like a very good bet for those wishing to 
embark upon a career in social welfare. On the other hand however, it provided 
the perfect vehicle for those who could imagine what IT could be, , and 
for those 
who saw in the poorly-defined nature of IT a perfect opportunity to effect 
S4 
radical smcial change. The subsequent history of IT began with an internal 
struggle between groups of IT workers to define the aims and objectives of IT 
practice. This internal struggle came to assume secondary significance in the 
mid-1970s as it was eclipsed by an external struggle between IT and field and 
residential social work in which IT attempted to gain greater power within local 
authority social services departments in order to exert greater control over the 
operation of the juvenile criminal justice system at a local level4. 
1969 to 1975: The Era of Optimism 
Like most people or movements with identity problems IT has often shown a 
tendency to edit its own history in order to demonstrate that what it is doing 
at the moment is an advance upon what it did in the past. IT is prey to a 
partial but convenient amnesia and a preoccupation with novelty which means that 
many contemporary accounts of the early development of IT tend to be simplifed 
and misleading. 
It is therefore necessary to correct the misapprehension that all early 
forms of IT consisted of therapeutic groups in which politically naive Freudian 
disciples made unwarranted incursions into the lives and liberty of juvenile 
r 
offenders by translating normal youthful misbehaviour into social pathology. 
The endeavour was in fact more diverse, more confused, and much less dogmatic 
than this popular caricature suggests. 
If there aas a dominant intellectual or, ideological influence upon the 
0 
development of IT in the early 1970s it was not one which derived in any 
straightforward way from social work's psychoanalytic inheritance. An equally 
significant influence was derived from the critical theory and the critical 
politics which emerged from the new left and the 'alternative society' in the 
mid- to late 1960s. This influence did not simply take the form of the 
application of a new and better set of curative techniques or 'practice 
theories' to the obvious, essential, and timeless phenomenon of 'juvenile 
delinquency'. Early IT developed within an intellectual climate, a paradigm, 
which offered no specific injunctions for, action, but rendered traditional 
C, r 
conceptions of the problem and traditional formulations of the solution 
problematic. Pearson (1977) identifies the core of this new understanding: 
'We must make here a similar pronouncement: all claims to talk of the 
politics of personal distress, the politics of deviance, and the 
politics of the machinery of the welfare state within which personal 
distress is handled must come to terms with the scandalous imagination 
of the counter, -culture. For it is there that the relationship between 
what is personal and what is political finds some articulation'. 
(p. 80) 
We must remind ourselves about what was happening to welfare and social 
work during this period. As Pearson (1977) again points out: 
'At this time also, of course, we find the emergence of welfare client 
groups (or groups of potential clients) who pose traditional welfare 
problems as politics: Claimants' Unions, Gay Liberation, Women's 
Liberation, Mental Patients' Unions, Child Poverty Action Group, 
various community and neighbourhood control movements, squatters, ' 
Preservation of the Rights of Prisoners (PROF), and in the United 
States the Mental Patients' Liberation Front and the Insane Liberation 
Front'. 
(p. 95) 
It was clearly not the case that more traditional conceptions of the 
problem of, and the solutions to, 'juvenile delinquency' were completely 
supplanted by the adherents of an 't-tppreciative' misfit paradigm. New movements 
co-exist with traditional practices. A single social work agency. may contain 
practitioners, administrators and senior executives who understand the problems 
they confront and the solutions to these problems in radically different ways. 
What is the case, is that in the early 1970s , it was the ideas which emerged 
from new left politics and the alternative society ideas brought to the Seebohm 
departments by the great influx of new professional workers who had been 
participants in the turbulent politics of the 1960s, which gave the impetus to 
some of the most significant innovations in work with children and young people 
in trouble with the law. 
In the period 1969 to 1975 the practice of IT was influenced and shaped by 
w broader, and arguably much more significant, political and professional 
movements. While some had a direct and obvious impact upon the practice of IT 
others were more oblique, lending a way of seeing and understanding young people 
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and their offe=nding rather than a prPscr,. pt ion for action. What they shared was 
an optimism about thFcý possibility of e-; fecttng positive betterment as a result 
of intervention in the lives and nelcihbourhoods of the socially disadvantaged. 
They were Radical Welfare; the alternative movements; social facilitation and 
normalisation and welcare and treatment. 
Radical Welfare 
By 1969 in Britain, the brief economic boom was ending causing unemployment 
in general but youth unemployment in particular to rise. The idea that youth 
unemployment was now a permanent feature of British economic life rather than 
. 
a. 
recurrent but temporary problem related to fluctuations in the trade cycle was 
Raining currency in government circles. Meanwhile the attempt to reduce poverty 
through the expansion of the personal social services and educational 
opportunity had yielded little obvious success. 
The problem confronting the govvrnmont in 1Q69 was like a chinese box in 
which each door which is opened reveals anoathr". er one. There was a problem of 
youth unemployment but within this w. as the problem that it was economically and 
educationally disadvantaged young peoples who were most likely to be unemployed. 
Within this was the problem that there was a disproportionate concentration of 
economically and educationally disadvantaged young people in the blighted inner 
cities where unemployment levels were highest. Within this was the problem that 
a disproportionate number of these economically and educationally disadvantaged 
unemnployed inner-city young people were black. Within this was the problem that 
in the disadvantaged, unemployed, ýý:! i F; -r {acta 1, änner-city, juvenile crime rates 
were highest. Indeed, had it been r', c, ss: Lbje to eradicate the crime perpetrated 
by children ana young people xn the nji. iinnt zones of the major British cities, 
then statistically at least, Britain would hive emerged as a virtually crime- 
free society. What was needed wa practicable point of entry to this complex 
web of inter-related problems. 
Thp Wilson administration was having American nightmares and American 
8".. 
dreams bemause Enoch Powell had predicted 'race riots' in his infamous 'Rivers 
of Blood' speech and many influential commentators believed that it was 
precisely these conditions which had led to the riots of 1967 and 1968 in the 
American inner cities 
5. On the other hand, the Kennedy administration had 
apparently devised a solution. Harold Wilson's solution to crime, unemployment 
and poverty in the inner city in Britain in 1969 was based upon the definition 
of the problem and the recommended remedies devised in the early 1960s by the 
architects of the US poverty programme. 
Juvenile crime became a major political issue in the USA in 1960 because it 
contained within it the two most pressing political problems with which the 
Kennedy administration had to deal. They were: the problem of the unequal 
position of black Americans, and a level of unemployment, unsurpassed since the 
Great Depression, which had led to staggeringly high levels of joblessness 
amongst black American and Puerto Rican young people in the ghettos of the 
northern cities, the areas where crime rates were highest. The massive 'March 
on Washington' by black and white civil rights campaigners in 1963 was for 'Jobs 
and Freedom' and increasingly black activists insisted that the demand for equal 
civil rights and the demand for equal economic and educational opportunity were 
indivisible. 
In 1961 John F Kennedy established the Pr'esident's Committee an Juvenile 
Delinquency and Youth Crime and appointed his brother Robert, the attorney 
general, as Chairman. One of the most influential and persuasive members of the 
Committee was Lloyd Ohlin of the Columbia School of Social Work. The Committee 
was profoundly influenced by a book published in 1960 and written by Lloyd Ohlin 
and his colleague at Columbia, Richard Cloward. The book was called 
'Delinquency and Opportunity'. 
It is undoubtedly the case that the work of Cloward and Ohlin gave the 
intellectual rationale not only for 'Mobilisation for Youth' which was Ohlin's 
specific concern, but for, the entire poverty programme. They developed a theory 
which explicitly and implicity, informed the politicans who developed the US and 
the British poverty programmes and the administrators and active-, ts who tried to 
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make them work. 
4, 
Cloward and Ohlin argued that in the United States the dominant culture, 
mediated via the press, television, and the educational system, presents all 
citizens, irrespective of their social or economic position with universally 
valued success goods. This culture suggests moreover that these goals may be 
attained by all on the basis of hard wort:: and individual endeavour. It is as if 
everybody can make the journey from the log cabin to the White House if they 
have a mind. The reality which belies the 'American Dream' is that the 
opportunity to achieve these success goals is not distributed equally. Down at 
the bottom of the social heap among the young people of the ghetto such 
b legitimate opportunities hardly exist at all. 
This presents the lower-class residents of the ghetto with something of an 
ontological problem. If they are unable to achieve socially valued success 
goals then either they are failures or something else is going on. They have, 
Cloward and Ohlin suggest, three options. They may avoid blaming themselves by 
banding together with other young people in a similar predicament in order to 
redefine the situation as one in which the system conspires to keep them down. 
Thus, in the manner of Durkheim's functional rebels, they Aay innovate by 
adopting illegitimate opportunity structures (ie, crime) in order to achieve the 
valued goals. This is only possible however if they have access to a mileau 
'the organised slum' in which the activity is culturally supported and a 
sufficiently sophisticated criminal infrastructure, into which they can be 
absorbed, is in existence. 
If however they live in a 'disor'ganised slum', the new housing projects in 
which characteristically Puerto Rican or black American emigres from the 
southern states are housed, and in which no reliable illegitimate infrastructure 
has had a chance to develop, they can still collectively avoid self-blame. They 
can do this by sidestepping universal success goals in favour of an alternative 
status system based upon toughness and bravery, demonstrated in gang fights. In 
this alternative status system the ceiling of one's aspirations is established 
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by the si; of the mileau in which one gains one's reputation. 
For those who are denied legitimate opportunity, have no access to the 
criminal 'goings on' of the organised slum, and cannot fight their way out of a 
paper bag the prospects are bleaker. They will continue to accept socially 
valued goals but they must also accept that they have failed as individuals to 
achieve these goals, they come to blame themselves. This, Cloward and Ohlin, 
argue accounts for the retreatism, the withdrawal into alcohol and drugs, which 
is so common amongst lower-class ghetto youth. 
Cloward and Ohlin point out that the organised slum is characterised by 
close relations between criminals in the illegitimate opportunity structure, -the 
police, local government officers, and local politicians. Not to put too fine a 
point on it 'the fix is in'. As a result of this the organised slum is, a mileau 
subject to tight social control in which conformity is demanded of the young. 
Nobody in the organised slum wishes to attract too much 'heat', nobody 'rocks 
the boat'. The organised slum is an intricate social system built upon a 
complet web of favours and tacit understandings, and a firm commitment by all 
participants to keep things the way they are. Nobody riots in the organised 
slum. Cloward and Ohlin are ambivalent about the organised slum because what 
they describe is so obviously capitalism with a human fäce operating slightly to 
one side of the straight and narrow. It is as if they are saying with the 
character in 'Pritzi's Honour' 'They saw a chance to make a buck, and they took 
it, it's the American way'7 
What is so intriguing about 'Delinquency and Opportunity' is that the 
illegitimate opportunity structure of the organised slum is not presented as a 
problem. On the contrary, it is presented as a blueprint for the solution to 
the problem of the disorganised slum. Cloward and Ohlin's book is not about how 
juvenile crime can be stopped. It is about how juvenile crime might be 
contained at an acceptable level and rioting averted. The organised slum was 
doing alright on its own but if violence, rioting and social mayhem were to be 
avoided then the disorganised slum had to get a lot more of what the organised 
9c) 
slum had p abundance, and that was organisation. 
'Don't Agonise, Organise' 
The major thrust of what came to be called the 'War on Poverty' was the 
involvement of the residents of the disorganised slum in the planning and 
implementation of programmes which would create opportunity for children and 
young people in those areas. The job of the professional workers was to 
mobilise the 'indigenous leadership'. Problems in local communities were to be 
defined by local people, young and old, and campaigns were to be launched. 
Discriminatory practices in local industries were to be challenged. Barriers to 
educational access and achievement were to be bludgeoned down by a politically 
aware community using a combination of community action and compensatory 
programmes for educationally deprived youngsters (Sesame Street meets the 
Weathermen). Local welfare bureaucracies were to be called to account. Robert 
F Kennedy speaking of the existing social welfare structure said: 
'They plan for the poor not with them. Part of the sense of 
helplessness and futility comes from the feeling of powerlessness to 
affect the operations of these organisations. The community action 
programs must basically change these organisations by building into the 
program real representation for the poor. This bill calls for 
'maximum feasible participation of the residents'. This means the 
involvement of the poor in planning and implementing programs, giving 
them a real voice in their institutions'. 
(Moynihan P, 1969, pp. 90-91) 
The war an poverty seemed to offer, the possibility of the state-sponsored. 
subversion of state agencies by the people. The proponents of a radical welfare 
through community action, a welfare designed by the people, for the people, were 
set against traditional welfare in the belief that the process whereby the 
residents of the disorganised slum would 'get out from under', would enable them 
'to develop the degree of social organisation', and hence social stability, 
which would allow residents to create and utilise opportunity. The 
organisational structures developed during the political struggles would serve 
the same purposes that the inter-relations of local government officials, 
police, politicians and community leaders had in the organised slum. The 
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disorganised slum would be grafted back onto the body politic. 
The poverty programme in Britain and the US contained the central ambiguity 
that in as much as it seemed to offer a political voice to the poor it also 
offered to 'cool out' genuine dissent, among the poor, by deflecting their 
attention away from issues of structural social inequality towards questions of 
how a finite quantity of welfare resources was to be distributed. Beyond this 
the poverty programme seemed to offer a more pervasive form of social control in 
the guise of social improvement. Harold Wilson handed responsibility for the 
British poverty programme to Derek Morrell and Joan Cooper (the architects of 
the 1969 CYPA) who showed an awareness of the more insidious aspects of the 
Proposed endeavour. 
'Miss Cooper (Chief Inspector, Children's Department, Home Office) said 
that in both the British and American plans there appeared to be an 
element of looking for a new method of social control - what one might 
call an anti-value rather than a value. 'Gilding the ghetto' or 
buying time, was clearly a component in the planning of both CDF' and 
Model Cities (the US Poverty Programme)'. 
Home Office (1977) 
Nevertheless, Derek Morrell saw in the Community Development Projects the 
possibility of developing a new tier of representative local government, the 
'neighbourhood council' as ,a means whereby the marginalised and disenfranchised 
residents of the poorest parts of society could make their voices heard. 
'The Chairman (Mr Derek: Morrell) said the general context (of the 
discussion) was in his view the liberal democratic process. It would 
be possible to discuss programmes and policy on the assmption that we 
had lost faith in this process, but he himself believed it had a 
highly creative future potential ... The whole process ... involved practical problems of the transfer of power from the 'haves' 
to the 'have-nots' - power, in the sense of the ability to effect or 
resist change'. 
Home Office (1977) 
The British poverty programme was composed of the Urban Programme (urban 
aid), Educational Priority Areas, Community Development Projects, Inner area 
Studies, Quality of Life projects and hundreds of more modest endeavours located 
in local authority social services, and housing departments, settlement houses, 
and other, voluntary organisations. 4 
Cooper and Marrell's 1969 CYPA strove to humanise social reaction to 
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children vid young people in trouble. Cooper and Morrell's poverty programme 
attempted to strike at the root causes of juvenile crime by orchestrating a 
political assault upon poverty at a local level. It is hardly surprising then 
that Cooper and Morrell's intermediate treatment, which had been reduced to an 
ambiguous and poorly-defined entity drifting somewhere between the Borstal and 
deprived inner-city children hanging about on a street corner, should eventually 
find itself caught up in the radical welfare practices of the British poverty 
programme. 
Whereas the ways in which the poverty programme was formulated by the 
British government left open the question of whether poverty was in fact the 
fault of the poor, the practitioners of radical welfare were in no doubt that it 
was not. The final report of the Coventry CDP asserted that: 
'2.0: We can no longer accept that the problems of Hillields can be 
satisfactorily explained primarily as the result of: 
i) inadequacy, pathology, deviancy or any other personal 
characteristics of its residents; 
ii) apathy or failure to participate in community activity; 
iii) low take-up of personal support services or poor communication 
between fieldworkers and residents; or 
iv) technical incompetence or failures in planning, management or 
administration of local government. 
2.1: Few of the problems (except redevelopment) experienced by 
individuals in Hillfields are different in kind from those 
experienced by large sections of the working class in other parts 
of the city, or indeed the country as a whole (eg, precarious 
incomes, insecure housing, etc). They must be treated therefore 
as part of that class, not as a separate minority sub-group'. 
Bennington et al, 1975, p. 63 
The endeavour, was unequivocally concerned with social need but 
v 
constitutionally opposed to ideas of individual pathology . Radical welfare is 
the attempt to effect localised political change through the participation of 
socially disadvantaged people. Whether practiced in the family, a tenants 
group, or an entire city it assumes that socially disadvantaged people 
encounter, experience and are oppressed by problems which are an unavoidable by- 
product of the recurrent economic crises endemic to an advanced capitalist 
society. This assumption may be right or wrong but it leads inevitably to a 
position in which intervention is not directed towards the attitudes, feelings, 
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or behaviour, of the disadvantaged subject because this would mean falling into 
the same trap as traditional social work. It would involve 'blaming the 
victim'. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s practitioners of IT and community work 
did not seem unduly concerned that they lacked a discreet respectable, and 
sacrosanct professional identity with its attendant body of theory, knowledge 
and expertise. The involvement of IT in radical welfare took: the form of the 
participation of IT workers and the investment of what vestigial amounts of IT 
money existed, 'in tasks which complemented broader local anti-poverty 
strategiesg. These tasks were seldom called IT because what things were called 
mattered less than how the central problem of poverty, which offered the key to 
all the other problems, could be assaulted. Thus, working with groups of young 
people, some of whom had a substantial involvement in crime, in order to devise 
ways of achieving better leisure services, was regarded as a perfectly 
legitimate use of IT time and resources because it addressed the issue of the 
powerlessness of the poor. Philip Cohen (1978) gives the flavour of this type 
of endeavour: 
'At a meeting in August 1973, the Open Space Committee was finally 
overthrown in a bitter coup, and a new and comparatively inexperienced 
group of tenants were democratically elected as the official Tenants 
Association. This was done with not a little prodding from local 
Community Organiser, Gerry Stern, a young man working for the Home 
Office-backed Community Development Commission ... p. 40 
v 
'While the Tenants Association Committee was suffering its birth 
pangs, the Youth Group was faced with the possibility of increasing 
youth militancy around the issue of a disco club for the Black Horse 
pub. It will be remembered that the haphazard youth alliance had 
suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of the Open Space Committee. 
Subsequently there had been talk. of storming the place and occupying 
it, with vague threats from some boys of putting the place out of 
commission if they weren't given what they wanted. However direct 
action was rejected by the Youth Group - why march yet another youth 
army up yet another futile hill'', So with the demise of the Open Space 
Committee and the ascendance of the new Tenants Association, the Youth 
Group decided to embark on the tactics of careful patient negotiation'. 
(p. 42-43) 
Radical welfare addressed the relationship between the disadvantaged and 
those state institutions which have the power to offer, or, withhold, goods and 
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services from them. The state institution which has the greatest impact upon 
the life chances of children and young people is the school. There were many 
initiatives, some of them orchestrated via the Educational Priority Areas 
programme, which strove to make education accountable to its local community. 
In this sphere IT resources were used to promote work which tried to reconcile- 
the needs and desires of deprived young people with the demands of the school. 
Roger Evans (1982) illustrates an approach to this work: 
... they came to see that the incidents had common elements as 
between individuals and individual schools. We asked the boys what 
they could do about these injustices which, on their evidence, had a 
basis in fact. Their common opinion was that to complain as 
individuals just led to further trouble. After a lively discussion on 
this point it was proposed that a film depicting scenes in school 
should be made. If shown to teachers this might both protect 
individuals as it came from the group and it might open up a dialogue 
with the local schools involved. As far as the staff were concerned 
the general aims of the video were: firstly, to increase collective 
consciousness about incidents in school and start making an analysis 
of them during the making of the film, secondly to explore alternative 
ways of handling situations both on the part of the boys and the 
teachers and in terms of challenging and changing school organisation 
(p. 34) 
The identification of the school as a site for intevention had a very 
respectable theoretical pedigree. In 195 AK Cohen had demonstrated the ways 
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in which the school promoted status frustration by presenting its pupils-with 
unattainable social goals. In 1967 David Hargreaves had shown how bright 
working class boys moved steadily down from the A stream in the first year of 
secondary modern school to the C stream in the fourth year, as a result of their 
social class orientation rather than their intellectual ability. Most 
importantly, in 1967, Michael Power discovered large differences in delinquency 
rates between ostensibly similar secondary modern schools which could not be 
explained in terms of the delinquency rates in the areas from which the schools 
drew their pupils. It was on this basis that the concept of the delinquescent 
school, a school which generated high levels of delinquency, was developed. 
Intervention in the delinquescent school using community action techniques has a 
much stronger empirical and theoretical justification than intervention with 
individual offenders or, their families. Early IT in the guise of radical 
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welfare made this important theoretical connection and developed models for 
intervention in the school. 
The community action approach of radical welfare offered a three 
dimensional view of juvenile crime. Professional workers could well be in 
contact with the young offender, his or her parents, the victim, the police, and 
the social worker at the same time. It was not uncommon for workers to try to 
mediate between young offenders and their victims, or between families involved 
in disputes or vendettas. In one area in London the local authority community 
worker and the IT worker organised a meeting between a group of black young 
people, who lived in the upper storeys of a block of flats and played football 
in the courtyard, and the nervous elderly white inhabitants of the ground floor 
who were frightened by the boys and kept phoning the police. This had'led to an 
incident one Guy Fawkes night in which two police cars were burned and a lot of 
young people ar, r, ested10 . 
The meeting yielded an agreement that if the football games were restricted 
to mutually agreed times and the swearing was kept down a bit then the police 
would not be called, but that in any event they would only be called if the 
nominated representative of the elderly residents could not sort the problem out 
with the nominated representative of the footballers. This type of, what came 
to be called, 'extra-judicial conflict resolution' did much to prevent 
vulnerable young people from being criminalised. 
Radical Welfare chose to enter the juvenile criminal justice system only in 
the role of advocate and it did this, as often as not, with the backing of an 
urban-aid-funded law centre. The ethos of radical welfare, drawn from 
contemporary revolutionary politics, indicated that to get inside the system and 
away from one's political constituency, who were the 'victims' of that system, 
was bad ethics and bad politics. Radical welfare would. normally rather 
challenge a practice than collude with it in the hope that the practice might be 
" modified. 
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The endeavour of radical welfare was ultimately to move the class struggle 
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out of the factory and into the community. It strove to politicise personal 
suffering. In the community action approach it saw a way of developing a 
'pedagogy of the oppressed', a radical do-it-yourself political education. It 
had remarkable political ambitions, sometimes believing that it could be the 
means whereby the capitalist state could be destabilised. It was 
unrealistically optimistic in believing that an #80,000,000 war an poverty, 
using welfare as the heavy artillery, could effect substantial and lasting 
social change. Yet, all this said, the analysis of the problem, developed by 
Cloward and Ohlin, and many of the solutions, devised by the poverty warriors, 
remain more plausible responses to the phenomenon of juvenile crime in the inner 
city than the theories and interventions which preceded them and most of the 
theories and interventions which came after. 
The Alternatives Movement 
The 1960s saw the rise of the Alternative Education movement in the United 
States and Western Europe. In Deschooling Society (1971) Ivan Illich draws 
attention to the ways in which the hidden curriculum of formal schooling 
systematically inhibits learning. 
'The hidden curriculum is always the same regardless of school or 
place. It requires all children of a certain age to assemble in 
groups of about thirty, under the authority of a certified teacher, 
for some 500 or 1000 or more hours per year. ... What is important in the hidden curriculum is that students learn that education is 
valuable when it is acquired in the school through a gradual process 
of consumption; that the degree of success the individual will enjoy 
in society depends on the amount of learning he consumes; and that 
learning about the world is more valuable than learning from the 
world'. 
p. 13 
The Alternative Education Movement, which was inspired by the ideas of Ivan 
Illich and Paulo Friere attempted to 'liberate' children and young people from 
the oppressive structures of formal schooling by providing them with 'Free 
Schools' geared to learning through dialogue with others and an exploration of 
one's self and one's relationships. 
Friere (1970) describes this process: 
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'There are many among them (oppressed people) that flee from freedom. 
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Oppression is such a deep strong reality that it produces fear of 
freedom. Fear of freedom exists when one sees a threat even in 
talking about it. Freedom is never a gift. It is something difficult 
because nobody can give freedom to somebody else and nobody makes 
himself free either. Men are made free in communion with others 
through a situation we have to change. We have to make our freedom 
together, with others - 'We' not 'I''. 
Dale R et al, 1976, p. 227 
In Britain the rise of the Alternative Education movement had been 
paralelled by a process of spontaneous 'de-schooling' in which truancy rates in 
the third, fourth, and fifth forms of inner city secondary schools had risen as 
high as 40'.. This was causing more than a little embarrassment to local 
education authorities and head teachers. By 1970 the alternative education 
movement, which aimed to subvert formal education, was being offered funds by 
local education authorities to deal with its truanting and disruptive pupils. 
It was not that education authorities or head teachers had undergone a 
miraculous conversion to the libertarian gospels of Illich and Friere, it was 
rather that they kgeW it made sense. The free schools demonstrated an ability 
to work effectively with children who were irretrievably lost to formal 
education. Small groups, a high adult-child ratio, the absence of academic 
competition, and the individual attention, concern, and support offered to 
children with learning or emotional difficulties, had the effect of drawing 
these lost children back into education. The names of children who attended 
free schools usually remained on the register of their secondary school of 
origin whose truancy rates consequently improved. The agreement between the 
education authority and the free school usually contained a statement to the 
effect that the objective to be achieved by the child's attendance at the free 
school was an eventual return to formal schooling. This appeared to place the 
free school in the role of a therapeutic unit. Since, however, the education 
authority, head teachers and free school workers all knew that this caveat was a 
face-saving nicety whereby the education authority could have truck with 
renegade educationalists without appearing to accept their damning critique of 
formal education, nobody was too worried that few if any children would in fact 
return to school. 
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For the free school, these children and young people were Friere's 
'oppressed' whether they came with local authority money or not. This was not 
simply left-romanticism in which non-conforming children, whatever their 
motivation, are seen as nascent revolutionaries. The oppression was in most 
cases all too real and the children who attended the free schools were as much 
the victims of the 'delinquescent school' as of their chaotic or impoverished 
family circumstances. 
'Reynolds and Murgatroyd (1977) found that attendance rates were worse 
in schools with a high use of corporal punishment; Heal (1978) found 
that misbehaviour was worse in schools with formal punishment systems; 
and Clegg and Megson (1968) noted that delinquency rates tended to be 
highest in schools with a great deal of corporal punishment ... the 
trend was far more misbehaviour and more delinquency with high levels 
of punishment; and this trend was significant in the case of 
particular forms of punishment (unofficial slapping and cuffing of 
children and a disciplianry style in the classroom which involved 
frequent checking and reprimanding)'. 
Rutter G and Gi l ler" H, 1983 
The free school was enormously attractive to IT for a number of reasons. 
Practically it offered a form of day care which provided the full-time education 
required by the 1944 education act. Free schools had staff and premises whereas 
IT was only empowered to fund the participation of individual young people in 
existing statutory or voluntary provision. The other important benefit the free 
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school offered IT and the Social Services departments was its willingness to 
work with long-term truants who were also offenders. By far the highest 
proportion of children and young people in CHEs were there as a result of their 
persistent truancy rather, than their, offending. As we have already noted the 
1976 White Paper specifically addressed the assumption that persistent truants 
should be placed in residential care and it did this because of pressure upon 
central government from local authorities which could no longer afford this 
remarkably expensive and ineffective response to non-school attendance. The 
free school offered the possibility of averting reception into care thereby 
saving the social services department a great deal of time and money. 
The free school was so important to education authorities and social 
services departments in their attempts to manage their troublesome young people 
that they all but annexed it. The free school was one of the great successes of 
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the late 1960s and early 1970s and it is no surprise that the IT day care 
centres and the off-site educational units, established later in the decade bore 
more than a passing resemblance to it. Staffed jointly by teachers and social 
workers, who sometimes owed their first allegiance to their employing authority 
rather than a philosophy about how young people can be freed to learn, the 
11 freedom of the free school was often lost in translation. 
The alternatives movement had an impact in psychiatry where the work of 
Bateson, Foucault, and Laing and Esterton challenged a medical model of madness 
and sanity. It gave the intellectual rationale for the community arts movement. 
The rise of the adventure playground was in no small part a consequence of the 
radical shift in the perception of children championed by the alternatives 
movement. From being perceived as no more than the product of the socialising 
and controlling endeavours of parents and other grown-up authority figures, the 
image of the child was redrawn to depict a resourceful self-managing choice- 
making, creative being who, given the appropriate materials, freedom and 
responsibility could learn to grow up and be quite a nice person at the same 
time. 
One aspect of the 'alternative' vision, epitomised in the contemporary 
slogan 'steal yourself', stressed the importance of individuality and individual 
liberation. The other aspect placed on emphasis upon communalism and the 
identification of a shared predicament. Faul Senior (1985) writes of a 
probation day centre in which this sharing is attempted: 
From this group sharing comes the realisation that what traditionally 
have been seen as 'personal problems' in fact have social and 
political bases and solutions. Seemingly complex analytical issues 
such as power and its use can and should be examined within personal 
situations. Consciousness-raising deliberately locates thinking in 
everyday experience and arises from the ability to translate those 
experiences into altered perceptions of the same reality ... Friere 
offers a different insight in relation to the same dilemma. Examining 
education, he argues that it cannot be seen as a neutral process and, 
of necessity, means political activity. He refers to the idea of 
conscientisation as 'A permanent critical approach to reality in order 
to discover the myths that deceive us and help to maintain the 
oppressing dehumanising structures' (Friere, 1976). Again there is an 
emphasis on collective discovery and collective action, on not pre- determining goals but encouraging congruity between personal and 
political dimensions'. 
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One sometimes had the sense that the alternatives movement was a green 
house where citizens for the new society were being grown. There was an 
implicit faith that if we could increase the numbers of people with the new 
consciousness then that quantitative change would transform itself into a 
qualitative change in the social order. It was as if the alternative schools, 
psychiatric refuges, arts, playgrounds and shops would eventually, by a process 
of steady incremental, expansion, come to engulf that other world to which they 
were the alternative. Timothy Leary posited precisely this model of how social 
revolutions happen when he suggested a short cut which involved putting LSD into 
the New York water supply in order to 'turn on' the entire city and with this 
first taste of personal liberation, effect an overnight social revolution. 
Radical welfare saw new human beings emerging as a result of experiences 
gained in the political struggle to change the external world. In this 
conception human beings emerge as simultaneously transforming and transformed 
in a perpetual dialectic between personal identity and political action. The 
alternatives movement, by contrast, built human-sized, human oriented 
alternatives run on humanistic principles to produce more fully human beings who 
would, hopefully, come into their own when the world came to its senses 
12.. 
Social Facilitatinn and Normalisation 
One lesson we can learn from a consideration of the history of IT is that 
the professional practices which develop into orthodoxies tend to be those which 
can be most readily adapted to serve as vehicles for the achievement of 
particular political goals at a particular time. They must moreover be fairly 
easily accommodated within, or adaptable to, pre-existing administrative 
categories and bureaucratic structures. Like theories of deviant behaviour 
their popularity, or acceptability to governments, policy makers, and 
bureaucrats is not contingent upon them offering an accurate account of the 
problem or a demonstrably effective response to it. Good ideas and 
'apparently 
effective practices often evaporate through a lack: of political punctuality and 
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their administrative and bureaucratic inconvenience. They are for9ötten' ands 
`' 
history gets written around them not about them. 
Here is a remarkable observation about the impact of a delinquency 
prevention project which operated in`Manchester between 1966 and 
1969. 
From January 1966 to July 1969 one year after the end of the social 
work programme, controls had been sentenced to and received a total". af 
909 weeks of residential training. Seven boys were still undergoing 
training and, calculating an the basis of an average length of. bbrstal. ". 
training of 18 months, were expected to receive a further 153 weeks-., - 
during the following twelve months giving an overall total of 1,062- 
weeks. By July 1969 participants had spent-169 weeks in such-training 
and were expected to receive a further 13*weeks-giving a total of-182. -,. 
weeks. Correcting for the differences in size of, -the two groups be. 
would have expected the participants to have spent an extra 593 weeks 
in training had they followed the pattern 'of the control grbup`"'. ýý. °ý 
(p. 255) 
Put another way, participants in the'project were expected, on average, to 
spend 3.5 times longer in custody than they actually did. The project madeä*. 
significant impact upon participants' offending but it was as a. method of 
intervention which diverted young people in trouble from custody that Wincroft 
has an obvious claim upon the attention of IT. It seems strange then that in 
1972, when the results of Wincroft were published, ' IT did not set about 
translating the lessons of Wincroft into the practice of IT"lock, stock and 
barrel since it appeared to offer IT a4way of doing what it was originally 
. .f invented to do, namely keeping young people out of prison. In the current. 
literature on IT and juvenile justice there are few if any references to 
Wincrof t. 
A discussion paper produced in 1965 stated the objectives of the project-as 
follows: 
'(a) To work with young people'in need of help, and assist them in finding a dynamic adjustment to society, and thereby among'other things to control delinquency; 
, (b) To develop methods of working with difficult young people in an unstructured setting'. 
(p. 6) .. c 
tVz. 
Wincroft's rationale suggested that in certain neighbourhoods in large 
cities we will find areas with unusually high levels of juvenile delinquency. 
These areas will tend to be run-down, one-class inner areas characterised by all 
the usual indicators of urban deprivation. In these areas we will find a 
disproportionate number of young people with whom urban schools, youth clubs, 
and welfare agencies will find it hard to make and sustain contact. These will 
be the youngsters who get suspended from schools, thrown out of youth clubs, and 
whom social workers and probation officers find most resistant. They will be 
the young people who get arrested and sent to community homes and borstals, not 
least because nobody has a good word to say about them. 
These people are of course Patrick Jenkin's 'avalanche of lawlessness' 
(1979), A Future for IT's 'persistent delinquents' (1977), The Expenditure 
Committee Report's 'hard-core' (1975) and modern day ITs 'heavy end'. The 
Wincroft Youth Project described them as 'participants'. Wincroft, having 
identified the 54 boys most 'at risk' in the chosen area proceeded to contact 
there by using 'detached work' methods of the type developed in the street gang 
work undertaken by the New York City Youth Board. This involved using, in the 
three years of the project, 156 students and volunteers as detached Social 
Workers who made contact with the peer groups in which the target 'clients' were 
located. The workers worked with 600 young people in order to be able to work 
with the 54 target clients in groups. They recognised the importance of the 
peer group and the more extensive local adolescent networks as a potential 
generating mileau for juvenile crime. The role of the worker was to enable 
those natural groups to identify their needs and wishes and to facilitate 
problem-solving, and the development of social education or recreational 
activities with them. The worker was there to facilitate culturally deprived 
young people in their endeavour to achieve goals and to take opportunities 
normally only available to more privileged youngsters. The emphasis was upon 
opening up access to normality. There was an assumption in the project that 
much of the apparently disturbed behaviour of the target clients was a function 
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of cultural deprivation. A frustration borne of an absence of opportunity, 
permission, and the tools and materials with which to develop their own 
interests and fulfil their own needs. 
One of Wincroft's most remarkable achievements was that it made and 
sustained contact over a three-year period, with young people who were selected 
because other professional workers had found this insuperably difficult. The 
project had dispensed with premises since the common experience of Youth Workers 
and others trying to deal with difficult young people in premises designed to 
attract them was that the need to protect and defend these very premises from 
them constituted a very serious barrier to contact. The other feature of the 
project which seemed to promote success was its commitment to 'permissiveness' 
and the absence of negative sanctions. 
'One further aspect of the method of working in Wincroft deserves some 
comment, since it has been widely misunderstood, this is the use of 
permissiveness as a technique and must be distinguished from 
permissiveness as an ideology. Permissiveness is a technique to keep 
open a relationship where the client can and will break it off if he is subjected to the disciplines that normal adolescents would accept. 
It has particular value to the withdrawn child who may need to be 
encouraged to act out some of the aggressive feelings that he normally 
conceals because he is fearful of the consequences, and also to the 
child who tests adults out in order to prove that they will punish him 
and do not love him'. 
(p. 264) ,,. .. 
Wincroft had an important impact upon youth work, offering as it did, the 
most comprehensive account of British detached youth work available. Its impact 
upon IT was more oblique. Some projects adopted the detached work method 
pioneered by Wincroft, but on a smaller scale. Others benefitted from the 
guiding assumptions of Wincroft about the nature of juvenile crime in slum 
areas. Yet others derived important ideas about monitoring, evaluation and 
research. But given the obvious applicability of Wincroft to IT we are still 
left with the question of why Wincroft was the first project of its kind in 
Britain and also the last. 
In the mid 1960s social welfare and social work seemed set for a period of 
rapid expansion. The probation service, the children's departments, education 
welfare, and mental welfare were poised, to pool their resources and expertise 
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in a new 'family service'. The newly professionalised youth service was 
developing as a community work agency and this coincided with a growing desire 
on the part of mainstream social work to use a community devleopment approach to 
address social problems. The new Certificate of Social Work courses developed 
curricula which had considerable points of overlap with the curricula of youth 
and community work courses. Preventive work, research, experimentation, and the 
use of volunteers were in the ascendant. It seemed that a convergence of ideas, 
efforts, professional orientation methods and. theories would result in a unitary 
personal social services agency which would deploy the most effective and 
scientifically respectable interventions available to resolve social problems. 
This was the climate of optimism in which Wincroft developed and the projected 
structure in which the lessons of Wincroft were to have been elaborated into a 
routine social welfare practice. 
By the early 1970s the political and administrative picture was very 
different. A Conservative government through the 1972 Criminal Justice Act had 
injected substantially increased resources into the probation service in order 
that it could develop into a community correctional resource geared towards 
reaction to, rather than anticipation of, juvenile crime. The new social 
services departments were short of social workers and in a state of disarray 
because of the non-implementation of key sections of the 1969 CYPA. The 
Educational Welfare Service was professionalised and expanded but was quickly 
consumed with the problem of policing the rapidly-rising levels of truancy in 
inner-city schools. The youth service, resisting attempts to implicate itself 
in IT and the statutory surveillance of youth, committed itself to a community 
development approach and to discrimination in favour of the poor. This 
signalled the beginning of its decline as a social service. 
There was nowhere for Wincroft to go. Its commitment to prevention was out 
of time with the dominant political thinking on crime which increasingly 
favoured reaction. Administratively Wincroft could not be fitted into any of 
the agencies concerned with social need, juvenile crime or community 
development. 
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Wincroft pioneered important and original approaches to juvenile crime. It 
provided an important test-bed for sociological and criminological theories, but 
the most important lessons it had to teach IT were not learned. Wincroft's 
success in diverting young people in trouble from care or custody has been 
attributed to the fact that probation officers, social workers and juvenile 
court magistrates were aware that the project participants were in regular 
contact with a social work agency, and that they were also part of a 
'delinquency reduction' experiment. As a result, it is suggested, courts were 
inclined to make non-custodial sentences and social workers and probation 
officers less inclined to recommend custody. This is an important observation 
because subsequent work in the field of juvenile justice has asserted that if 
the juvenile bench realises that the offender in the dock is already involved in 
a delinquency prevention or treatment programme which, by the evidence of the 
court appearance, has been unsuccessful, then the offender's progress into care 
or custody will be accelerated. This argument asserts that any attempt to 
anticipate delinquency or to prevent it by social work intervention must 
inevitably lead to stigmatisation and criminalisation and that such endeavours 
should be abandoned in favour of 'leaving the kids alone'. 
The findings of Wincroft suggest that it was precisely because juvenile 
court magistrates did know that the young offenders who participated in Wincroft 
were the objects of professional intervention and research that they were 
treated leniently. The Wincroft participants were rescued from imprisonment by 
a combination of academic respectability, the aura of professionalism, and the 
lk 
Hawthorn effects Magistrates, then as now it seems, could often be 
persuaded to keep young offenders in the community if they could be persuaded 
that somebody competent was doing something sensible with them. 
It is ironical that in 1986 the results of projects which have attempted to 
help communities develop into 'safe neighbourhoods' by introducing measures to 
minimise crime all point to the need to intervene in the peer groups and the 
networks of local adolescents (22). Recently a worker in an intensive 
ipG 
intermediate treatment project funded by Leon Brittan's new initiative was asked 
by his colleagues to see if he could find out what a thing called the 'Wincroft 
project' had been. 
Welfare and Treatment 
In 1971 the Manchester Youth Development Trust (MYDT) which had initiated 
the Wincroft Youth, Project, established an experimental IT project. This was 
one of ten projects which were to be monitored by the DHSS. Like Wincroft the 
IT project aimed to work with children and young people identified by social 
workers and teachers as delinquent and at risk of reception into care. The work 
focussed initially upon the school where project workers and teachers worked 
together with small groups of identified children and young people and their 
friends. The project was a product of Wincroft and it attempted to refine the 
technique developed initially by Wincroft in which the workers worked with the 
identified client within his or her 'natural' peer group. Over time the project 
was subject to growing pressure from the Local Authority social services 
department, which was providing the bulk of the funding, to abandon this model 
in favour of one in which it would act as a resource into which children and 
young people 'at risk' or 'in trouble' could be referred by social workers. 
This was more than an attempt to modify the project's referral procedures for it 
involved a change in the conception of the problem to be dealt with, a change in 
the target for intervention, and a change in the project's pattern of 
accountability. 
Wincroft and the subsequent MYDT IT project located the genesis of 
adolescent crime or conformity in the interaction between a social world 
characterised by deprivation and a lack of legitimate opportunity, a peer group 
which attributed meaning to this world and devised prescriptions for action 
within it, and individuals who experienced themselves as failures in this world, 
and carried with them negative attributions placed upon them by powerful adults. 
The peer group was seen as a mileau which could contain or exacerbate the 
propensities of its members to violate laws or norms. For the purposes of their 
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interventions they sought to mobilise the peer group as a source of social 
control, but also as a place in which the alternative to deviation could be 
explored and articulated in action. 
It was an intervention in the 'here-and-now' dialogue of real life, not a 
form of treatment aimed at individual transformation. It located the ultimate 
problem in the chances and choices available to members of the peer group as a 
result of social class, geography, and history. 
The attempt by the social services department to divert the focus of the 
project to the problems of indiv-iduals referred for treatment in a group 
setting, betrayed a substantially different set of assumptions about the 
aetiology of the problem. In this revised formulation the problem of juvenile 
crime was located squarely within the juvenile criminal. As a consequence the 
target for change shifted from the interaction between the individual', the peer 
group and the social world to the motivation, attitudes, beliefs and behaviour 
of the individual deviant. It was not that the initiatives pioneered by the 
MYDT had ignored the importance of the individual or the fact that some 
individuals seem to show a greater enthusiasm for social deviance than others in 
any social mileau. It was rather that it acknowledged the crucial role of the 
peer group in mediating individual behaviour, however ostensibly 'disturbed' or 
otherwise that behaviour might, at times, appear. to be. This changed emphasis 
in the MYDT IT project precluded the possibility of intervening in what had 
previously been seen. as the key intervening variable in the 'poverty causes 
crime' equation. 
The MYDT IT project was developed as a means whereby natural peer groups of 
inner-city adolescents could participate in a social education project which 
might, amongst other things, prevent juvenile crime and help to divert 
participants away from care or custody. As such, it operated as a resource to 
its participants. As this original model was gradually supplanted by one with 
an explicit commitment to individual treatment the accountability of project 
staff shifted from participants to referring social workers. At its inception 
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the MYDT IT project had seen itself as a subcontractor for the local authority, 
executing part of its preventive social work function. The local, authority was 
to supply funds and sufficient information on potential clintele, and other 
matters necessary to maximise the impact of the MYDT initiative. In the event 
the local authority effectively annexed the project. 
What started out as an attempted solution to the problems of children and 
young people in a deprived inner-city neighbourhood became an attempted solution 
to the problems of inner-city social workers who had nowhere to place children 
and young people in trouble. 
The pre-Seebohm-1969 Act Social Workers or Probation Officers could be 
characterised as artisans, practising specific skills drawn from their 
psychoanalytic or common sense inheritance. With a specific client group and a 
fairly clear-cut range of problems, they worked in a relatively simple hierarchy 
with confidence in their skills and the nature of the endeavour in which they 
were engaged. Inter-professional co-operation was limited and within the bounds 
set by professional judgement and the local court, with which they often enjoyed 
a 'special relationship', he or she enjoyed some autonomy. Importantly, in 
their work with young offenders, the fit between the worker and the resources 
available to the courts in the form of Approved Schools, Attendence Centres etc, 
was a loose one. He or she did not have responsibility for placing young people 
in institutions but were merely empowered to make recommendations to the court. 
The pre-Seebohm-1969 Act social worker or probation officer had a greater degree 
of autonomy from the apparatus of control than their post-Seebohm-1969 Act 
successor. 
In the post-Seebohm-1969 Act world the social worker is no longer the 
artisan but rather the junior executive in a large corporation. In-their 
dealings with young people in trouble many of the functions previously performed 
by the social worker are devolved to institutionalised facilities. Observation 
and Assessment are increasingly handled by residential institutions established 
for this purpose. Court officers are appointed in an effort to regularise, and 
make social workers recommendations to the court more acceptable. Meanwhile the 
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worker's range of responsibilities is broadened to cover everything from 
problems of physical handicap to admissions to mental hospitals. The social 
workers role is that of co-ordinator of a range of specialised resources on the 
basis of an initial diagnosis. The worker becomes a kind of General 
Practitioner, less of a solution in their own right in terms of their own 
skills, and increasingly a broker of institutionalised solutions developed 
within and limited by the resources of the Local Authority Social Services 
Department and the Prison Department. This was an extremely fateful shift in 
its consequences for children and young people in trouble and contributed to the 
unprecedented incarcerations of the 1970s. 
The transformation of IT into an appendage of family casework was common in 
the early 1970s. The family service was organised to deal with families. Each 
social-problem whether it fell into the category of mental health, mental 
handicap, physical handicap or juvenile offending, was located conceptually, and 
also administratively, within the family. Professional ideology and 
bureaucratic and financial arrangments presumed that the site of the problem, 
the focus for the intervention, and the genesis of the solution could be located 
within, the family. The day centre, the Community Home,. the Assessment Centre, 
Meals on Wheels and IT were conceptualised and organised as specialist 
diagnostic, and therapeutic resources available to the post-Seebohm GP as she or 
he restored the body of the family to social health. While the family 
caseworker worked on root causes within the family, IT was required to offer 
'compensatory' and 'corrective' experiences to the offspring of the caseworker's 
cases. 
The primacy accorded the family 'case' by the local authority. social 
services departments was understandable both-in terms of the ideology which 
inspired the 'family service' and its organisational structure. It was by no 
means clear however that the problem of working class juvenile crime was caused 
by, nor readily solved within, the family. 
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By puberty the family's major task in relation to its children, that of 
primary socialisation, is at an end. Similarly the family's potency as an 
agency of immediate social control is waning. Sociologists and psychologists of 
all political persuasions are agreed that by the onset of adolescence the young 
person is marginal to the family and increasingly susceptible to influence and 
pressure from the peer group and the subculture (23). Social scientists, 
parents and youth workers recognise that on a day to day basis adolescents are 
more open to the influence of unrelated adults than their parents. 
The peer group and the school, and often the peer group within the school, 
have supplanted the home in terms of their impact upon, and knowledge about the 
lives of many young people by the age of 13 or 14 (24). Youth workers and 
teachers are from time to time confronted with bewildered parents, staggered by 
the fact that their child has broken the law. For the Youth Workers, teachers' 
and peers of this child the most bewildering thing is often that the parents are 
the only people who hadn't realised what the child was up to. 
The peer group and the school are an obvious focus for intervention in 
the lives of young offenders and yet from 1971 the social services department, 
organised around a central concern with the family or 'case', carried this 
responsibility. The family 'case', shaped as, it is by bureaucratic, legal and 
psychotherapeutic imperatives, served as a barrier to the development of 
theoretically informed responses to children and young people in trouble. 
This is not to argue that the offending of some young people cannot be 
directly related to serious problems within the family. Most workers in the 
sphere of juvenile justice have met young people who would rather be in care or 
custody than at home. In certain 'cases' family work or family therapy can_be 
effective in identifying some of the reasons for a youngster's behaviour. and 
effecting changes which render this behaviour unnecessary. This type of 
intervention represents a somewhat esoteric tributary of of work with young 
offenders rather than its mainstream however. 
The argument here is that effective intervention with young people in 
trouble is often most usefully directed at the point where a commitment to the 
Iýr- 
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deviant enterprise is either forged or discouraged and that for most adolescents 
this is no longer the home and the family, on the contrary, it is the school and 
the peer group '* -: 
The approach to IT developed within social services departments was to form 
groups of adolescents from aggregates of cases, and to work with them on the 
assumption that they were the victims of deprived and depriving families. In 
doing this social work developed forms of social group treatment which strove to 
find the source of delinquency in damaged and damaging family relationships. 
This may well have been the correct point to look for the ultimate causes of all 
sorts of socially deviant behaviour but it was not the point where the 
commitment to law breaking was made, and to this extent, welfare and treatment 
tended to miss the point. 
i 
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1. The discrepancy between an ideological commitment to the reduction 
of public spending and a pragmatic need to increase it in response to 
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2. For a fuller discussion of the political ambiguities attendent upon 
the role of the welfare professional see London-Edinburgh Return Group 
(1979) In and Against the State and Bailey R. and Brake M. (1975) 
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3. That Millham overlooks here of course is the changing material 
conditions and political imperatives which conspire to make the non- 
residential alternative more attractive to politicians. The "residential 
tradition" was never vanquished. The dwindling significance of the CHE 
as a response to young offenders was a function of its economic non- 
viability. 
4. The initial meetings of IT practitioners in 1972/3 took place at 
Trent Polytechnic and were normally attended by between 8 and 12 people. 
This represented virtually everybody in England Wales and Scotland 
"doing" IT. From their inception these meetings revealed two major 
rifts. The first was between those who saw IT as an adjunct of a local 
authority child-care service and those who saw IT as a response to 
ajudicated offenders only. The second was between those who wished to 
focus only upon the behaviour of offenders social workers and 
magistrates and those who wished to focus upon the social, economic and 
political conditions which which juvenile crime. 
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5. It was during the notorious Sparkbrook by-election of 1969 that the 
slogan "If you want a nigger for a neighbour-vote Labour" gained 
currency. 
6. Cloward and Ohlin express their indebtednes to Merton (the American 
Dream) and Sutherland (differential association) yet they did not draw 
explicitly. upon Parkes and the work of the Chicago school although their 
"disorganised slum" and certain aspects of their " organised slum" are 
clearly evident in this earlier work. 
7. Race is played down in Delinquency and Opportunity but it seems 
fairly clear that the organised slum is a predominantly "white" domain 
while the disorganised slum is a black one. This "colour-blindness". 
prevents Cloward and Ohlin from including the impact of white racism on 
differential access to opportunity on the one hand, and the targets of 
juvenile crime on the other in their analysis. 
8. Thorpe D. et al (1980) Out of Care uses the term needology as a 
synonym for treatment approaches. This view, and this phrase have gained 
considerable currency and it therefore becomes important to stress that 
an acnowledgement of social need does not lead automatically to a 
treatment response. 
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Chapter 5 
The Professional Response 2.1976 to 1982, The Era of Pessimism 
they end as bureaucracies - Howard Becker 
By the mid-1970s, the academic debate about juvenile crime, in Great 
Britain, had effectively abandoned its preoccupation with the causes of juvenile 
offending in favour of an analysis of the ways in which the justice system 
compounded criminal careers and generated crime (Preston R, 1960). This 
changing focus emphasised the ways in which the justice system selected and 
identified its subjects, how it processed them, and the consequences of this 
processing for personal identity and future offending. In the USA David Matza 
(1964) had chronicled the ways in which the juvenile court, by conflating the 
concerns with treatment, welfare, and justice, served to mystify the defendant. 
Aaron Cicourel (1969) had suggested that social class rather than law violation 
was the major determinant of prosecution in the juvenile justice system. Howard 
Becker (1963) had demonstrated how labels were attached to people and how people 
came to 'live the label', while Edwin Schur (197 ) had advocated 'radical 
non-intervention' as the most efficacious response available to us in our 
dealings with young law-breakers. 
This movement away from causation, or the site of primary deviation, to a 
focus upon social reaction marked the conclusion of a 150 year endeavour to 
discover the genetic, biological, psychological or sociological determinants of 
deviant behaviour. In this new analysis it was the legal and disciplinary 
apparatus which was identified as problematic rather than the offender. The 
focus upon social reaction in the USA tended to ignore, or take for granted, the 
role of the state, and alighted instead upon the activities of police officers, 
social workers, and psychiatric nurses, the 'goo-keepers' of deviance, the 'bad 
guys' who kept the 'underdogs' under (Becker H, 1967). 
In Britain the social reaction perspective developed both a radical and a 
technicist strand. The radical strand of the 'new criminology' set off to 
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reconcile the Marxian dialectic with Meadian interactionism (Taylor I et all 
1973). The technicist strand followed the lead of the theorists in the USA. 
These theories were adopted pragmatically into an administrative criminology 
which attempted to develop a technology of delinquency management which was more 
humane, rational, and cost-effective (Thorpe D et all 1980)1. 
By 1976 this movement was having a serious impact upon IT. These 
initiatives were opportunistic in as much as they traded upon growing anxieties 
within government about the mounting costs of, and the impending crisis within, 
the British juvenile justice apparatus. The quest for a technology of human 
manipulation had given way to the quest for a technology of system manipulation. 
This technology eschewed considerations of the state, the causes of crime, and 
importantly the attempt to appreciate and understand the motivations of deviant 
actors which was at the core of earlier American social reaction theory. 
Administrative criminology reduced the offender to an inadvertant victim of low- 
level 'soft policemen' ignoring the radicals claim that he or she might be a 
critic, albeit an inarticulate and misdirected one, of the social order. It was 
an approach which was nihilistic and hence forgetful. It appropriated theories 
but broke them at the stem leaving their ideological and political roots in the 
ground. The fact that Goffman's (1961) Asylums was also an allegory for the 
relationship between the state and the citizen was lost in the scramble to 
infiltrate and refurbish the state's controlling and socialising bureaucracies. 
The endeavour to do things to, for, or with the poor was being contested by a 
minimalist approach which envisaged no good coming from intervention in human 
lives, and enjoined us to attempt to do less harm rather than more good. 'Leave 
the kids alone' (Shur, 1974) it said. 
It was in this changed intellectual and political environment that the 
'Back to Justice' movement, 'Delinquency Management' and Abolitionism began to 
change the shape of'IT. 
Beck to Justice 
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The 'Sack; to Justice' movement emerged in the mid-1960s in the USA in 
response to a disillusionment with the capacity of a juvenile justice system 
which fused 'welfare' and 'punishment' to deliver 'justice'. The watershed in 
the USA came with the Gault decision of 1967. In this case the supreme court 
ruled that where a juvenile faced incarceration as a consequence of offending, 
the juvenile should be entitled to the protection of due process of law in the 
same way as an adult offender. The implication of this ruling was that the 
period spent in an institution should be proportional to the seriousness of the 
offence committed and not based upon 'treatment'-infused considerations 
concerning the likelihood of future offending. 
In Great Britain 'Justice for Children' and 'Fair play' pioneered the 
justice model which was also advocated by Taylor et al (1980) and by implication 
at certain points Thorpe et al (1980). Social workers bear the brunt of the 
back, to 'justice' attack. Morris et al (1980) write: 
'Because we do not understand the significance of much juvenile 
'misconduct', the various reports presented to decision-makers contain 
value judgements and unfounded assumptions. As a general rule, we do 
not know with certainty which factors refer to, or which situations 
indicate which form of treatment ... As such, 
these reports are 
useless guides to choosing dispositions, but these 'facts' then 
justify the form and content of intervention. These reports recast or 
reconstitute the child's identity as a 'delinquent', 'truant' or 
'troublesome'. They are in essence what one American writer calls 
'character assassinations''. 
The proponents of a back; to justice position argue that the Juvenile court, 
by fusing 'welfare' and judicial considerations, offers the young offender the 
worst of all possible worlds. On the one hand it denies them the civil 
liberties available to adults while on the other it allows unbridled 
interference by agents of the state. 
Parker et al (1981) have argued that social workers are often identified as 
scapegoats in the juvenile justice system whereas in reality the magistrates and 
police are still the major power holders in the system. The back to justice 
stance by minimising the complexity and difficulty of working in the best 
interests of the child in an era in which Law and Order concerns have come to 
the fore and resources for the poorer sections of the working class are 
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shrinking fast, perpetuates this scapegoating. It identifies the problem as a 
consequence of false ideas held by social workers rather than as a function of 
radical changes in provision expenditure and political ideology. 
This raises the question of what it is that the back to justice campaigners 
actually want. Young J (1979) writes: 
'It is important to reflect on the contradictions of a position which 
all too frequently leads the radical criminologist simultaneously to 
demand formal equality in the field of juvenile justice and 
substantive equality for adults'. 
The reality is of course that in the 1970s many minor adult and juvenile 
offenders were dealt with purely in terms of their guilt or innocence and as a 
result were committed to prison department establishments (Priestley P et al, 
1977)2. The juvenile court has increasingly used the penal institution in 
preference to social work or social service department provision and has become 
more and more punitive. The 1982 Criminal Justice Act met many of the demands 
of the back to justice lobby in terms of determinate sentencing and restrictions 
upon the discretion of social workers. This resulted in an increase in the 
numbers of young offenders being locked up. It seems clear that in the current 
political climate a left or liberal back to justice lobby whose radical demands 
include decent legal representation for all juveniles, radical limitations in 
sentencing powers and judicial discretion is easily accommodated by a right-wing 
government which will grant the demands for a reversion to due process while 
ignoring the issues of limitation of the powers of the bench and the judiciary, 
and the need for a radical restructuring of penalties and penal institutions. 
We therefore confront a strange convergence in which left-liberal positions 
become conflated with those of the radical right`. 
The back to justice lobby criticise 'treatment' and welfare in that it 
tends to individualise and personalise what are essentially social or structural 
problems. The irony is, of course, that, accurate though this critique might 
be, in place of treatment and welfare they pose a model of judicial procedure 
which, as Foucault (1972) has observed, not only served as the model, but made 
possible the conception of individualised responses to the phenomenon of crime. 
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If the law is to be used as a means whereby a more equitable society is to be 
achieved, then government and the judiciary must, as Christie argues, abandon 
the eighteenth century utilitarian ideology which currently underpins the system 
and permeates the back to justice stance, in favour of a morality rooted in 
ideas of social justice (18). If this is to happen then back to justice, which 
thus far has concerned itself with a manipulation of the existing rules to make 
them approximate more closely to this notion of an abstract utilitarian justice, 
will perforce have to get back to politics. This would require them to move 
beyond their bland dismissal of welfare and treatment to an analysis of the ways 
in which welfare resources gained in part as a result of class struggle come4, 
in certain circumstances, to be transformed into oppressive procedures which 
militate against working class interests. Such an analysis would raise the 
issues of extra-judicial conflict resolution and the abolition of major parts of 
the control system. Thus far only Taylor I et al (1979) have moved beyond this 
reformulation of the rules to a consideration of these broader issues. 
As currently formulated the proposals of the back to justice movement lead 
us back; to a rationalised prison divested of its trappings of treatment and 
rehabilitation, in which the legal subject is granted his right to punishment. 
Delinquency Manaqement 
Delinquency Management is an approach which is more often practised than 
theorised. Put simply, delinquency management involves the attempt to change 
the behaviour of decision-makers in the juvenile criminal justice system in an 
attempt to divert some young people out of the system altogether, and to 
minimise the institutionalisation of those within the system. These objectives 
are pursued by an analysis of existing patterns of decision making and 
discussion of this analysis with key decision-makers in an attempt to get them 
to revise their objectives. Alongside this, intensive IT provision for young 
offenders is developed which offers sufficient control and containment to make 
it a viable sentencing option for the court. The IT programme maintains an 
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exclusive focus upon offending behaviour, and excursions into questions of need 
or subconscious motivation are rejected in favour of hard-headed behaviour 
modification. Meanwhile, residential institutions are closed down or re- 
designated for another function`'. 
This approach to juvenile crime is articulated most thoroughly by the 
Lancaster Centre for Youth Crime and Community (Thorpe D et al 1980) whose 
work has had a considerable influence upon contemporary practice in IT. Their 
position draws its theoretical rationale from labelling theory and focusses upon 
the functioning of the agencies and agents of the juvenile criminal justice 
system. They state: 
'A complex process of definition, discrimination and decision-making 
must be undergone before any child appears before a juvenile court. 
When he does get there what happens to him depends largely upon what 
social workers and sentencers see as the range of choices open to 
them. It is in these areas - modification of the administrative 
processes which precede a court hearing and the development of 
credible alternatives to the sentencing options now available - that 
the possibilities of change are clearest and the prospects most 
hopeful'. 
They argue that much behaviour, which is formally penalised is no more than 
a manifestation of a relatively innocuous working class youth culture. In this 
picture of the world, the police and social workers misrecognise behaviour and 
attribute to it a greater significance than it merits. Thus intervention by 
social workers aimed at the 'prevention' of such behaviour is seen to be doomed 
to failure since it confuses culture and pathology. It is also dangerous 
because it tends to label cetain youngsters and project them needlessly into the 
juvenile justice system. For Thorpe et al, professionals in the Juvenile 
Justice System seem to be constantly engaged in pre-emptive intervention and 
over-reaction to youthful misbehaviour. They say that we must make '. .. an 
ethical and political choice about whose side ... we are on'. They are on the 
side of the underdog offender and opposed to the professional system 
heavyweights who stigmatise and imprison them. There is, as we have seen, a 
tendency in this analysis to locate the responsibility for all this injustice 
with low-level operatives and to ignore the role of government in promoting the 
decline in the number of CHE places through the 1970s and the parallel expansion 
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of Detention Centre, Borstal and Secure Unit places. In the light of these 
developments it becomes necessary to consider the expansion of penal and secure 
provision as an indicator of shifting government priorities and the 
restructuring of State expenditure in favour of law and order services rather 
than as a simple consequence of bad decisions made by social workers or 
magistrates. Thorpe et al tend to minimise the growing symbolic and actual 
importance of the penal institution in the juvenile justice system for 
governments anticipating the threat to social order occasioned by rapidly rising 
levels of youth unemployment. The delinquency management perspective largely 
confines itself to an analysis of the functioning of local authority social 
services departments and is silent on the issue of penal provision. It 
therefore fails to show why the closure of community schools (CHEs) should 
result in young offenders entering community facilities rather than penal 
institutions as has tended to happen to date. By ignoring the need to attack 
the Youth Custody Centre as the pinnacle and backstop of the juvenile Justice 
system it runs the risk of advocating administrative and procedural reforms 
which could well condemn even larger numbers of youngsters to penal dustbins. 
The idea of the young offender as a randomly selected working class youth 
whose idiosyncratic and culturally supported activity is dramatically 
criminalised by intrusive and arbitrary official labelling is also problematic. 
Firstly, this view ignores the reality that youth sub-cultures are not always 
merely exotic features of a pluralistic society but are sometimes, quite 
understandably, organised around resistance to deprivation and oppression 
(Willis P, 1977). To respond to these young people by a strategy of non- 
intervention as Thorpe et al seem to suggest, is not to replace pernicious State 
intervention with enlightened tolerance but rather to abandon them to the 
vagaries of a rapidly worsening social predicament. As Cohen (1975) has 
suggested, such liberal non-intervention is too often a form of 'benign 
neglect'. It is also the case that their behaviour may cause alarm to peers, 
parents and neighbours as well as the authorities, and that the victims of much 
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juvenile crime are in fact other members of the working class community. By 
adopting a position which advocates 'an ethical or political choice about whose 
side we are on' the question is raised, for example, about whose side one takes 
in the case of youngsters involved with the British Movement who launch attacks 
upon Bengali families. This view of juvenile crime also fails to account for 
the overwhelming majority of working class young people who are not engaged in 
serious or persistent delinquency 
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The labelling perspective tends to steer us away from the site of primary 
deviation and the social and economic conditions which foster the least 
acceptable manifestations of juvenile crime. It is of course correct to 
identify interactions between the police and young people as a crucial 
determinant in the identification of certain youngsters as 'delinquents' but as 
Lee and Young (1984) have pointed out, this is a much bigger issue than 
policemen making the wrong decisions about the wrong children at the wrong time. 
It is simply not the case that the police merely misunderstand the phenomenon of 
juvenile crime and over-react to it, although this is obviously a component in 
the processes at work. The policing of inner cities and those with large black 
populations in particular, has changed radically in the last decade. High 
profile policing or 'the policing of the unemployed ghetto' rooted as it is in 
the notion that the police should maintain an obvious and uncompromising 
presence in certain inner city areas in anticipation of a growth in crime and 
civil disorder has served to inflate juvenile arrests and channel growing 
numbers of juveniles to penal institutions. Strategies for policing the inner 
cities are increasingly formulated at the highest levels of the police 
bureaucracy and are not merely the sum total of decisions taken by individual 
police officers (Hall et al, 1978). 
Thorpe et al castigate social workers for their punitive recommendations 
and the unwarranted power they exert over clients, but tend to ignore the 
formidable constraints in which they work. Parker et al (1981) have shown in 
contrast that the power holders in the juvenile justice system are the police 
who frame the charges and the bench who in 1982 were handed even greater powers 
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to sentence and control young people. This research also suggests that quite 
often the social worker in court is reduced to 'reading' the bench in an attempt 
to negotiate the least punitive response to youngsters in trouble. 
By suspending considerations of political power and the relationship 
between the juvenile justice system and broader political and administrative 
changes in the State, the Delinquency Management approach has presented a 
prescription for change which leaves the major determinants of the present 
crisis in the system untouched. While this approach has done much to divert 
young people from the CHE and offers a salutary reminder of the problems 
created as a consequence of the subjective perceptions of agents of the juvenile 
justice system, it must move beyond its focus upon attitudes and attitude change 
if it is to contribute to substantive system change7. 
The growing popularity of delinquency management is in a large part 
attributable to the worsening economic situation and the financial constraints 
in which local authorities currently operate. As a pragmatic approach it 
remains unreflective about the roots of its own strategies and uncritical of an 
increasingly authoritarian response to young offenders by governments throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s. By viewing the provision of welfare as the thin end of the 
totalitarian wedge the point that in the wake of the 1982 Act, the thick end, 
the Youth Custody Centre, is being driven deeper and deeper into the working 
class community is missed. 
By the end of the 1970s the back to justice and delinquency management 
positions had, for the purposes of the practice of IT, become fused. The 
Association of Juvenile Justice, was formed by IT workers who broke away from 
the National Intermediate Treatment Federation because the federation retained 
its commitment to preventive work and welfare. It epitomised the minimalist 
radicalism, a self-styled 'Politics of Reality' which had emerged as an 
orthodoxy within IT by the late 1970s. This position can be expressed in the 
form of 10 propositions. 
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1. Juvenile crime is not a serious problem 
(a) because, when we calculate the proceeds of the sum total of juvenile crime 
or the costs in terms of damage wrought by juveniles, this pales into 
insignificance against a backdrop of organised and corporate crime; 
(b) because the government, media, and public concern about juvenile crime is 
the result of a series of moral panics orchestrated by various moral 
entrepreneurs and a media hungry for horror stories with which to sell 
papers. These groups are periodically aided and abetted by the police. 
2. The helping professions are the major source of hindrance to young 
offenders 
(a) because it is in the nature of social work and social welfare that it will 
constantly search for new needs and new causes of deviant behaviour far 
beyond the time and place of the particular deviant act; 
(b) because social work by its equation of deprivation and deviance will 
intervene in the lives of non-ajudicated delinquents in an attempt to 
prevent delinquency. In doing this, it will serve to stigmatise new non- 
deviant populations and thus draw them into the juvenile criminal justice 
system through a process of guilt by association with social workers doing 
delinquency prevention work. This is often described as the application of 
a 'needology' which results in the 'spreading of the net'; 
(c) because social workers in their Social Enquiry Report's (SERB) while 
ostensibly offering the court an opinion above the subject, based upon 
social and psychological scientific training, are in fact mainly offering a 
character evaluation -a moral judgement. Thus SERs may be seen as either 
a pitch or a denunciation or, indeed, a character assassination. 
3. Placing young offenders in residential or custodial institutions is a -bad thing 
(a) because it fractures links with home, family and neighbourhood; 
(b) because it forces the subject to take on an inmate identity, it spoils 
identity; 
(c) because it increases the subject's rate of offending and serves to project 
the subject into a deviant subculture thus promoting secondary deviance and 
projecting the subject into a deviant career; 
(d) because it is costly and in the light of (c) above, ineffective in 
achieving the objective of rehabilitation to a non-deviant mode of 
existence in the community. 
4. Placing young offenders in a community-based alternative is a better thing 
(a) because it avoids all the disadvantages itemised above; 
(b) because it is less costly, and even if it is as unsuccessful as the 
residential or custodial institution in achieving rehabilitation, the failure is less expensive. 
5. Leaving the kids along is the best thing radical non-intervention is the most desirable response to Young offenders 
(a) because it avoids all the problems associated with the application of deviant labels by the heavy-handed agents of the state who serve to 
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stigmatise the subject and worsen the problem to which they are purportedly 
the solution; 
(b) because much behaviour which is the object of intervention by the police, 
education authorities, social workers, probation officers and courts, is no 
more than a relatively innocuous expression of working class youth culture 
which should be tolerated as a normal part of growing up; 
(c) because since most interventions by powerful labellers tend to serve the 
professional interests of the labellers rather than the needs of the 
subjects, we must always be sceptical about the purpose of such 
interventions; 
(d) because it costs virtually nothing. 
6. Welfare considerations should be banned from the juvenile court 
(a) because the consideration of deprivation, need and the determination of 
deviant behaviour by mysterious, intrapsychic or social forces serves to 
mystify the defendant and lay her/him open to the possibility of the 
imposition of protracted treatments in residential establishments for 
offences for which an 'adult would receive a much less intrusive or 
restrictive penalty; 
(b) because a consideration of guilt or innocence and the adversarial due 
process of law enables the greater possibility of proportionality, ie, 
justice; 
(c) because the child or young person has an innate sense of cause and effect 
and justice and (i) expects, and (ii) has the right to expect, punishment; 
(d) because social workers are inept in their, operations in court and lawyers, 
the police, magistrates and judges are not. 
7. IT must concern itself only with adjudicated offenders 
(a) because any excursions into work with girls as the objects of sexual abuse, 
non-school attenders, glue sniffers etc is welfare or social work and is 
not the concern of IT which works only to prevent adjudicated offenders 
being locked up; 
(b) because such net-widening may suck: new populations into the system while 
limiting the opportunities for adjudicated offenders to be offered the 
alternative. 
B. In IT progrAmmes credibility with the courts is more important than what 
you do 
(a) because IT is first and foremost a strategic intervention to keep young 
offenders out of care or custody. Since courts put people into care or 
custody anything which looke like a plausible alternative, and this may 
often involve including a punitive or overtly controlling element in the 
programme, may be tried to achieve the decarcerating objective; 
(b) because programmes which begin to concern themselves with issues other than 
offending are in danger of drifting into the metaphysics of needology and denying the essential unproblematic normality of the subjects of IT 
programmes. 
9. The job of science is to quantify how much less harm we can do or have 
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done, not to explain crime or devise cures for it 
(a) because in the entire history of criminology no effective technology of 
behavioural change has been devised; 
(b) because the problem is clearly social reaction and the task is to find it 
and neutralise it; 
(c) because practitioners need a science they can use to get the job done, not 
irrefutable metaphysics and intellectual speculation about the nature of 
human kind and the nature of the social world. 
10. The State is run by unsophisticated, unscientific, deaf idiots, who for 
some reason, keep making mistakes at the levels of policy of 
implementation. This has the unintended consequence of locking up even 
more Young offenders. Dur, job is to tell them how to do their job 
properly. 
(a) because politicians do not understand the dynamics of the juvenile criminal 
justice system; 
(b) because if they did they would then be able to turn their stated objective, 
ie, the minimisation of custodial confinement, into a reality; 
(c) because if we can keep pumping them information about cost-effectiveness, 
and evaluations which show effectiveness in terms of 8 individual behaviour and system change we will win their hearts and minds. 
This technicist orthodoxy elaborated the fullest and clearest account of 
the role and function of IT in the juvenile criminal justice system. Unlike 
earlier theoretical and political perspectives on IT it gave practitioners 
something concrete and quantifiable that they could do. The problem for the 
other strand of thought influenced by social reaction theory, radical 
criminology, was to identify a practice and it was to this problem that Thomas 
Mathiesen turned his attention. Mathisen's roots were in the 'new' left 
politics of the late 1960s and the attempt within this movement to devise a 
political praxis which would contest the power of the State. 
Abolitionism 
The abolition of the prison has been a minor theme in criminological debate 
throughout the 20th century. Described by David Downes (1980) as the ultimate 
penal reform, abolition has been supported by, amongst others, HJ Eysenck, 
George Bernard Shaw and Beatrice and Sidney Webb. It is surprising 
therefore that while the Justice for Children and New Approaches to Juvenile 
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Crime pressure groups and the Lancaster Centre for Youth Crime and Community 
vigorously debated reform of the juvenile justice system, abolitionionism was 
seldom mentioned. The abolition debate was rejuvenated in 1974 with the 
publication in Norway of Thomas Mathiesen's The Politics of Abolition. In 
this book Mathiesen spells out an abolitionist politics which offers to would-be 
reformers short-term goals, long-term objectives, and strategies for their 
achievement. He argues that reformers normally founder on the rocks of the 
'reform versus revolution' problem. In demanding the abolition of the prison 
the reformer is asked to suggest what she or he will put in its place. In 
Mathiesen's terms they are asked to offer a 'fully-formed' alternative which 
will meet objectives established by the prison system the reformers aim to 
replace. This, as Mathiesen points out, is a virtually impossible task for 
reformers who are then driven back to working upon piecemeal reforms of parts of 
the prison system. The irony he sees here is that in working for 'positive' 
reforms, better educational facilities, better treatment programmes, colour TVs 
etc, rather than hastening the demise of the prison, successful 'positive' 
reform merely serves to give greater legitimacy and credibility to the prison 
system. This then makes the eventual abolition of the prison all the more 
difficult. As Downes has argued 'the stage is set for penal reformers to end up 
hopelessly compromised with the system on the one hand or condemned to the 
irresponsible revolutionary role on the other'. 
In the face of these problems Mathiesen argues that rather than opting out 
of the long-term goal of abolition and into piecemeal 'positive' reform 
reformers should pursue both simultaneously. This, he suggests, can be done if 
instead of 'positive' reforms they demand 'negative reforms', that in place of a 
'fully formed' alternative they offer an 'unfinished' alternative, and that 
crucially in their efforts they form links, and work with, the 'expelled' 
institutional populations. 
Negative reforms do not give greater credibility and legitimacy to the 
penal system. Thus Mathiesen would argue that to demand the cessation of 
solitary confinement in prisons, and child-care establishments, to oppose the 
127 
forcible application of drug 'therapy', and to require the granting of full 
civil and legal rights to institutional populations would all constitute 
legitimate negative reforms. Their legitimacy resides in the fact that they 
require the system to relinquish its power and control over its subjects for the 
demands to be met. This diminuation of power and control is part of a process 
of attrition in which the legitimacy and power of the system is worn away. 
If, Mathiesen argues, a 'fully-formed' alternative to a penal system is 
proposed which stays within the objectives of that system, it is destined to 
piecemeal incorporation and will serve to strengthen that system. If, however, 
a 'fully-formed' alternative which requires a radical shift in objectives and 
practices is posed then it will be rejected because it offers no solutions to 
the problems decision-makers in the existing system are trying to solve. He 
proposes instead of the 'fully-formed', the 'unfinished' alternative which 
constantly confronts and heightens the contradictions and absurdities in the 
current structure and current practices while offering only a sketch or a hint 
of what might happen if current structures or practices are abandoned. In this 
approach to reform, the alternative is seen to emerge in the wake of abolition 
and in the space left by the defunct structures or practices. This alternative 
Mathiesen argues may be shaped by the 'expelled' populations themselves. 
Central to this theory is the idea that institutional populations, 'the 
expelled', will take increasing power in negotiating for reform. The 
populations of mental hospitals, childrens' homes, prisons and old peoples 
homes, Mathiesen argues, are the unproductive and troublesome members of a 
society which routinely generates human waste but would rather not look at or be 
reminded of it. Thus these people are expelled, stripped of social status, and 
often legal and civil rights and the rest of us are not reminded of the real 
nature of the world we inhabit. He sees the task of abolitionism as reuniting 
the expelled sectors of the working class with the mainstream of the labour 
movement in order that the true nature of capitalist social relations is 
comprehended and changed. Thus he commends the establishment of links between 
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the expelled populations on the inside and trade unions, ex-prisoners, political 
pressure groups, academics and journalists on the outside who will together 
constitute an abolitionist alliance. 
Downes offers an analysis of the 'possibilities' and 'pitfalls' of 
abolitionism pointing out that Norway has a relatively small institutional 
population, an established social democratic reformist tradition in the sphere 
of prisons, and a 'crime' problem which is far less significant than 
Britain's. He also shows that organisations like preservation of the Rights of 
Prisoners (PROP) and Radical Alternatives to Prison (RAP) in this country have 
made headway only on issues of alternatives to prison which Mathiesen would see 
as a mere diversion from the real issue of abolitionism. In the light of 
Mathiesen's theory we are left with a problem concerning how we regard IT. Is 
it merely a mechanism whereby the existing institutional apparatus strives to 
legitimise itself as Millham (1977) once suggested, or might it, as was 
originally intended (in the Children and Young Persons Act 1969), provide the 
space in which the 'unfinished' alternative might develop in the wake of 
abolition. 
Within the sphere of IT the abolitionist position was articulated most 
clearly by the editorial collective of Eureka, the journal of the London 
Intermediate Treatment Association. 
'New approaches to Juvenile Crime for example is a marriage, or more 
accurately a menage, of convenience between a number of interested 
professional groups each of which'is concerned to keep its 'solution', 
its capacity to manage the problem of juvenile crime, on the political 
agenda. The actual 'problem' of juvenile crime and the boundaries of 
the debate about it are largely defined by the government, the police 
and the magistrates association. The problem this poses is that in 
order to keep their 'fully-formed' alternative in the debate they 
have to accept, in public at least, the governmental definition of the 
problem as the starting point for their policy recommendations. The 
same would be true for the All Party Committee on Penal Affairs 
(chaired by Mr Kilroy Silk) whose recent report accepted the need for 
punitive responses to those who engaged in the type of 'hooliganism 
seen on the streets of Brixton and Toxteth'. In a similar way Justice 
for Children proceeds uncritically from the position that formal 
legality represents a desirable and just model of conflict resolution 
in a fundamentally unequal society. 
'An abolitionist strategy by contrast regards these bland orthodox 
assumptions about the nature of the problem as themselves problematic. It would contrast the social realities of Brixton and Toxteth and the 
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bitter heritage of aggressive policing with Mr Kilroy Silk's 
'hooliganism' in order to point up the absurdity of a punitive 
response to individual participants in a profoundly social conflict. 
It must constantly link its proposals for negative reform, police 
accountability, community control of policing, the decriminalisation 
of SUS, with a thorough-going analysis of the real nature of the 
problem. Thus, to use a time-honoured metaphor it must not merely 
propose a radical re-arrangement of the deck chairs on the Titanic but 
must ask of the captain and the owners why it is that the ship is 
being steered towards the iceberg in the first place'. 
Fitts J (1981) 
They observed that if it was true that 'alternative' responses to children 
in trouble must always be measured in terms of their potential for containment 
and control vis a vis the borstal, detention centre or other custodial 
provision, then only with the abolition of these institutions could IT stand a 
chance of becoming a creative 'unfinished' and major response to juvenile crime. 
In this case the only defensible rationale for the future development of IT was 
as a replacement for, and not as an adjunct of, punitive custodial provision and 
this led them to a position where they maintained that any further development 
of IT had to be paralleled by a vigorous abolitionist campaign. Cohen (1979) 
identifies the three essential components of an abolitionist strategy. 
1. The demand for a 'total moratorium on all new prison construction' and the 
closure of existing institutions. 
2. Decarcer, ation - all prisoners who can safely be released from the 
institution (usually estimated at 70-80%) should be released. This, he 
argues, will make no difference to re-conviction rates and might actually 
lower them. 
3. Ecarceration - we must stop putting people into penal institutions by 
decriminalising certain offences and placing severe limits upon the powers 
of the courts to impose custodial sentences. 
(28) 
Within the abolitionist strategy only those initiatives which diminish the 
power and contest the centrality of the custodial institution, ie, negative 
reforms, are admissible. For IT this would mean that only those initiatives 
which can be conclusively proved to have taken young offenders out of 
institutions or can demonstrate that they have kept out young people who would 
otherwise have been subjected to incarceration, should retain a formal link with 
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the juvenile justice system. 
Abolitionism is unique amongst the initiatives described here in that it 
addresses the parlimentary politics of the juvenile criminal justice system 
rather than its administration or the practices of its professional personnel. 
It locates the problem in the relationship between the state and its surplus and 
unproductive citizens the people Spitzer (1975) describes as social junk. 
Abolitionism is a minimalist theory and practice which attempts to erode, by a 
process of political attrition, the apparatus of penal control developed 
within advanced capitalist states. It attempts to reverse conventional social 
democratic political processes by championing an intervention by the socially 
disadvantaged 'expelled' populations into the functioning of the state 
apparatus. The expelled are to contest and erode the power of the state by 
developing a politically powerful abolitionist alliance. Bill Beaumont, 1985, 
Chair of the National Association of Probation Officers between 1981 and 1984 
writes: 
'In campaigning work, probation officers need to seek support and this 
involves making wider contacts than is usual in the job. We will need 
to contact local authority and government departments, MPs, 
councillors, campaigns, trade unions, tenant's associations and other 
community groups. Seeking out and making links is an important stage 
in campaign development. Alliances around limitied aims are possible 
between quite disparate groups but caution is needed in avoiding 
allies who seek to limit goals, differ significantly on methods or 
arguments, or desert when the going gets tough. Effective lobbying in 
councils and parliament requires some detailed knowledge and 
considerable effort. With care good use can be made of local 
councillors and MPs, special interest parliamentary groupings and 
parliamentary debates, all of which can make news as well as 
contribute to administrative and legislative change'. 
(pp. 98-9) 
The technique is of course remarkably similar to the community action 
strategies adopted by the practitioners of Radical Welfare. Their endeavour was 
to facilitate the political organisation of unorganised, and previously 
politically marginal, sections of the working class. Radical welfare, as it 
developed, adopted the same strategy as Mathieson in which an attempt is made to 
link the concerns of the socially and economically marginal to the mainstream 
politics of the labour movement. Radical welfare and Abolitionism both identify 
1_1 
the problems of economic and social marginality as a manifestation of political 
marginality, and hence, powerlessness. Both identify the need to re-connect 
this 'reserve army' with the political process, but this has proved, in the 
sphere of juvenile justice reform to be the hardest trick of the lot. 
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NOTES - CHAPTER 5 
For a full analysis of these developments see Young J, 1986, The Failure of 
Criminology, the Need for a Radical Realism, in Matthews R and Young J. 
Confronting Crime and Cohen S (1983). Social Control Talk in Garland D and 
Young F, The Power to Punish. 
2 The 1970s is also the period in which prison riots, precipitated in no small 
part by a rapidly growing band of long-term prisoners who arrived there as a 
consequence of due process of law, became an important political problem. 
`' What we see during the period in a juvenile justice system which begins ; to 
disregard those features which are specifically juvenile in favour of an 
emulation of the adult system. We therefore witness a polarisation of the 
'intermediate strata' (the CHE and the Borstal) and a growing polarisation of 
'community based' responses and 'penal' responses. 
4 See Saville (1957) in Fitzgerald M at al (1977) Welfare in Action for an 
analysis of the function of the welfare state. 
b 'Increasingly delinquency' management has been associated with the 
development of behavioural approaches to work with young people. See 
Messenger E (1982) Self Control Programme, Herts C C, Social Services 
Department. 
6 Interestingly it required the Radical Right (cf. Chapter 3) to alert us to 
the problem of juvenile crime and victimisation. This was then 'annexed' by 
Left realists who realised that crime was a concern to the oppressed. 
7 The research in progress of Bottoms AE at Cambridge suggests that 
'delinquency management' is currently a top priority for local authority IT 
sections. 
8 This characterisation necessarily over-simplifies the positions adopted by 
individuals but, in my view, is not an unfair rendition of the position as a 
whole. 
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Chapter 6 
The Politics of Reform 
The struggle around the prisons, the penal system and the police- 
judicial system, because it developed in solitary', among social 
workers and ex-prisoners, has tended increasingly to separate itself 
from the forces which would have, enabled it to grow. It has allowed 
itself to be penetrated by a whole naive, archaic ideology which makes 
the criminal at once into the innocent victim and the pure rebel - 
society's scapegoat - and the young wolf of future revolutions. 
This return to anarchist themes of the late nineteenth century was 
possible only because of a failure of integration of current 
strategies. And the result has been a deep split between this 
campaign with its monotonous, lyrical little chant, heard-only among a 
few small groups, and the masses who have good reason not to accept it 
as valid political currency, but who also - thanks to the studiously 
cultivated fear of criminals - tolerate the maintenance, or rather the 
reinforcement, of the judicial and police apparatus'. 
Michel Foucault (1977) 
A Politics of Ecstasy 
If the central political issue inside Parliament, in the mid to late 1960s, 
concerned which party had a legitimate claim to manage a prosperous, expanding, 
technologically sophisticated society, then outside Parliament the issue was the 
legitimacy of parliamentary government and the social order it represented. 
By 1968 a new generation of 'meritocrats' were locking their teachers out 
of the new universities and polytechnics and running their own courses. The 
texts they adopted were written by Fanon, Friere, Illich, Laing, Chomsky, 
Marcuse, and Karl Marx, and Bob Dylan sang: 
'You've been with the professors 
And they all liked your looks 
With great lawyers you have 
Discussed lepers and crooks 
You've been through all of those 
F Scott Fitzgerald books 
You're very well-read 
It's well known 
But something is happening here 
And you don't know what it is 
Do you, Mr Jones? ' 
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In Grosvenor Square this new generation was asking 'Hey, hey LBJ, how many 
kids did you kill today? '. In Paris in May 1968 students and workers fought on 
the streets with the police and'it appeared, for a time, as if they might 
actually achieve a socialist revolution, and the Rolling Stones (courtesy of 
Martha and the Vandellas) sang: 
'Going off all around the world 
Are you ready for a brand new beat 
Summer's here and the time is ripe 
For fighting in the streets'. 
Earlier in the decade a newly prosperous younger generation were 
apparently beating each other senseless on the beaches of Margate and Clacton. 
By 1968 the 'tough mods' had transmogrified into the more menacing skinheads. 
Rock bands were breaking up' their instruments in accordance with the injunctions 
of dadaism, but it was hard to get at the full gist of this particular endeavour 
since most of the people who were doing it had normally been smoking a lot of 
marijuana when they were asked about it. Commentators talked about a sexual 
revolution and although these young people hadn't invented sex they seemed to be 
the first generation which actually enjoyed it, and The Who sang: 
'People try to put us down 
Just because we get around 
Things they say sound awful cold 
Hope I die before I get old'. 
The well-educated beneficiaries of the welfare state were 'hip' and they 
were rejecting both the means and the ends of industrial capitalism in favour of 
hedonism or revolution. As the 1960s progressed the existentialists, beats, 
dadaists, situationists, hippies, yippies, and freaks had consolidated into the 
alternative society' or the 'revolutionary left'1. 
At its core the radical critique suggested that industrial capitalism in 
its voracious pursuit of profit violated both the human environment and the 
human spirit. It was a system built upon the oppression of all but the 
powerful. This oppression was doubly pernicious because its subjects were 
manipulated into believing that they were its beneficiaries rather than its 
victims. The system worked because human beings were alienated from their 
natural environment, themselves, their creativity and their potentiality. The. 
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costs could be counted in the numbers of people driven into madness. The 
process could be observed in schools which merely produced the right amount of 
the right type of fodder for the machine, and in the factories which reduced 
human beings to mere appendages of the productive process. Whereas the 
parliamentary politics of the 1960s concerned the management of technological 
expansion, the critique developed by the 'alternative society' and the 
'revolutionary left' repudiated a society which deified growth and productivity 
and subordinated human beings to it. 
Beyond the parliamentary social democratic consensus this 'new' left 
politics rejected social democracy as the velvet glove clothing the iron fist of 
capitalist domination. Social democratic reform was regarded as a practice 
which conspired to delude and tranquillise the working class and mislead them 
about where their interests lay. If welfare and treatment were opiates, justice 
2 
was a hallucination`. 
The irony is of course that a government which contained erstwhile members 
of the revolutionary left had abandoned an 'outdated' class politics in favour 
of a modern managerial style and now espoused a philosophy which suggested that 
it was possible, through the provision of opportunity, to transcend social 
determination and achieve freedom3. Outside parliament a group of people who had 
been the beneficiaries of previously, unprecedented educational and occupational 
opportunities espoused a philosophy which suggested that this side of a 
socialist revolution no change was possible and 'freedom' would remain a 
mystificatory illusion 4 
The 'alternative society' was at odds with the 'revolutionary left', not 
over the revolutionary goal, which always remained vague, but over the ways in 
which revolutions happened in mid-twentieth century Europe. And the Beatles 
sang: 
'You say you want a revolution 
Well, that's alright 
You tell me that it's evolution 
Well, that's alright 
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But if you want money for people with minds that hate 
Then I'm telling you brother that you're gonna have to wait 
You know it's gonna be alright 
It'll be alright'. 
In a similarly optimistic vein RD Laing (1968) specified the ways in which 
the revolution of the alternative society would be realised. 
'In our society, at certain times, this interlaced set of systems may 
lend itself to revolutionary change, not at the extreme micro or macro 
ends; that is, not through the individual pirouette of solitary 
repentance on the one hand, or by a siezure of the machinery of the 
state on the other; but by sudden, structural, radical qualitative 
changes in the intermediate system levels: changes in a factory, a 
hospital, a school, a university, a set of schools or a whole area of 
industry, medicine, education, etc'. 
Laing R D, p. 16 
The alternative society posed the possibility of incremental revolution 
initiated by doctors, teachers, managers, or social workers who held an 
alternative consciousness. The apparatus of the state, could, it seemed, be 
used as an instrument to transform the state and bring into being a new era in 
which what was most human in human beings might be elevated and celebrated. For 
the revolutionary left however the practices of state personnel, however 
enlightened, were irredeemably tainted by the structures in which they took 
place. For them the problem was not the transformation of the state apparatus. 
The problem, for the revolutionary left of the late 1960s was how they might most 
effectively 'smash the state's. 
In 1970 the 'family service', the central pillar of Labour's assault upon 
poverty and inequality was brought into being creating a vastly expanded social 
work apparatus and an unprecedented number of jobs for a generation of 
social science graduates committed to effecting radical social change on behalf 
of the poor through the medium of a social welfare. 
As we stood, in 1970, on the verge of a new era in welfare, in which the 
development of the personal social services was supposed to complete the task 
initiated by the architects of the Welfare State in 1945, doubts were looming. 
Could we, as the Fabian reformers had claimed, achieve social equality and usher 
in a classless society by the redistribution of wealth in the form of welfare 
resources and by the judicious application of treatment to deviants? 
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Or could we, as the alternative society implied, assume control of the 
welfare apparatus and then, audaciously, redefine the problem so that the ideas 
of the conventional and the powerful were rendered problematic, and the actions 
of 'deviants' could be revealed in all their rich rationality? 
6 
Or should we, as the revolutionary left enjoined us, infiltrate the state 
apparatus, identify, exploit and hence heighten, its contradictions in order 
that it would eventually self-destruct as a result of its own intolerable 
internal tensions? 
Were we to be therapists, consciousness raisers or guerillas? As we 
pondered this dilemma Edward Heath's Conservative government was elected. Heath 
pledged his administration to the control of inflation, the unions, and crime. 
In the midst of strident argument, confusion, bitterness and dissent at all 
points left of the Labour party, the first post-war law and order government 
came to power. 
By the early 1970s the post-war social democratic consensus in British 
politics had given way to a sharp division between the right and the left. 
Within the Labour movement the traditional alliance between the intelligentsia, 
the trade unions and the parliamentary Labour party having failed to achieve 
its main objectives, lay in disarray. The Wilsonian myth of the prosperous 
classless society had exploded in the face of growing evidence of poverty, 
social unrest, political dissent and an impending economic crisis. 
During this period the new left found few points of contact with the 
traditional Labour movement. They rejected both the means and the ends of 
parliamentary politics, arguing that a 'socialist government' in a capitalist 
society must inevitably betray the working class in its attempt to 'make a deal' 
with capital. They castigated the trades union movement as a self-seeking and 
politically impotent bureaucracy which had been incorporated into the capitalist 
state and served merely to legitimise wage restraint. Whereas an old left 
politics had seen the class struggle unfolding within the 'endemic' and 
'historically necessary' conflict between capital, in the form of 
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industrialists, and Labour, in the form of the trades union movement, the new 
left found only collusion here, arguing that the real 'struggle' was now 
somewhere else. 
Indeed, the new left found evidence of class struggle virtually everywhere 
except the workplace. Whereas a traditional reading of Marx had suggested that 
changes in the social structure were always and everywhere prior to, and the 
determining factor in, changes in political consciousness, the new left asserted 
that the relationship between material conditions and consciousness was a 
dialectical one in which each affected, and was affected by, the other. Thus by 
revising, or offering a more sophisticated version of, socialist doctrine it 
became possible to shift the site of the class struggle away from the moribund 
shadow-play of the workplace towards population and conflicts where social 
oppression was both more evident and more keenly felt. The politics of 
gender, race, and poverty, came to supplant a more traditional politics of class 
struggle located within, and dominated by, those sections of the working class 
which were organised into trades unions. For the new left the quest was for the 
political in the personal and the personal in the political. Oppression, 
generated by an inequitable social order, could be identified and worked with in 
all personal relations, not simply industrial relations. 
A Politics from Below 
The new left had of necessity to seek an alliance beyond the traditional 
coalitions of the British labour movement. As an essentially middle-class 
endeavour New Left politics had no roots in the Labour movement and inevitably 
sought an alliance with those who were not organised by, and hence not subject 
to the protections of, the Labour movement. The new left attempted to forge an 
alliance with the socially, economically, and politically marginal populations 
of the inner city. 
For the new left the newly expanded social welfare apparatus offered a base 
and 'radical welfare' the means whereby the class struggle could be fought out. 
Put another way, finding no point of accommodation with the proletariat, the new 
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left, composed of members of the non-commercial bourgeousie, attempted to form 
an alliance with an unorganised non-industrial lumpen proletariat. Engels 
(1874) had once unkindly remarked that: 
'The lumpen proletariat, this scum of the depraved elements of all 
classes, which establishes its headquarters in the big cities, is the 
worst of all possible allies. This rabble is absolutely venal and 
absolutely brazen ... Every leader of the workers who uses these 
scoundrels as guards or relies on them for support proves himself by 
this action a traitor to the movement'. 
p. 646 
Sweeping though Engels condemnation is he does alert us to an important 
division within the working class between the 'respectable' and the 
'disreputable'. The choice to align oneself with the 'disreputable' is also a 
choice to distance oneself from the respectable, but of course the respectable, 
in the guise of the mains. tream of the Labour movement, had offered the new left 
little choice. 
There were three central problems attendant upon this alliance between the 
new left and the newly discovered poor. First, there was no pre-existing 
organisational structure which could be utilised by the poor to articulate their 
demands. Secondly, the politics of the poor (the elderly, single-parent 
families, the intermittently employed) was grounded in their day-to-day 
experience. As a result they were inclined to say that they wanted another job 
rather than a socialist transformation, a winter coat for the baby rather than 
a popular uprising. Thirdly some of the activities of the very poor, predatory 
juvenile crime not least amongst them, made some elements of this population 
harder to market than others when attempting to develop a political voice which 
would be heard and taken into account by those with the power to effect change. 
It is notable that two of the most effective organisations which 
emerged from the New Left of the early 1970s, the Child Poverty Action Group and 
the Low Pay Unit succeeded in large part because they were able to present those 
who had previously been viewed as culpable or negligent, as either innocent by 
dint of age, or industrious but wronged. Their success lay in their ability to 
ideologically prise away certain sections of the previously 'disreputable' and 
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represent them as 'respectable' but'previously misunderstood. Similarly the 
plight of the elderly and the psychiatric patient could be addressed by offering 
a potentially sympathetic public the means with which to identify with their 
plight. 
It was perhaps for this reason, amongst others, that radicals working with 
young offenders in the 1970s chose to present juvenile crime as either an 
inconsequential spin-off of poverty or an unintended consequence of official 
intervention, but seldom, if ever, as juvenile crime. 
7 
The new left endeavour was to reinstate the marginalised populations of 
the run-down inner-city into the political process by transforming the images of 
the poor and getting their concerns on the right agendas at the right time. 
Thus a previously oppressed population was to arise and take its rightful place 
in the political process. This was achieved, where it was achieved, by 
demonstrating that it 'wasn't their fault'. 
A Politics from Beyond 
This proved to be an enormously difficult task even where one cduld effect 
the necessary redistribution of blame. Young offenders proved tö be less 
amenable to such a dramatic social metamorphosis since most potential audiences;, 
including the poor themselves, insisted upon believing that juvenile crime was", 
the 'fault' of juvenile criminals. 
The new left's ambivalence didn't help since in as much as they argued that' 
juvenile crime was a pathetic consequence of deprivation or an invention of 
heavy-handed agents of 'social control' they also hoped, and sometimes believed, 
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that young people in trouble might be proto-revolutionary Robin Hoods engaged in 
activity which anticipated the imminent post-revolutionary re-distribution of 
wealth. To this extent those members of the new left who chose to concern 
themselves with juvenile crime entered the ideological ghetto in which young 
offenders were themselves trapped. 
It is no doubt true, as Muncie (1984) asserts that. 
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I... sections of youth are all too readily defined as deviant or 
criminal and thus are continually feared on the streets and in the 
schools ... there is as much 'trouble' created for the youth of today through the processes of media and public reaction as youth 
itself may create for its critics'. 
p. 28 
Yet quite clearly the fear and disapproval of juvenile crime by a 
potentially victimised citizenry, irrespective of social class, is a social 
reality. It may be fed by, but it is certainly no mere creation of, a 
sensationalist media. What the new left was unwilling to confront was the fact 
that those who are most likely to be victims of crime, the very poor, also tend 
to take a dim view of it (Wilson J Q, 1975). 
'At about that time I happened to be supervising the survey described 
in Chapter 1 and noted the striking fact that when asked what was the 
biggest problem facing large cities, black respondents were more 
likely to mention crime and juvenile delinquency than any other 
issue'. 
p. 65 
The problem for the new left was that through a process of denial and 
romanticisation of juvenile crime they left no route open to the places where 
the power to make things change resided. As 'radicals' they located themselves 
'outside' the system, only entering it as advocates and critics. They were 
concerned to either develop the alternative to existing structures or to bombard 
those structures with the rhetoric of change. Whereas the new left made 
remarkable advances in the spheres of psychiatry, welfare rights and community 
work the issue of Children and Young people in trouble was fumbled because the 
activists isolated themselves politically, in the same way that the children and 
young people they strove to help were isolated. 
To say this is not to say that the experimental work developed in the free- 
school, alternative youth projects, the adventure playgrounds and community arts 
had no value. These were, and remain, some of the most exciting, and arguably 
the most effective, interventions with inner city young people in this century. 
The problem was that in the sphere of juvenile crime, the new left lost any 
political purchase it might have had upon the issue because it misunderstood the 
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actual and symbolic political significance of juvenile crime. It ignored the 
victim of juvenile crime, and it never had a clear view of what the 'state' was 
beyond a notion that it was alive, oppressive and existent within every formal 
structure. This was however a distinction it shared with most of the other 
actors who attempted to effect reform in the juvenile criminal justice system in 
the 1970s. 
The Politics of Reality (reframing the problem by framing the problem solvers) 
In the mid 1970s the protagonists of Delinquency Management and Back to 
Justice developed an explicit critique of social workers and their involvement 
in the juvenile criminal justice system and an implicit critique of the 
prescriptions for change offered by the new left. 
The failure of government to implement key sections of the 1969 CYPA left 
social workers with some unpalatable choices. Would they-simply attempt to 
bring some unspecified 'welfare' to those children who were patently not faring 
well or would they attempt to bury the contradiction implicit in their new role 
beneath a professional rhetoric which reconciled care and control as related and 
legitimate activities of 'responsible parents', and presumed that those 
responsibilities and activities might be discharged by a range of state 
institutions, and state professionals. 
While the first option involved a certain denial, optimism, and 
romanticism, the second involved a very serious psychological mistake for it 
developed analogies between the uses of rewards and punishments by parents in 
the process of childrearing, and the functions of the normalising and coercive 
institutions of the state. Primary and secondary socialisation were not to be 
squared so neatly and the random deployment of welfare. resources designated for 
crime control soon revealed a nasty propensity towards the moral contamination 
of those they touched because in the act of deployment lurked the imminent 
possibility of stigmatisation, 
g 
Both options opened up the possibility of self-defeat. Both options, 
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couched as they were in the positive, determined as they were to effect positive 
change and adjustment, or positive reform, ultimately ran into the limit set by 
the non-implementation of the 1969 Act. Both options, predicated as they were 
on a hope of the possibility of individual salvation and change, threatened to 
transform the state-employed solution into part as the state inspired problem. 
So how then was it to be possible to effect the desired and desirable goal 
of the deinstitutionalisation of young offenders from the 'inside' when to be 
inside was to be part of the problem? Was it possible to be a subversive 
insider simultaneously accepted and oppositional? 
Here was the juncture at which 18th century utilitarianism 1960s labelling 
theory, abolitionist politics, micro-computer-technology and the patter of the 
used-cat' salesman united 'Delinquency Management' and 'Back to Justice' in the 
'politics of reality'. This foray into the intellectual supermarket brought 
together the ideas and approaches it did in the way that it did in order to find 
a way out of the strategic bind which confounded would-be reformers within the 
welfare apparatus. Despite its devastating critique of social work, the 
'politics of reality' grew out of, and was sustained by, social work and social 
workers who were its audience and its market. The eclecticism of the approach 
was strategic and pragmatic. Each element of this new coalition of ideas 
addressed a different aspect of the problem. Ironically it did what governments 
had always done with theory. It wove ideas together into a vehicle which would 
take it where it wanted to go, irrespective of the purity, form or coherence of 
those ideas. 
If the practice of social work. in the juvenile criminal justice system had 
previously proceeded upon the assumption that it was bringing scientifically 
informed practices to bear upon the problem of criminality then the 'politics of 
reality' indicted this endeavour as a major cause of criminalisation. If social 
welfare personnel had dreamt that they were helping the offender, the 'politics 
of reality' fractured that dream by citing them as a source of hindrance. The 
traditional oppositions of a legal and penal apparatus struggling with a welfare 
apparatus for the body of the accused were rendered problematic by a new idea 
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that together the penal judicial and welfare apparatus stood in opposition to 
the interests of the accused. But this reversal was even more radical for it 
suggested that legal professionals, magistrates and judges, might in fact, if 
separated off from welfare, become the real defenders of the young offender, the 
people who would protect them from the voracious ambitions of welfare 
professionals. If all of these people had previously believed that the problem 
was located within the psyche, morality or activity of the individual offender 
and that the remedy should also be sought there, the new orthodoxy pointed to a 
system which delivered outcomes at stark variance with the stated aims of 
justice, social well-being, and morality articulated by professionals within the 
system. 
Yet in all this, the apparent radicalism of the critique notwithstanding, 
was a central assumption about how change might occur. This assumption was that 
the chaotic and unjust outcomes of the juvenile justice system arose by mistake. 
They arose it seemed out of false ideas, mistaken assumptions and a misplaced 
professional entrepreneurism. The solution lay in control and information, 
gatekeeping and feedback. It was in this way that the system would return to 
optimal functioning. Thus the problem was not the system itself, not the 
structure, not the legitimacy of the process, but rather the mistakes, 
inefficiency, stupidity and professional greed of its operatives. The 'politics 
of reality' strove from its inception to restore the system to optimal 
functioning. It did this in the implicit belief that the system in equilibrium 
with all the anomalies ironed out, would deliver formal and social justice. 
This essentially liberal endeavour saw its central task as that of closing the 
gap between the rhetoric and the actuality of the juvenile justice system. It 
strove to make the system live up to its promises by exposing the irony in its 
functioning. Yet in choosing to believe this account of events the possibility 
that the mistakes identified so clearly were not in fact inadvertent, 
irrational, and arbitrary was denied, for to accept this possibility meant that 
the technology of Delinquency Management would become instantly redundant. 
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So the other strand of the 'politics of reality', the fit between its 
ideological coalition and its technology was revealed. It was a technology 
whose viability was contingent upon the world being in fact a pluralistic and 
ultimately benign one. It relied upon the hope that technological rationality 
would eventually triumph over vested interest. An alternative analysis which 
suggested that the juvenile criminal justice system might be yet another 
battleground upon which a class struggle was being enacted threatened to render 
the technology irrelevant. 'Do-ability' required the politics of reality to 
locate itself within a pluralistic paradigm. Being located within a pluralistic 
paradigm meant that some of the most striking anomalies identified by the 
technology could only be understood as human errors and not as indicators of 
profound political conflicts lying beyond the juvenile criminal justice system. 
Thus the question arises as to whether the 'mistakes', 'anomalies' and outright 
absurdities identified by the technology were in fact 'problems' or whether they 
were manifestations or 'symptoms' of other deeper, more intractable problems 
which lay beyond the understanding of this ideological coalition-and the reach 
of its technology. 
The new left had struggled to develop a base within the working class. The 
coalition which spawned the 'politics of reality' had no political base but a 
central political idea. It was a coalition developed in the university with an 
implicit commitment to the minimisation of state intervention in the lives of 
citizens. To that extent it remained unselective about those elements of the 
state and those activities of its professional personnel which might be defended 
and those which might be condemned. It was committed to a pragmatic social 
science and the development of technologies which would minimise bureaucratic 
intrusion into personal lives and to that extent its programme coincided with 
that of the radical right. It had no strong objections to the existing social 
order and betrayed an enthusiasm for the unfettered operation of free market 
forces when it came to peddling its cost-cutting computer technology to hard- 
pressed local authority social services departments. It claimed to be 'on the 
side' of the young offender and against clumsy social reaction. It chose not to 
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discuss juvenile crime because it was wedded to a conception of labelling theory 
in which social reaction was seen to generate crime. It launched its assault 
upon the activities of social workers in the social services departments where 
it had marketed its equipment. And as the attendance centres, the detention 
centres, and the Borstals grew fuller and fuller with less and less problematic 
offenders throughout the 1970s, the protagonists of a 'politics of reality' 
could only suggest that social workers or policemen or magistrates seemed to be 
making a lot of mistakes. They could not account for the growth of the prison 
and offered no strategy with which to address it. They did not address the 
reality of social inequality or the reasons why new forms of juvenile offending 
like street crime or heroin abuse might rise to prominence at a particular 
moment. They had nothing to say about any relationship which might exist 
between poverty, offending, and control, dismissing such concerns as 
'needology'. They therefore repudiated the very possibility of a political 
dimension to their essentially technological and administrative project. Like 
the new left, they ignored the victim and remained vague about the nature of the 
'state' seeing it as a large inept but potentially benign bureaucracy which 
could be made to operate efficiently if offered the right sort of information. 
By the late 1970s the 'politics of reality' had developed into an 
'administrative criminology' concerned with the dispersal of deviant bodies not 
the dreams in deviant heads. 
The Politics of Opportunism 
While the endeavours of the protagonists of a 'politics of reality' were 
opportunistic in as much as they traded upon a growing scepticism within 
government about the efficacy of social intervention and a pressing need on the 
part of local authorities to cut expenditure, they did alert us to the 
phenomenon of professional entrepreneurism in the sphere of juvenile justice. 
There is an adage in local government circles which suggests that politicians 
understand buildings and equipment much better than they understand procedures 
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and practices. Thus if you wish to ensure a future for your procedure or 
practice you are advised to try to get as many buildings, and as much 
specialised equipment in which, and with which, to proceed with your 
procedures and practise your practices. It is also extremely important to spend 
all of your budget if not more, lest the councillors should come to believe that 
you will need less next year. Survival in a local authority it is suggested is 
contingent upon acquiring buildings and equipment which you may not need and 
spending far more money than is necessary. It is also the case of course that 
if you do this you will then need more staff. More staff will lead to greater 
responsibility and a consequent extension of your span of control. As a result 
of this your post will be regraded and you will gradually rise in the hierarchy, 
projected upwards by the empire which is inflating below you. 
What the usual critiques of professional entrepreneurism miss is that 
this activity, where it can be observed, may or may not be a reflection of the 
incumbant's desire for self aggrandisement but it most assuredly is an example 
of the best way to get a new solution to an old problem established in a welfare 
bureaucracy. The fact is that if a very able senior social worker runs IT and a 
very inept assistant director runs childrens' residential establishments then 
the chances of IT replacing the CHE as a solution to juvenile offending will 
remain slight. The internal politics of local authorities dictate that your 
success will be gauged by your rate of expansion and the velocity of your ascent 
through the hierarchy. You have done the job if you have done more things to 
more people in more places. For the purposes of evaluation in the informal 
power structure of the social services bureaucracy meals on wheels and IT are 
regarded similarly. Both are innovative, both respond to the needs of rate- 
payers and while the efficacy of the former is calculated on the basis of prunes 
down throats the efficacy of the latter is calculated on the basis of bodies up 
mountains. 
Power is achieved in the process of expansion. The irony for professionals 
who wish to implement a non-interventionist strategy with young offenders is 
that in order to achieve the requisite power it is necessary to expand the means 
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whereby one can intervene in the lives of young people. 
While it is generally recognised that more than enough community-based 
provision exists to decant the entire CHE, Detention Centre and Youth Custody 
population into the community, the role of IT as a political base from which to 
exert influence upon local authority child-care policy requires it to keep 
growing. 
This need for perpetual growth is fuelled by the nature of-the funding of 
IT provision. Much IT provision has been jointly developed by the voluntary and 
statutory sectors and local and central government, andlit is therefore subject 
to the requirements placed upon it by funding agencies both governmental-and 
voluntary. The funding agencies are usually enthusiastic about innovation and 
tend to be unimpressed by projects which just keep on doing the same thing to 
the same kinds of young people. They want to put their money into something new 
and innovative, something one suspects, for which they will be remembered. This 
places IT workers and projects which want to keep doing what they already do 
because it works, in something of a dilemma. They therefore come up with 
something new, innovative, exciting and based squarely upon what they already do 
so that what they already do is not jeopardised. Thus in order to achieve 
sufficient political influence and in order to retain existing provision 
projects must grow and change. Growth and change involves intervention in'new, 
previously unreached populations. 
The motivation of those embroiled in the politics of opportunism may be 
pristine but once at the wheel of the IT juggernaut very delicate steering is 
necessary in order to avoid transforming what started out as an attempt`to 
restore the prisoner to the community into a means whereby the prison, in the 
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form of expanded intensive IT provision is imposed upon the community. What we 
do know about control systems leads us to believe that where space exists it 
will be filled irrespective of levels of crime or levels of social need. 
To argue that the structure of local authority social services departments 
and the requirements of central government and voluntary funding have tended to 
push IT in the direction of opportunism is not to suggest that IT is unique in 
this. Radical welfare, and Delinquency Management as movements of professional 
academics and welfare workers operating within the educational and welfare 
apparatuses were equally opportunistic. Each had an investment in suppressing 
inconvenient bits of social reality and emphasising others. Each set out to get 
more power and more money in order that its solution would triumph'over other 
peoples' solutions. Each sought to establish its definition of reality and 
demolish other definitions. Each was ultimately limited in its reforming 
endeavour by the position it chose to occupy in relation to the welfare 
apparatus. 
Politics and Ideas 
The politics of reform in the juvenile criminal justice system in the 
-period 1969 to 1987*has been a politics elaborated by radical professionals 
within the system rather than political activists beyond the system or groupings 
of the clients or subjects of that system. Attempts to elaborate reforming 
alliances beyond the system like 'New Approaches to Juvenile Crime' or 'Keep- 
' 
Out' have invariably met with failure. NACRO and the Howard League speak up if 
an excess or anomaly is reported in the press, while PROP and RAP can barely 
function through lack of money and support. 
The ideas and activities of these radical professionals have undergone a 
remarkable transformation over the period. Commentators on juvenile justice 
have maintained that the emergence and popularisation of new ideas in this field 
is an example of a theoretical 'survival of the fittest' in which theories and 
ideas by the sheer force of their explanatory power or practical relevance elbow 
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their way to the fore. This Darwinian explanation, had it been pursued to its 
logical conclusion would however have suggested that ideas and theories, like 
species, survive because they adapt to a changing and sometimes worsening 
environment. It is not necessarily the explanatory power of the theory which 
ensures its popularity but its adaptability to a changed political environment 
which encourages the emergence of some theories and the suppression of other, 
equally plausible, ones. 
The development in the early 197Us of a practice of radical welfare found 
its intellectual rationale in ideas and assumptions derived from the 
'opportunity theory' developed by Cloward and Ohlin (1960) There were a 
number of possible 'readings' of this theory. It could have been read as a 
remarkably fatalistic account of the structural barriers to any significant 
redistribution of wealth and opportunity in American society. It was read by 
would-be social interventionists however as an injunction to apply community 
action method in 'order to help lower-class communities get themselves organised 
into an additional tier of local government so that their discontent could be 
channelled via the formal political process. This was certainly the reading of 
the Wilson government and it served as the rationale for the creation of the 
Community Development Projects and the Educational Priority areas. Workers in 
these projects who held new left sympathies read opportunity theory as an 
injunction to help the lumpen proletariat mobilise for the struggle which was to 
hasten the demise of 'a corrupt capitalist social order. 
Opportunity theory did a lot of things for a lot of people but in both 
Britain and the USA it was adopted in the first instance by governments as a 
solution to the problem that the existing social and political order was facing 
in its attempt to retain credibility and legitimacy with the politically 
marginalised and'potentially, disruptive residents of the inner city. The fact 
that other theorists had levelled serious criticisms at Cloward and Ohlin's 
formulations was completely irrelevant in terms of the co-option of the theory 
by governments who needed a plausible do-able academically respectable 
solution. 
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Adopted in this way opportunity theory in its endlessly vulgarised versions 
described what ought to be done and what central and local government was 
prepared to spend money-on. Radicals 'radicalised' opportunity theory but 
worked within its intellectual parameters because that was where the work was. 
They worked on a government-defined problem, operationalising a government co- 
opted theory, implementing a government-defined solution, financed by government 
money. The new left did not invent 'radical welfare', they adapted it from the 
community action approach commended to them by the government. 
The usual accounts of the historical emergence of particular theories also 
ignore the issue that for the radical professional the first pre-requisite of 
professional survival is to stay relevant. For professionals to be taken 
seriously it is necessary for them to annexe a body of theory which supports 
their claim to specialist knowledge and skills unknown and unavailable to non- 
professionals. A problem arises however if, as happened during the 1970s and 
1980s the Home Office, the probation service, and local authority social 
services departments in their dealings with young offenders began to distance 
themselves from traditional social work responses and to speak of 'hard-headed', 
'no-nonsense', usually a euphemism for behavioural approaches to young 
offenders. It certainly seemed by the mid 1970s with the rise of a right-wing 
intelligentsia and the 'decline of the rehabilitative ideal' in criminology and 
penology that the days of traditional social work, based upon a diluted version 
of Freudian psychoanalysis, were numbered. This shift was fuelled by financial 
cutbacks in social welfare budgets which meant that there were fewer and fewer 
workers to undertake traditional social work. This was of course the era in 
which 'brief focal work' and 'contracts' gained currency in the social work 
vocabulary for these innovations, neither of them new, offered the possibility 
of dealing with more people, more purposefully, and hence more cheaply. Two 
messages were passed down the line from government to the probation service and 
local authority social services departments. The first was that the government 
wanted to see more control being exerted over young offenders by social workers 
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if social work was to retain any relevance in the juvenile criminal justice 
system. The second was that local authorities should reduce their expenditure 
on residential care. The minimalist assumptions of the Back to Justice movement 
and the technological cost-cutting pragmatism of Delinquency Management offered 
the possibility of ideological acceptability. The time for a politics of 
reality had arrived. 
Whereas traditional social work had offered intervention the message of the 
politics of reality was 'radical non-intervention'. Their project was to 
minimise formal intervention in the lives of young offenders. They wanted less 
government, a diminished social work, and hence a less pervasive welfare state. 
Their theoretical mainstay was labelling theory. 
Now as every sociology student knows one of the problems with labelling 
theory is that it does not tell us why people choose to deviate in the first 
place. What they also know is that labelling theory gives us an inadequate 
account of the sources of social reaction suggesting as it does that the problem 
of social reaction is dealt with if we stop welfare professionals, psychiatric 
nurses, and police officers saying bad things about people. Labelling theory 
does offer an interesting, albeit speculative, account of why some people may 
deviate on a subsequent occasion if bad things are said about them. The problem 
is that the available empirical evidence suggests that although the dramatic 
official labelling involved in a court appearance may serve to project some 
defendants into a future deviant career, the majority of young offenders only 
appear in court once and this could suggest that such official intervention, or 
labelling, actually prevents the development of a deviant career. 
On the face of it then, labelling theory, which is not without its merits, 
seems to offer a shaky set of premises from which to market the solution to the 
problem of juvenile crime on a national and indeed an international scale. Its 
explanatory power was not great but it gave a professionally respectable 
theoretical underpinning to an endeavour which fitted well with the ideological 
and political imperatives of the time in which it was launched. Similarly we 
see the politically timely emergence of a revitalised Pavlovian behaviourism in 
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the 'correctional curriculum' of the contemporary intensive IT programme. If 
the response to young offenders is to resemble a sentence of the court, eschew 
considerations of social need, and fit into a classical justice model, it must 
be based upon a time-limited intervention which assumes that its subjects are 
motivated by the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, and effect 
rational choices about their own behaviour. This is abominable sociology, poor 
psychology, but a good example of a political initiative which attempts to 
placate an increasingly predatory bench and government. 
It seems clear that in these circumstances theory is adopted 
pragmatically in order to achieve a rationale for a necessary movement in a 
necessary direction. The movement is necessitated by the need to remain 
indispensible. Continuing indispensibility in a rapidly changing world requires 
speed and flexibility. Continuing professional credibility requires a knowledge 
base which professionals can claim for their own. Change indispensibility and 
professional credibility mean that theories must be adopted and dropped with 
equal alacrity. Thus the emergence of a 'new' theory does not signify a further 
step in a progression towards a new enlightenment, it may signal no more than 
the fact that 'radical professionals' and 'radical' welfare academics have 
effected a different adaptation in a changing political climate in order to 
ensure their continued relevance and presence in a law and order discourse which 
seems to be attempting to emancipate itself from social work. 
The Structure of the Politics of Reform 
Radical professionals have striven to achieve a 'radicalisation' of face to 
face practice at certain points. In 'Working with Offenders', a collection of 
articles by socialists working within the probation service, most of the 
contributors seem to be arguing that the job of socialists in welfare is to (a) 
humanise service delivery, (b) minimise authoritarianism, and (c) give clients 
an experience of participatory (socialist) forms of working. 
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'Being treated in a normal humane manner is often a pleasant surprise 
for these clients who have been previously treated to the exigencies 
of the 'deep' case worker. This style of working is also a positive 
antidote to another pressure that bears upon the officer-client 
relationship - the need to encourage conformity to a set of values 
promulgated by the criminal justice system' 
p. 39 
These are laudable professional objectives but they don't, in themselves, 
constitute exclusively 'socialist' responses. The radicalism, indeed the 
courage, of these initiatives, resides in their espousal of humanitarian values 
in an authoritarian era. The irony is apparently compounded as the contributors 
discuss the radicalisation of practice in the court, in the prison, and in the 
day training centre because they advocate on internal radical practice for an 
expanding system of authoritarian control which the editors identified and 
bemoaned in their previous volume 
These socialist probation officers annexe, rework and give a radical edge 
to ideas and practices developed in the mainstream of the profession. This is 
necessary because it is difficult, if not impossible, to derive specific 
practices from the vast and contradictory body of Marxist writings. It is 
primarily necessary however because as I have argued above, the population to be 
dealt with and the range of possible interventions and resources available to 
deal with them is given by the political, administrative, and bureaucratic 
imperatives which structure the service. Practitioners do have a degree of 
professional autonomy but they are not free to specify the goals'to be achieved 
by the service. They have the freedom to impose a radical style' upon their 
practice rather than to develop a full-blown radical practice because a 
precondition for a radical practice would be that political and administrative 
imperatives would be changed to reflect socialist, and hence in the current 
political environment, oppositional and indeed subversive goals and values. 
The question is raised then, whether it matters if the practitioner is an 
anarchist, a black seperatist, or a seventh day adventist. The answer seems to 
be that to the client it probably matters but it matters somewhat less to 
employers and governments. It matters less because the importance of an 
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expanding control system lies in its capacity to exert more control and 
surveillance over more people. The style of that control is of less political 
significance than the extension of the state's machinery of control which allows 
it to 'keep an eye on, and exert control over, more wrong-doers. 
'The bourgeoisie is interested in power, not in sadness, in the system 
of control of infantile sexuality, not in that phenomenon itself. The 
bourgeoisie could not care less about delinquents, about their 
punishment and rehabilitation, which economically have little 
importance, but it is concerned about the complex of mechanisms with 
which delinquency is controlled, pursued, punished and reformed'. 
. 
1u2,. 'y) 
M ? 
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'Working with Offenders' describes, not iaerely a style of work, but a huch 
more audacious attempt by socialist probation officers to trant'; j1, ' 2! 'actice as 
a step towards the achievement of a socialist transforwation. The 
sophistication of their approach, and what distinguishes it from other 
approaches described is that it attempts to operate at the levels of face to 
face practice administrative change and parliamentary politics simultaneously. 
In this way it addresses the potential contradiction in which the reformer 
merely serves to legitimise and soften the image of repressive systems. At the 
moment socialists hold political power in the National Association of Probation 
Officers (NAPO). NAPO has the distinction among groupings of professionals in 
welfare that it is simultaneously a professional association, a trades. union, 
and a penal pressure group. Its members occupy a strategic position in the 
justice system and have been able, as we have seen, to resist the extensions of 
control into the community proposed by the 'reinforced supervision' of the 
Younger Report (1974) and tue 'curfew' of the Criminal Justice Act (19ö2). In 
these instances NAPO has used its muscle as a trades union to exert negative 
control on behalf of, and in the interests of, its actual and potential 
clientele and arguably the entire community. NAPOs major struggle through the 
1970s was to resist pressure from central government and the upper eschelons of 
the probation service itself to become a community correctional service and 
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assume a more controlling and coercive role in relation to its clients. NAPOs 
industrial action has slowed and modified these developments but it remains the. 
case that the radical practices advocated in Working with offenders are to be 
practised in the new institutions, and as facets of the new work roles created by 
this extension of the apparatus of control. It is this realisation which has 
taken NAPO over the threshold of the politics of abolition. Bill Beaumont 
writes: 
'A fundamental criticism of social casework is its failure to tackle 
economic and social problems faced by clients. Campaigning work 
offers one way of overcoming that limitation. It may produce reforms 
which make a more significant widespread and long-term contribution to 
the welfare of the client group than individual assistance ever could. 
Thus for PROS, if the removal of imprisonment were brought about, it 
would at a stroke remove the need for hundreds of mopping-up 
operations ... There is considerable potential for campaigning work to become an integral part of probation work, routinely drawing upon 
the experience of practice to press for relevant charge'. 
pp. 9U-91 
Whereas for the NAPO practitioner/activists attempt to resist the spread Of 
control is pursued on the basis of the collective action of trades unionists 
applying pressure on behalf of their clients, for the 'Delinquency Managers' 
such action is initiated by the upper eschelons of the welfare bureaucracy and 
is imposed upon practitioners from above by administrative- If the 
actions of NAPO in the sphere of reform can be described as radical 
collectivism, those of the Delinquency Managers could be described as radical 
authoritarianisr, i. The approach is determined by the political assumptions of 
those with the power to impose their solutions. Socialist welfare professionals 
will try to create a lateral political alliance seeing the collective action of 
practitioners as a solution. The radical liberalism of the Delinquency 
Management approach will locate the problem in the unfettered opportunism of 
welfare professionals and find the solution in an alliance with a senior 
management group which has an interest in cutting expenditure. 
Whereas NAPO has resisted the concentration of power in 'the hands of senior 
management, Delinquency Management actively promotes such a concentration. and 
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yet both claim to do this to protect the client from unwarranted surveillance 
and control. The Delinquency Management and Back to Justice perspectives assume 
that a concern for social need i, uust lead inevitably to an extension of control. 
It is for this reason that they are only prepared to countenance responses to 
offending which are effectively sentences of the court and in which tile 
exclusive focus is upon the offence. Socialists in probation by contrast would 
argue that a concern for social need rather than individual criminality should 
remain at the centre of any intervention with clients. They argue this because 
they see the attempt by management to push them towards an exclusive focus upon 
offending as an attempt to implicate them in the extension of control. They 
also see an aspect of the need of the client as the need to be afforded 
protection from the incursions of the apparatus of control by the probation 
officer. This need is addressed through the development of an internal radical 
practice linked to industrial action which attempts to resist the transformation 
of the service into a 'community correctional' apparatus. Over and above this 
the attei,. ipt by PJAPO to enter the law and order debate by developing an 
abolitionist alliance from its base in the trades union movement has been a 
successful one in which KAPO has added a radical voice to an issue previously 
dominated by the POA. This indicates that the requirements for a radical 
socialist practice, that it should operate simultaneously at the levels of 
political change administrative change and face to face practice are beginning 
to be addressed. 
NAPO is a particular and peculiar case but it offers an interesting model 
of a potential politics of penal reform which overcomes some of the limitations 
of the new left radical welfare initiatives and the endeavours of Delinquency 
Management and Back to Justice. Probation is an intrinsic part of the justice 
system, 'its practitioners are officers of the court and the court could not 
function without them, they are relevant and necessary. The centrality of 
probation to the justice system means that probation officers are not 
ideologically ghettoised with their clients. These are structural advantages. 
What the NAPO initiative has and what the early politics of the new left and the 
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'politics of reality' lacked is an analysis of the state which moves beyond its 
bland representation as either an omnipotent malevolent force or a potentially 
benign but inept monolith harbouring greedy professional entrepreneurs. 
The abolitionism developed within NAPO is at odds with the abolitionism 
developed by I"; athiesen (1974` The struggle for Mathiesen Iies' beyond 
finding the right kind of accommodation with a law and order state. It lIi far 
beyond the development of an internal radical practice, which he repudiates in 
favour of a politics of attrition to be mobilised in the struggle to minimise 
the power and effectiveness of the state apparatus. At this point, Mathiesen's 
minimalist politics of abolition coincides with the politics of reality of 
Delinquency management and Back to Justice. He repudiates all radical 
humanitarian practice as merely serving to legitimise an intrinsically 
repressive state apparatus. While negative reform might be the key to a 
socialist abolitionist strategy, in its repudiation of all state activity it is 
also naive. 
1n the late 196Us and early 197Us the new left attacked the educational and 
welfare bureaucracies as the velvet glove masking the iron fist of the 
capitalist state. When in the mid-197us the capitalist state began to dismantle 
the educational and welfare bureaucracies a, by this time slightly more 
sophisticated, left attempted to defend these services against the government 
axe. This was neither pure pragmatism nor protest for its own sake, because by 
this time the left was beginning to recognise that the state was a rumore complex 
phenomenon than had previously been assumed. The realisation dawned that if 
the, admittedly vestigial, welfare state was merely a mask for the 
conspiratorial intentions of the board of directors of 'capitalism UK' then 
either the state was acting against its own best interests in dismantling 
services during a time of economic recession or there was more to the welfare 
state than a shabby bit of political legitimation. The realisation dawned that 
the welfare state grew out of a struggle between the Labour movement and the 
owners of capital in which, in the interests of social stability, and the 
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creation of the necessary social and econo !c conditions for capital 
accumulation, concessions were granted ,. Thus, the contradictions 
notwithstanding, the welfare state grew out of and remained a site upon which 
the class struggle had been and could be enacted its same ambiguity, "" 
these some contradictions, were also seen to a lesser extent to characterise the 
i'istice system. It therefore became possible to be 'in and against the state' 
I- and to maximise the benefits and minimise the oppressive aspects of the 
welfare state on behalf of the poor. 
If this analysis was correct then hathiesen's, admittedly brilliant, 
formulation was too bland and abolitionism in the form of the demand for 
negative reforms could in fact be squared with the maximisation of benefits and 
responses to the needs of, disadvantaged offenders. This is chat the 
14APO initiative attempts to do. Their 'neo-abolitionism' emerges as the most 
sophisticated and thoroughgoing reforming initiative to be developed by radical 
professionals. 
NAPO is effective because its organisational structure and its range of 
functions are similar to those of other groupings which are trying to gain some 
political leverage in the adult justice system. As an organisation it has 
adapted well to its political environment. The Prison Officers Association 
(POA) like NAPO is a trades union, a professional association, and a political 
pressure group. The Magistrates Association may represent amateurs but as a 
defender of a closed shop and restrictive practices it puts many trades unions 
into the shade. It is certainly the case that the Magistrates Association, as a 
pressure group, exerts considerable influence upon Tory governments. The police 
federation as a professional association and political pressure group has had a 
considerable impact on law and order policies. NAPO is the least powerful of 
the four groups but it holds some power by dint of the indispensibility and 
centrality of the probation officer within the adult justice system. 
Statutory or Voluntary workers within the juvenile\criminal justice system 
may belong to NALGO, NUPE or ASTMS, none of which have an exclusive interest in 
social work let alone the concerns of social workers and IT workers working with 
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young offenders. They may be members of the social work's professional 
association BASW but BASW only has a subcommittee dealing with juvenile justice 
issues and this isn't a permanent feature of the association. They may support 
the pressure group activity of the National IT Federation or the Association for 
Juvenile Justice or the Howard League or the NCCL but each of these has a 
slightly different view of what the main issues are in the juvenile justice 
debate. 
The role of the social worker in the juvenile criminal justice systen is 
neither central nor indispensible. IT remains an optional extra in the range of 
juvenile court disposals and even then the bench has to be persuaded of its 
usefulness. It is for these reasons that social work and IT have been fairly 
ineffective participants in the politics of reform. The radicals in NAPO have 
demonstrated an ability to carry the bulk of the membership ºwith them on a range 
of issues because it has been able to relate the radicalism of its policies to 
the professional and personal interests of probation officers. By contrast, 
social work with young offenders and IT is characterised by dissension and 
factionalism. Regional IT association are periodically devastated by feuds 
between those who wish to do 'preventive work' and those who maintain that IT 
must only work with adjudicated offenders. IT workers attack social workers as 
the cause of the problem. Social workers sometimes indict IT workers as 
irresponsible anarchists who tacitly condone the bad behaviour of their clients 
but are unprepared to take any responsibility for them or to exert any control 
over them. 
If an effective reforming alliance is to be constructed in the juvenile 
criminal justice system it might usefully consider what lessons can be learnt 
from the experience of NAPO. There appear to be six central principles which 
characterise the NAPO initiative. An effective alliance will act simultaneously 
to: 
1. represent the interests of workers in its 'role as a trades union. 
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2. represent the interests of its clients in its role as a pressure group and 
3. promote the development of a radical practice in its role as a professional 
association. 
This radical practice will operate at three different levels 
simul taneously: 
4. by developing an internal humanitarian face to face practice, 
5. by attempting to effect administrative and bureaucratic change, either by 
initiating a systems management initiative controlled by basic grade 
officers, or by industrial action against management, and 
6. by developing an external abolitionist politics which contests current 
penal and judicial policies and the rhetoric of law and order through the 
construction of political alliances within and beyond the mainstream of the 
Labour movement. 
.. 
1lß 3 
1. Vheras in France in 1968 the student movement established an 
alliance with trades unionists this did not happen in Britain and the 
radical movement remained essentially middle class. 
2. It was was within this particular but pervasive explanation of 
events that we should seek the origins of what Young J. (1986) calls 
"left idealism". 
3. Prior to W. W. II, for example, Denis Healey had been a member of the 
communist party and many of the members of: Labour's front bench had been 
either members or "fellow-travellers" of the communist party or other 
left wing organisations in prior to entering parliamentary politics. 
4, Probably the most influential of these theorists was Herbert Marcuse 
with concept of the "one dimensional man". 
5. The International Socialist Party, which subsequentially became the 
Socialist Workers Party, were in the forefront of the movement to "smash 
the state" from the inside by fomenting dissention in the workplace. The 
SWP found it difficult to deal with the instrumentalism of real members 
of the working class however. 
6, Cohen S. (1975) It's Alright For you to Talk in Bailey R. and Brake 
M. Radical Social Work has characterised and caricatured this position 
as "homage to catatonia". 
7. Debate amongst "radical" youthworkers at this time concerned whether 
or not we should view juvenile crime as proto-revolutionary activity 
which workers should support. Needless to say, the "indigenous" but 
untrained youthworkers whosa-families were most likely to become victims 
of this crime were less enthusiastic than their colleagues who had 
attended university. 
8. Social work with offenders has been dogged by this inability to 
separate primary and secondary socialisation and the family and the 
state. 
9. The lessons of NAPO have posed local authority social workers and IT 
workers with the dilemma that political influence seems to be contingent 
upon the centrality of the role and function of -the worker to the 
judicial process. This has required workers to rethink this 
relationship. 
a 
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Chapter 7 
The Brixton Triangle 
How many rivers do we have to cross 
before we get to meet the boss? ' 
'To the right wing, 'law and order' is just a code phrase 
meaning 'get the niggers'. 
Gore Vidal, 1975 
Burning and Looting by Bob Marley 
The Bermuda Triangle is an area in the Carribean bounded by the Bahamas, 
North Carolina, and Bermuda where people in boats and aeroplanes mysteriously 
disappear. Scientists using all the tools available to them are unable to 
account for these disappearances. 
The Brixton Triangle is an area in South London bounded by Clapham Common, 
Tulse Hill and the Oval where young black people who commit offences, or are 
suspected of being about to commit offences, mysteriously disappear. 
Criminologists using all the tools available to them are unable to account for 
these disappearances. 
Where did they go 
In 1982 an assistant governor at Wandsworth jail monitored the daily intake 
to that prison by colour and discovered that 237. of the intake was black. Of 
the broader picture Martin Kettle (1982) wrote: 
In April this year according to the Home Office 50% of the population 
of Ashford remand centre was black. Brixton (another remand prison) 
and Aylesbury prisons were between 25% and 35% black. So were 
Rochester, Dover, and Hewell Grange borstals and Blantyre House 
detention centre. Others with more than 10% black inmates were Wormwood Scrubs, Parkhurst, Albany, Wandsworth and Reading prisons and Wellingborough, bulwood Hall and Feitham borstals'. 
As we move down the age range so the proportion of black inmates 
confined in custodial institutions increases. While the Home Office contends 
that the Afro-Car'ribean population in the penal system constitutes only BY. of 
male and 12% of female prisoners a recent RAP report maintained that the overall 
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black population in the prison system was in fact nearer 20% but that in young 
prisoners' wings this figure rose to 37% and as Kettle has noted in some 
borstals (now youth custody centres) the figure is as high as 50%. When we 
recognise that the proportion of black people in the population of the United 
Kingdom is somewhere between 3% and 4% this over representation begins to appear 
ominous (Home Office, 1986). 
These facts are stark enough yet the fastest growing section of the penal 
population is the 15-25 age group. Indeed the 1982 Criminal Justice Act was in 
large part a response to this fact, and its apparent commitment to the 
development of community alternatives to prison is explicable in that the 
. crisis in the prison' is nowhere more acute than in the institutions for this 
age group. If wie recognise that young black people will over the next few years 
constitute an ever-increasing proportion of this population it becomes clear 
that a sign ificant component in the crisis in the prison is the increasing' 
confinement of young black pe ople. On 1 November 1981, the TV programme 'Skin' 
televised a feature on young black people in borstal in which it suggested that 
if currant trends continued, by 1991 50% of all black males under 25 would have 
spent some time behind bars. 
Why Conventional Administrative Criminology Cannot Find Them 
The mystery of these disappearances persists because criminologists working 
in the sphere of juvenile justice have operated within a paradigm which 
relegated all identified anomalies to the category of 'mistakes' perpetrated by 
low-level decision-makers within the system itself. They have therefore been 
unable to explain 'the basic triangle of relations which is the proper subject 
matter of criminology - the offender, the state and the victim'. What 
happens in the Brixton Triangle can only be explained in terms of this 
criminological triangle. The Brixton Triangle must be explained if progressives 
in the field of juvenile justice are to break out of the political ghetto, which 
they share with their subjects, and enter the politics of 'Law and Order' as 
serious contenders 
i 
171 
Throughout the 1970s criminologists only asked the question of the relation 
between crime and the state in terms of the relation between particular 
offenders and particular 'soft policemen' - social workers, or probation 
officers, and the impact of the actions of the latter upon the former. The 
possibility of understanding changing pattern s of juvenile crime, and state 
reaction to it, in relation to the radically changed political landscape of 
Britain in the 1970s and early 1980s was therefore abandoned. The bland 
acceptance within the conventional criminological endeavour of an oversimplified 
version of Durkheim's observation, suggested that since juvenile crime, like the 
poor, is always with us, then its form need not tax us unduly. By accepting 
juvenile crime as an undifferentiated monolith to be managed more humanely it 
becomes irrelevant to ask why in a particular place at a particular time 
particular people choose, are impelled towards, or are implicated in the 
transgression of particular laws. Similarly changes in state reaction to 
particular groups of offenders tends to be attributed to the emergence of 
scientifically-targeted policing strategies, while the incursions which these 
strategies may make into the lives and liberties of citizens merely serve as 
indicators that the strategy may need further refinement. On the margins are a 
few rotten apples who are irrational, bigoted, unscientific and a source of 
embarrassment to the rational core of senior police officers and politicians 
whose first priority is to deliver rational policing. As for the victim, Chubb 
locks, resident caretakers, video surveillance and the hope of better luck next 
time are the best that conventional administrative criminology can offer them. 
As a result the massive over-representation of black children and young people 
in childcare and custodial institutions, the disproportionate criminal 
victimisation of black citizens and the peculiar nature of the policing of the 
black community can only be explained as a series of technical errors rather 
than the logical consequence of broader political economic and social 
determinants`. 
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The Political Economy of the Brixton Triangle 
Marginalisation 
The Caribbean colonies existed on the margins of the British Empire. One- 
crop islands peopled by ex-slaves, they served initially as a source of 
inexpensive raw materials and as a market for manufactured goods. Subsequently 
they became a source of inexpensive labour for a metropolitan economy locked 
into the logic of perpetual expansion. When in the 1950s, Caribbean people were 
welcomed 'home' by the British government to what Salman Rushdie 
describes as the 'last colony of the British Empire', they found that once again 
they were forced to the margins. In the twilight"of the British Empire they 
came to live in the twilight zones of the chronically ailing inner city. 
The Caribbean people who came to Britain in the 1950s came to fill jobs 
vacated by the indigenous white working class. The post-war economic boom had 
brought with it a bonanza in highly-paid skilled and semi-skilled jobs in the 
new' industries and white workers moved rapidly into these new work roles. The 
demand for labour was outstripping the. supply and dirty, inconvenient, 
unskilled, poorly-paid, un-unionised jobs in the 'old' industries in the inner 
city were abandoned by white workers in favour of new industries and new homes 
in the new towns. 
The economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s was a white economic boom played 
out before a black audience. The 'Embourgeoisement' of substantial sections of 
the white labour force was achieved at the expense of the 'lumpen 
proletarianisation' of black labour. As the expectation of perpetual prosperity 
became lodged in the minds of the white working class and the educational and 
occupational means of achieving these expectations expanded, black citizens had 
to reconcile themselves to a set of economic circumstances which looked worse 
and worse when set against the steadily improving circumstances of white. The 
experience of lack of access to occupational and educational opportunity and its 
consequences for earning power and social status, has been an enduring one for 
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black Britons and the backdrop against which the events enacted within the 
Brixton Triangle have unfolded. 
In the 1950s and the early 1960s black people were offered low-level jobs 
but they retained high hopes for their children. As workers they were 
marginalised because they had no power and no voice within the trades union 
movement. As citizens they were marginal to the major political parties and a 
parliamentary politics which had no place on its agenda for the hopes and fears 
of black people. It was a politics moreover which responded to the racist 
fears and fantasies of white people by the implementation of policies 
which sought to limit immigration from the black commonwealth and colonies by 
constantly re-defining the category of 'British subject' more narrowly. The 
marginality of Britain's black citizens was compounded by this barely concealed 
political hostility. 
To occupy the margins with hope of future centrality can make marginality 
more tolerable but by the mid- to late 1960s such hopes were dashed as it became 
clear to black parents that their children, irrespective of educational 
attainment, were being offered the same kinds of menial jobs as they had. 
'A check of the London Youth Employment Offices by a correspondent of 
the Observer showed that white youths in the 'deprived' areas of black 
settlement such as Islington, Paddington and Notting Hill were almost 
five times more likely to get skilled jobs than coloured youngsters. 
Of the 147 firms dealing with the Youth Employment Offices, nearly 
half had stated 'No Coloured', or were known to be 'unlikely to accept 
them'. 
Hiro D, 1971, p. 75 
As the 1960s turned into the 1970s it became apparent that 
black young people were to be in the front line again as the British economy 
responded to the economic recession by laying off labour. Hunt G and Mellor J 
(1980) write: 
'The second generation's labour power is no longer needed. So 
Britain caught in the heritage of her colonial past, is now faced 
with a population of young black Britons culturally alienated by 
racism and disillusioned, initially by the type of work they were 
offered and more recently by perpetual unemployment. Their 
predicament exposes contradictions inherent in the immigrant's 
position from the outset 
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These contradictions were not lost on arising generation of black: britons 
experiencing levels of unemployment without precedent in 'British history. Black 
Youth Unemployment in Brixton in the late 1980s was rurniirig at over 607.. In 
Moss Side and Handsworth the figure was in excess ofr807.. 'From the late 1970s 
an entire generation of black young people had become, -to all intents and 
purposes, ' marginal to the productive process (Guest C L, 1984). 
Alienation = 
The economic recession of the 1970s and 1980s has been-accompanied by a 
growing concern within government and amongst the upper eschelbns of the-police 
about the threat to 'cultural integrity' and 'social order'`posed by`the'black 
inhabitants of the 'unemployed ghetto'. ' these concerns have resulted in the 
reorganisation and concentration of police resources; zon the"black community on 
the "one hand, and a contraction in the numbers of-people who-may now be regarded 
as British subjects, with a consequent expansion in the numbers of people who 
may now be regarded as aliens, on the other hand. 
In his written evidence to the Royal Commission, on Criminal Procedure in 
1978, Sir David McNee of the Metropolitan Police called for new police powers to 
allow them to 'finger-print whole communi, ies in certain`circumstances on the 
order of a High Court Judge'; 'powers, to'be'legalised and formalised to stop 
and search everybody'; and 'powers to search the homes of all persons who are 
arrested and taken to the police station oniwhatever charge': In a similar vein 
the Select Committee on Race'Relations and Immigration Report (1978) recommends 
that: 
'the police, the Immigration Service Intelligence Unit and other 
authorities should be afforded substantially more resources to trace 
over-stayers and tackle all aspects of illegal immigration. We 
recommend that the Department of Health and Social Security introduce 
without delay new procedures to tighten up identity checks and to 
improve the issuing. of national insurance numbers to'new applicants'. 
Hunt and'Mellor, 1980 
Margaret Thatcher expressed the prevailing mood in"government and policing 
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circles very clearly in 1979 when she spoke of 'our culture' being 'swamped'. 
Thatcher's strategy was not a new one, the attempt from the Heath 
government onwards to ideologically transform the economic crisis into a moral 
one had the effect of locating the Afro-Carribean, and to a lesser extent the 
Asian, populations as parasitic and potentially subversive to cultural integrity 
and social order. In the second half of the 1970s the police did not just 
make a mistake or overreact in their policing of black neighbourhoods. They 
were deployed as a response to crime but also in order to recapture 'illegals' 
and forestall anticipated violent social disorder. These important decisions 
about the deployment of manpower and resources were made at the highest levels 
of the police bureaucracy (Hall S et all 1978). The state was not benign nor 
crime meaningless and the police and the black community understood this much 
more clearly than orthodox criminology. The borderland between policing and the 
black community was 'SUS' and the successive indiscriminate sweeps of black 
areas by special squads of police. The consequences of such policies were to 
effectively transform all black people into suspects and all police officers 
into racists, irrespective of the wishes or intentions of individual citizens or 
police officers. 
The effect of these policing and immigration policies has been to freeze 
the black British citizen in political rhetoric and racist folklore as a 
subversive and potentially dangerous alien who haunts the streets of the inner 
city ready to mug, riot or rape. If this alien population-cannot be dealt with 
by immigration control or a Nationality Act there are other means whereby their 
insidious impact may yet be neutralised. 
Expulsion 
Thomas Mathiesen (1974) writes: 
'In our society 'productivity' is to a considerable and increasing 
degree geared to activity in the labour market. At the same time, our 
social structure probably increasingly creates groups which are 'unproductive' according to this criterion. A social structure which does so must rid itself of its unprodctive elements, partly because their presence creates inefficiency in the system of production, it 
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'throws sand into the machinery' and partly because the 'unproductive' 
brutally remind us of the fact that our productive system is not so 
successful after all. A society may get rid of its 'unproductive' 
elements in many ways. One way is to criminalise their activities and 
punish them by imprisoning them. This may be done towards a sub- 
category of the unproductive. In this perspective the rulers of the 
prison system are merely the executives of the expurgatory system of 
society'. 
p. 77 
Research undertaken by the Policy Studies Institute showed that black young 
people were the prime targets for police stop and search operations (Smith D, 
1983). Figures collected by probation officers in the Midlands indicate that 
the second highest category of offences for which young black people are charged 
arose out of confrontations with the police on the streets. These offences, 
'criminal attempts' assault and threatening or insulting behaviour, did not 
occur until the police arrived (Pitts J, 1986)`'. 
The offence of 'Criminal Attempts' offers the police a more flexible 
instrument than the 1824 Vagrancy Act (SUS). The 'Criminal Attempts' bill was 
welcomed by the Police Review in an article entitled Let's Have a Loophole and 
the New Law Journal explained that the new offence could be useful 'where firm 
dishonest intention cannot be established' (Denniglen J, 1981). The SUS 
controversy concerned the use of the law as a means of harrassing black young 
people but SUS/criminal attempts has other consequences. In Lambeth, for 
example, a young person charged with SUS would seldom if ever, as a matter of 
local practice, be offered the opportunity of being referred to the juvenile 
bureau who, if the charge is admitted, are empowered to issue a caution. Young 
people charged with SUS were normally charged immediately as a matter of course 
which meant that they had to appear in court. In court the complainant and the 
witnesses were almost invariably the police. Upon conviction the young person's 
name would be added to the 'recidivists' list which meant that if at some future 
date*he or she was apprehended for whatever charge no referral to the juvenile 
bureau could be made and the young person would be charged immediately. This 
had the effect of projecting those young people so charged deeper into the 
juvenile criminal justice system and further up the 'tariff' of penalties4. 
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Landau's study (1981) noted that SUS was the offence for which there was 
the greatest difference between races. He discovered that white young people 
were up to 50% more likely to be referred to the juvenile bureau for this 
offence than their black counterparts. While it might be argued that this 
discrepancy could be accounted for by the fact that black youngsters so charged 
had a larger record of previous offences, Landau shows that black first 
offenders were subject to an immediate charge decision significantly more than 
whites. The only area in which SUS was used more than in Lambeth was in Toxteth 
in Liverpool. Landau also noted that the police tended to see black young 
people as more antagonistic to them than whites and suggests that this may be a 
significant factor in the decision whether to charge immediately or refer to the 
juvenile bureau. In conclusion he writes: 
'As to ethnic group, the main finding was that blacks involved in 
crimes of violence, burglary, and public disorder are treated more 
harshly than their white counterparts'. 
Black young people are subject to more intensive policing than any other 
section of the population. Such policing generates further offences, and upon 
apprehension black young people are less likely to be diverted out of the 
mainstream of the system to the juvenile bureau and this appears to be related 
to the threat that they are perceived to pose to public order and the authority 
of the police. 
It is usually at the point of the court appearance that the young black 
defendant will first encounter a social worker or probation officer. Here a 
difference between white and black defendants appears for there is growing 
evidence that a majority of young black people who become involved in the 
juvenile criminal justice system do so at a later stage than their white 
counterparts. Whereas many white juvenile defendants and their families may 
have been known to welfare agencies for many years, the involvement of young 
black people tends to start around the age of 14 or 15. Put another way -a 
distinctive feature of the 'criminal careers' of many young black people is that 
they are not characterised by prior involvement with welfare agencies concerned 
with other social or family problems. They are not in the main drawn from 
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families who have previously been a cause of concern to welfare agencies. 
Observations of young black people in penal establishments tend to support this 
in that they appear to be more socially and academically able than their, white 
counterparts. They are also much more likely to be drawn from 'respectable' 
rather than 'disreputable' families (Pitts J, 1986). 
What we are not seeing here is the apparently inexorable unfolding of a 
criminal and institutional career which may be traced back, sometimes over 
generations, but rather a rupture, a departure, from a previously conventional 
mode of existence by a group of young people, many of whom had until shortly 
before their first arrest been successful conforming school girls and school 
boys. 
Wendy Taylor, 1981, has shown that in the Crown Court black defendants are 
two to three times more likely to receive a custodial sentence than whites. 
These custodial sentences have very little to do with the nature of the offence 
but correlate most closely with whether the defendant is homeless, jobless, or 
was previously the subject of a care order. As a consequence of 
institutionalised racism, young black people experience extremely high levels of 
homelessness, they are much more likely than whites to be unemployed and 
their predicament is seriously worsened if they have previously been the 
subjects of a care order. This inequitable sentencing is not simply 
reducible to the racial prejudice of particular judges since unemployed homeless 
offenders, black or white have always been particularly vulnerable to 
imprisonment. These defendants are victims of structural inequalities which 
affect the black population in general but Afro-Carribean young people in 
particular. They are being sentenced three times over. Firstly for their 
offence, over which they have some control, secondly for a set of social, 
economic and cultural circumstances which have dramatically limited their 
options and over which they have no control, and thirdly because there exist few 
if any, legitimate means whereby they might escape from these circumstances. 
Black young people tend to identify the magistrates court as the place 
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where the most blatantly prejudiced judgements are handed down. In a study 
undertaken in the West Midlands only 11% of white young people charged with 
indictable offences opted for trial by jury in a crown court, whereas 43% of 
black young people did. They claimed that the magistrates courts were 'police 
courts' and there you only got 'white man's justice' and they hoped that in a 
crown-court one of the jury might be black (Taylor W, 1981). 
When black young people enter child-care or penal institutions their 
problems are compounded. Many CHEs operate a racial quota system which attempts 
to prevent the proportion of black residents rising above 20%.. The quota system 
is, it is argued, necessitated by the problems of management posed by Afro- 
Carribean young people when they are together in substantial numbers. This 
parallels exactly the complaints of the police, prison officers, and to a, 
somewhat lesser extent field social workers and probation officers. 'They band 
together', 'They speak their own language' and 'They intimidate other residents 
or members or prisoners' (WLIHE, 1982)5 . 
When staff in an institution feel threatened, devalued or misunderstood, 
they will often develop collective defences in which the inmates are attributed 
all the characteristics that most threaten the staff and so a vicious circle of 
which the quota system is both a cause and a consequence develops. The quota 
system has created a log-jam of young black people in remand and observation and 
assessment centres, the institutions which assess young people for placement in 
community homes (with education). Indeed Stamford House, a large remand and 
assessment centre for young offenders in West London frequently holds a black 
population of 60%6. 
The Home Office Prison department shares similar concerns to those 
expressed by some of the staff of the CHES. Staff are concerned that the 
increase in the numbers of black people in prisons has led to changes in the 
relationship between the institutions of control and their black inmates. Cook 
(1982) writes of the Home Office seminar on ethnic minorities in prison: 
'The seminar heard that frequently the superior physical and intellectual abilities of many black, people have led to a growing black hold on traditional prison rackets like extortion and hoovering 
180a 
- taking food away from weaker inmates ... But the department 
has 
failed to establish the point7at which the growing proportion will 
become a danger to stability' . 
The spectre of the black: deviant who poses special problems of control 
looms again. Institutions which, it is suggested, were quietly getting on with 
the job, the erstwhile white-dominated rackets notwithstanding, are suddenly 
confronted by a new and threatening phenomenon. The response to the problems 
has two aspects. On the one hand the Home Office, in a spirit of enlightened 
pluralism, has ruled that Rastafarians will no longer have their locks removed 
by the prison barber while on the other, black 'subversives' and 'ringleaders' 
are identified and dispersed around the prison system in an attempt to forestall 
anticipated 'race riots'. 'Thus it is that black young people are expelled from 
the unemployed ghetto into prisons where their ghettoisation is reproduced and 
the responses of the powerful are similarly fearful and short-sighted. 
The Phenomenology of the Brixton Triangle 
Be11 fs 
This account of the political economy of the Brixton triangle describes the 
objective constraints placed upon its inhabitants by their economic and 
political predicament. The subjective experience of these constraints, the 
meaning imposed upon them by those who experience them, will vary from person 
to person, and from time to time, and will as a consequence evoke very different 
responses. The political and economic circumstances which conspire to loosen 
the commitment of some people to the legal and moral order may well serve to 
reinforce that commitment in others. George Jackson (1971) writes: 
'You know our people react in different ways to this neoslavery. Some 
just give up completely and join the other side. They join some 
Christian cult and cry out for integration. These are the ones who 
doubt themselves most. They are the weakest and hardest to reach with 
the new doctrine. Some become inveterate drinkers and narcotic users 
in an attempt to gain some mental solace for the physical deprivation 
they suffer. I've heard them say 'there's so hope without dope', some 
live on as janitor, bellboy, redcap, cook, elevator boy, singer, 
boxer, baseball player or maybe a freak at some sideshow and pretend 
that all is as well as possible. They think since its always been 
this way it must always remain this way, these are the fatalists; they 
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serve and entertain and rationalise. 
'Then there are those who resist and rebel but do not know what, who, 
why or how exactly they should go about this. They are aware but 
confused. They are the least fortunate because they end where I have 
ended. By using half-measures and failing dismally to effect any real 
improvement in their condition they fall victim to the full fury and 
might of the systems' repressive agencies'. 
pp. 70-71 
If the deprived believe that their deprivation is deserved and unavoidable 
they are likely to respond with stoicism and sadness. If, by contrast, they 
believe that their deprivation is an undeserved but unavoidable tribulation they 
may attempt to transcend it by spiritual means: 
'The otherworldly posture accounts for the doctrinal importance of the 
beatitudes in the ideology of saints. By diverting their attention in 
a heavenly direction and explaining away the real objective causes of 
their predicament, the doctrine of the beatitudes helps saints cope 
with their sense of alienation and powerlessness. This expectantly 
otherworldly focus is responsible for the charge, sometimes levelled 
against them, that they are 'so heavenly-minded, they are no earthly 
use,. 
Prycek, 1979, p. 211 
If, however, they believe their deprivation to be undeserved and avoidable 
then they are likely to respond with anger, challenging the rules and practices 
which appear to compound their deprivation. It is this belief which, propels 
the subject into a critical confrontation with the prevailing legal and moral 
order. The manner in which this critical confrontation is expressed will be 
determined by opportunity. 
Opportunity 
If we disagree with laws, rules and practices we may if the opportunity 
exists, enter the political process and attempt to change them. Alternatively 
if we believe that laws, rules and practices compound the deprivation of our 
people because of the discriminatory manner of their application we may aspire, 
if the opportunity exists, to become lawyers, teachers and business 
administrators in order to ensure their just application. If we are politically 
marginalised and denied educational and occupational opportunity and we believe 
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that the laws, rules and practices which are applied to us merely compound our 
deprivation then we can live silently with the pain and frustration or break the 
rules. Our beliefs will then become manifest in our actions. Dodd (1978) 
states the matter thus: 
'The welfare state is seen on the street as another means of keeping 
blacks helpless and dependent. It leaves nothing to risk and provides 
no structure for action - except in designing schemes to manipulate it 
advantageously. It is just another white man's game for which the 
black man must as always invent his own response. The problem is how 
to construct a serious identity outside the roles that are offered -a 
problem of meaning as well as survival. Well, there is meaning in 
ganga and there is meaning in crime. For increasing numbers of black 
youth, only real options'. 
p. 25 
To suggest that to hold certain beliefs about one's predicament makes crime 
an option for young people, who, with different beliefs and different 
opportunities would shun the option, is not to suggest that crime becomes either 
inevitable. or central to their way of life. Crime is an option which comes, in 
certain circumstances, to exist alongside other, conventional options: 
'The available account clearly show that few young blacks confront a 
clear choice between the options of hard labour and crime, and settle 
permanently for one strategy or another. One of the precipitating 
factors is precisely a difference in attitude to the problems of 
survival between the two generations ... All the evidence suggests that the numbers now forced to survive in these ways on the margin of 
the legal life are increasing directly in line with the numbers 
unemployed and that the age limit of those involved is dropping'. 
Hall et al, 1978, pp. 358-9 
The bond which ties these young people to the conventional world is 
loosened as they grow more marginal to social and economic life. Their 
commitment to the dominant moral and legal order is conditioned by their stake 
in the dominant social and economic order. Put simply, 'when you've got 
nothing, you've got nothing to lose'8. 
The black children and young people who inhabit the Brixton Triangle feel 
cheated. Their parents had hoped for a better life for their children. They 
had hoped that their children, like the children of previous waves of immigrants 
to the United Kingdom, would achieve material success and enhanced social 
status. Their teachers in the Carribean had assured them that in the land of 
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the mother of parliaments, and the fairest police force in the world, every 
citizen of the British Empire would be equal before the law and free to succeed. 
Instead the experience has been one of downward social mobility, material 
failure, and eventual ghettoisation. Immigration to Britain in the past 100 
years has been characterised by a first generation with low social status and a 
relatively high crime rate which is transformed by a process of absorption and 
dispersal into a second and subsequent generation with higher social status and 
a low crime rate. The low-status immigrant group simply disappears into the 
existing class structure. In contrast the first wave of Afro-Carribean 
immigrants weis a remar4: ably law-abiding section of the population (Lanberk J, 
1970). In the subsequent thirty years, however, levels of crime amongst Afro- 
Carribean people have risen to, and in certain categories exceeded, the crime 
rates of the indigenous populations. 
Black people in Britain have not disappeared-into the existing class 
structure in the way that the Hugenots, Poles, Jews and Italians did and in 
Britain racial invisibility is a prerequisite of social mobility. The residents 
of the Brixton Triangle cannot achieve social mobility because they are black 
and hence racially visible. Their economic and political predicament has 
transformed these black British citizens into a beleaguered black under-class 
trapped in the unemployed ghetto of the Brixton Triangle. 
The economic and political predicament which generates higher levels of 
crime also generates higher rates of victimisation, Lea and Young (1984) note: 
I... a young black male (aged between twelve and fifteen) is 
twenty-two times more likely to have a violent crime committed against 
him than an elderly white woman (over 65), and seven times more likely 
to have something stolen from him. Thus the objective likelihood of 
serious crime occurring to a person is sharply focussed by locality 
and by the social characteristics of a person'. 
Lea J and Young J, 1984, p. 26 
In Britain and the United States black men and women are at much greater 
risk from crime than white men and women. Whereas deaths of white males by 
homicide in the USA are 9.2 per million, deaths of black males by homicide are 
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52.6 per, million. Similarly a poor black woman in the USA is almost six times 
more likely to be raped than a rich white woman. Both serious and trivial 
crimes will tend to be perpetrated by young working-class men and it will be 
intra-class and intra-racial. Poor young white men tend to steal from and hurt 
poor white people. Poor young black men tend to steal from and hurt poor black 
people. Most juvenile crime is in this sense ghettoised. It usually is neither 
a political act in which the poor reappropriate the wealth of the rich nor is it 
a tightly organised conspiracy of feckless predators against the virtuous. It 
is sadder and more self-defeating than either of these crude political 
stereotypes suggest. It is usually episodic, unplanned, opportunistic and 
often, a complete shambles. In central Lambeth the most likely perpetrators and 
the most likely victims of street crime will be young black men aged between 10 
and 18 (Pratt I Y, 1980). If you live in an inner-city housing estate the 
chances are that the person who burgles your flat will live in the same, or an 
adjacent, block of flats and you will probably have known them prior to the 
bur'glar, y9. 
The effect of these high levels of victimisation in the Brixton Triangle is 
corrosive and cumulative. James Q Wilson (1975) writes: 
'Predatory crime does not merely victimise individuals, it impedes, 
and in the extreme case, even prevents the formation and maintenance 
of community. By disrupting the delicate nexus of ties, formal and 
informal, by which we are linked with our neighbours, crime atomises 
society and makes of its members mere individual calculators 
estimating their own advantage, especially their own chances for 
survival amidst their fellows. Common undertakings become difficult 
or impossible, except for those motivated by a shared desire for 
protection'. 
p. 21 
Wilson describes the conditions which promote a 'ghetto mentality' as does 
Harrison (1983): 
'But is is not just the facilities that suffer: it is the solidarity 
of the community itself. Redevelopment, migration and the rapid turnover of people seeking better accommodation means there is 
precious little of that to start with. But crime dissolves it even further. The climate of fear engenders a defensive egotism of 
survival, in which everyone looks after themselves. A new code of ethics emerges: that they days may be long, thou shalt not question strangers on the stairs; thou shalt not look if thou hearest screams or shattering glass; thou shalt not admonish youths for vandalism; 
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thou shalt not admit to witnessing a crime; thou shalt not help the 
victim of an attack'. 
p. 282 
So it is that levels of reported crime are often low in areas where 
victimisation is highest. The police response has been to intensify their 
military-style policing which serves only to alienate the population so policed 
still further. 
What reformers might learn from the Brixton Triangle is that if we are 
serious in our wish to defend the children of the poor we must also address the 
conditions which make it necessary to defend them from each other. Black 
children and young people are the victims of a predatory and unjust system of 
justice and punishment but they are also the victims of predatory and unjust 
crime perpetrated against them. The perpetrators and the victims have been 
inserted into the social script of the Brixton Triangle in which individual 
choice plays only a minor part in determining the role they will act out in the 
drama. Any strategy which simply attempts to manipulate the justice system and 
leaves the social, political and economic factors which contrive to abandon a 
generation of black children and young people in the Brixton Triangle, untouched 
will inevitably fail. The problem is one of a profound social dislocation which 
cannot be met by yet another ineffective attempt to manipulate the law or the 
practices of a group of police officers or a particular juvenile bench. 
Reformers must address those profound structural social factors which 
precipitate the crime, victimisation and the mundane misery of life in the 
Brixton Triangle. Saul Bellow (1982) states the problem with characteristic 
bleakness and clarity: 
'We are talking about a people consigned to destruction, a doomed 
people. Compare them to the last phase of the proletariat as pictured 
by Marx. The proletariat, owning nothing, stripped utterly bare, 
would awaken at last from he nightmare of history. Entirely naked, it 
would have no illusions because there was nothing to support illusions 
and it would make a revolution without any scenario. It would need no 
historical script because of its merciless education in reality, and 
so forth. Well here is a case of people denuded. And what's the 
effect of denudation, atomization? Of course, they aren't 
proletarians. They're just a lumpen population. We do not know how to approach this population. We haven't even conceived that reaching it may be a problem. So there's nothing but death before it. Maybe 
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we've already made our decision. Those that can be advanced to the 
middle class, let them be advanced. The rest? Well, we do our best 
by them. We don't have to do any more. They kill some of us. Mostly 
they kill themselves .. . '. 
p. 205 
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NOTES - CHAPTER 7 
It is perhaps significant that the DHSS research into Intermediate Treatment 
(IT) costing some #380,000 has no questions about the racial origins of the 
subjects of IT. Meanwhile after three years of work the National Youth 
Bureau has been offered #15,000 by the DHSS to conduct research into the 
involvement of black young people in IT. The issue of race still seems to be 
regarded as a marginal one by the DHSS. 
2 
The abandonment of any conception of social aetiology puts criminology out of 
step with the Conservative government and the popular press both of whom 
seem to have accepted a relationship between poverty, racism, 'hard'-policing 
and crime. 
`' In an investigation carried out by the present author it emerged that many of 
the offences for which black young people were arrested occurred in the local 
shopping centre and were often a consequence of the running feud between the 
security patrols and the unemployed young people who 'hung out' in the 
centre. 
4 In 1981 the district commander of L division added the newly coined offence 
of 'insulting language in a riot situation' to the charges which could gain a 
young person a place on the recidivist list. 
o 'Black and in Care' is a comparatively new organisation, an offshoot of 
NAYFIC, which is beginning to chronicle the experience of care for black 
youngsters. They point to the fact that 'dispersal' policies can lead to 
identity problems for youngsters in long-term care since in an 'all white' 
environment they will grow up black on the outside but white, on the inside. 
Thus they will have difficulty relating to both black and white people upon 
their return to the 'community'. 
6 For a fuller account of institutional defences, cf. Miller and Gwynne, 1978. 
7 This seminar led to one Assistant governor in each jail being given 
responsibility for 'race relations'. The person responsible for 'race 
relations' in the DHSS social work service in the early 1980s was also 
responsible for health and safety in all local authority children's 
establishments in England and Wales. Black people have suggested that 
government departments do not take them seriously. 
8 In this section I attempt to bring together the opportunity theory of Cloward 
and Ohlin (1960) with Matza's (1964) concept of 'drift'. 
9 
While this account is broadly true we should bear in mind that young people 
may feel themselves under pressure to 'own up' to other offences which will 
then be 'taken into account'. Some unscrupulous police officers will 
sometimes try to improve the 'clear-up' rate by engaging in this dubious 
practice. 
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Chapter 8 
Think: inq About Theor 
'Mire: is as much a rewriter of history as the Communist Party, all 
political parties, all nations, all men. People are always shouting 
they want to create a better future - it's not true. The future is an 
apathetic void of no interest to anyone. The past is full of life, 
eager to irritate us, provoke and insult us, tempt us to d str y or 
repaint it. The only reason people want to be masters of he 
future 
is to change the past. They are fighting for access to the 
-laboratories where photographs are retouched and biographies and 
histories re-written'. 
Milan Kundera - The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, 1980 
Back to the Future 
The history of the theory and practice of juvenile justice in Britain from 
1959 is, to a considerable extent, a history of the perpetual and apparently 
random repudiation and replacement of one set of ideas by another. It is a 
process in which yesterday's theory or practice is attacked, dismantled, buried 
and if the attacker is lucky, forgotten. Theoretical and practical orthodoxies 
are periodically recycled in a slightly different guise. For a time they hold 
sway, and then collapse in a hail of ridicule all too often emanating from 
erstwhile adherents who abandoned the position when they realised that its days 
were numbered. It is a process in which today's great new idea is often 
yesterday's idea standing on its head. 
The examination of the intimacies of the mother-child relationship is 
abandoned in favour of Opportunity Theory. But Opportunity Theory, an 
expression of Durk: heimian and Mertonian structuralism, is jettisoned within a 
few years in favour of a labelling perspective for which the concept of 'social 
structure' is effectively non-existent. 
Social work intervention in the lives of children and young people in 
trouble which aims to help them improve the quality of their relationships with 
their families and adult authority figures is out. 'Radical non-intervention' 
is in. Yesterday's social worker was a human resource who brought material help 
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and a scientifically informed sympathy to her clients. Today's social worker is 
a malevolent agent of creeping totalitarianism. 
These astonishing paradigm shifts are effected without the turn of a hair. 
It is a sequential, not a dialectical, process and no synthesis of ideas or 
practices is either attempted or achieved. Ideas and practices are suddenly 
right or wrong, good or bad, in or out. What this is not, although it 
occasionally attempts to pass itself off as if it were, is a F'opperian project 
of conjecture and refutation. What it is, is a process of intellectual 
entrepreneurism and professional asset-stripping. Ideas and practices are 
abused in this way because ultimately their integrity and veracity is of less 
significance than their capacity to act as vehicles for ideologues and 
practitioners who wish to exert control over the ways in which the issue of 
juvenile crime is conceptualised and the juvenile criminal is managed. As we 
have seen, the history of the theory and practice of juvenile justice is, ' 
perhaps inevitably, the history of a struggle for power and control rather than 
a simple progression towards enlightenment and humanitarianism. The most 
damaging consequence of this is that a heritage of theory and practice is lost 
from sight in the pursuit of politically acceptable novelty and the promotion of 
theoretical amnesia'. 
The Retreat from Novelty and Amnesia (Come homes Emile Durkheim, all is forgiven) 
The consequences of the quest for, novelty, the pursuit of political 
acceptability, the furtherance of sectional interest and pragmatism are all too 
evident. We have more police officers, magistrates, social workers, probation 
officers and prison officers doing more and more things to an ever-expanding 
army of, frequently unemployed, frequently homeless, frequently black:, 
adolescents whose 'crimes' grow less and less serious. Prison sentences grow 
longer as 'alternative to custody' projects, and the victims of street crime, 
burglary, and auto-theft grow more numerous. 
The ideology that nothing can, or should, be done about the social' causes 
of crime and that the onus of intervention should be placed instead upon the 
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more effective or 'humane' management of deviant populations has misfired 
alarmingly. The decision taken by many people professionally involved in the 
juvenile justice process to treat questions of poverty, race, and law and order 
as an irrelevance and to concentrate instead upon the modification of the 
behaviour of social workers and adjudicated offenders, may be politically 
expedient and administratively tidy but it consigns the real-life cops and 
robbers drama which daily unfolds in the inner-city to the category of a mistake 
occasioned by poor decision-making on the part of the police officer and the 
absence of a necessary skill in the behavioural repertoire of the offender. We 
need to return to our forgotten theoretical heritage to find ideas with which to 
conceptualise the contemporary impasse. 
For more than a decade, our preoccupation with social reaction has blinded 
us to the significance of social action-and the structuration of social events. 
Crime may have a meaning and a purpose for^ its perpetrators who may find in 
crime an individual solution to their social, economic, or existential 
2 
predicament`. The Brixton Triangle tells us that structually generated social 
problems, just like Shakespearian dramas, have an existence which is independent 
of the particular actors, the criminals, the victims and the agents of the 
state, who may from time to time and from place to place constitute the 
dramatis personae which enacts them. We need to re-establish the link between 
social action and social reaction and to locate both within a theory of the ways 
in which social events are structured. This is what Emile Durkheim tried to do 
and he called it sociology. 
Some things our theory should explain 
We need a theory of the ways in which the interactions between a social 
structure and the cultures and subcultures it generates shape the biographies of 
individual actors. This theory must explain how these interactions contrive: 
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,' 
a) to o construct the meaning of their predicament, the options for, and the 
actions of, a group of people seriously disadvantaged by the place they 
occupy in the social structure, in terms of their class, race, gender, and 
geography, that they become pre-disposed to the perpetration of criminal 
acts. 
b) to so construct the meaning of their predicament, the options for, and the 
actions of a similar, but much larger group of people, seriously 
disadvantaged by the place they occupy in the social structure, in terms of 
their class, race, gender and geography, who nonetheless refrain from the 
perpetration of criminal acts. 
C) to =o construct', the available options for a similar group of people located 
at a similar place in the social structure, in terms of their class, race, 
gender, and geography that they have a heightened vulnerability to criminal 
victimisation, 
d) to so construct the meaning of events, the available options for, and the 
actions of a different group of people, with greater social advantage and 
greater social power in terms of their class, race, gender and the position 
they occupy in the state apparatus that they are constrained to develop and 
institutionalise particular modes of anticipation of, and social reaction, 
to 'crime' and 'civil disorder'. 
This theory must then explain how this highly-structured or 'over 
determined' confrontation between the perpetrator, the victim, the non-criminal, 
non-victimised bystander, and the apparatus of state anticipation and social 
reaction develops through time reaching a climax in the ritual of the court 
appearance and the castigation or expulsion of the criminal from civil society, 
and then doubles back upon itself to start all over again with a similar cast of 
players, a similar script and an identical plot. It must explain 
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diffPr, entiaticn, solutions, victimisation, social anticipation and social 
reaction. 
Diff¬rentiation 
Only if everybody of the same class, race, age, gender, social and economic 
predicament and neighbourhood, committed the same offences with the same 
frequency could we sustain a theory which located the causes of crime 
e<clusively in the social characteristics of perpetrators rather than in the 
ideas held in their heads or made manifest in their actions. This was one of 
the problems with Opportunity theory. Opportunity theory (Cloward R and Ohlin 
H, 1960) specified the invarient social characteristics of the perpetrators of 
particular types of offences but failed to explain why only a minority of people 
with these characteristics actually committed offences. As David Hatza (1964) 
observed, the 'hard determinism' of Opportunity theory offered us an 
'embarrassment of riches' because, on the basis of these social characteristics, 
it predicted far more crime than was actually perpetrated. This is not to 
argue, of course, that a specification of the characteristics of perpetrators is 
unimportant. If it was unimportant then we should expect middle-class white 
women of 45 with annual incomes in the region of #20,000 to appear as 
perpetrators of street crime, with the same statistical frequency as young 
unemployed working class black men and they don't. The specification of the 
social characteristics of the perpetrators of particular offences is of central 
importance and offers us vitally necessary, albeit insufficient, information 
with which to construct a theory. A sufficient explanation of the perpetration 
of offences requires in addition, an understanding of the meanings developed 
within the family, the peer group, and the subculture and the structurally 
available solutions realised by subjects as they attempt to deal with the 
experience of relative deprivation and the consequent status frustration it 
'! I 
induces`'. 
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Sr IlI't ions 
As we have seen the experience of relative deprivation and status 
frustration throws the subject's relationship with the social order, into 
gUestion. Existence is e, perienced as problematic, things are not as they 
should be, there is a discrepancy or a dissonance which requires a solution. 
There are two types of solution. One involves finding an answer, the 
other involves finding a way out. A solution in the first sense requires a 
conceptual change, a change in the beliefs of the subject. A solution in the 
second sense requires an actual change in the relationship between the subject 
and the social order. 
The Saintly Answer, 
Fryce's (1979) 'saints' have found a solution in the form of an answer. The 
question is 'why must we experience tribulation in this life? '. The answer is 
that this life is a test-bed, or entrance examination for the next. One's 
performance in this life is important to the extent that it will guarantee a 
rich reward in the next. It is an answer which has sustained some Afro- 
Caribbean people through slavery, colonialism and migration. Close adherence to 
the precepts of religion, the elaboration of a detailed and specific set of 
moral injunctions concerned with how one's day to day existence should be 
conducted enables the saints to monitor the accumulation of righteousness which 
will ultimately be their passport to transcendance. The reward of religious 
conformity will be a privileged place in the 'sweet by and by' which will be an 
exact mirror image of one's present social and economic predicament. On that 
day the righteous shall wield power and subject the unrighteous, who currently 
create or compound the saints tribulation, to their will. Someday, on the other 
side of the grave everybody is going to get theirs. There is no escape. All 
the scores will be settled and the person who today appears to passively absorb 
inequality and social rejection will be vindicated and elevated to sit upon the 
right hand of God. 
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The Rasta f rian An=. w? r^ 
Rastafarianism offers a different but analogous solution to the problem. 
Its answt- r is to transform the Brixton Triangle into 'Babylon', marginalisation 
and alienation into 'exile' and heaven into Afrika. Dick, Hebdige (1976) 
writes: 
'Simultaneously the apotheosis of alienation into exile enabled him to- 
maintain his position on the fringes of society without feeling any 
sense of cultural loss, and distanced him sufficiently so that he 
could undertake a highly critical analysis of the society to which he 
owed a nominal allegiance'. 
F. 152 
The saints have been placed in their predicament as part of the divine 
plan. To complain is to question the intentions of the supreme being who 
arranged one's predicament and so fatalism, a belief in the inevitability, 
coherence, and rightness of one's fate, becomes a virtue. 
Rastafarians by contrast see themselves in some ways correctly, as 
disploaced and dispossessed people. The Rastafarians ought to be at home in 
Afrika but have instead been forced into exile, first in the Caribbean and now 
in Britain. Their answer to the question 'why must we experience tribulation in 
this life?? ' is that Babylon is like that and having inadvertently stumbled into 
it we must practice the faith, observe the sacraments, and live in peace and 
love until the time comes for the final exodus. The 'temporary' nature of the 
stay in Babylon defends Rastas from the third answer. 
The Annihii? tign Answer, 
At the extreme end of the 'solution as an answer' trajectory lies madness 
and death because a possible, available and powerful answer to the question 'why 
must we experience tribulation in this life? ' is that 'I brought it upon myself 
by my on deeds or as a result of my own inadequacies'. Whereas the saints and 
the Rastafarians are able to collectively locate the cause of their oppression 
outside of themselves, retreatist opiate abusers4, the growing numbers of 
black young people experiencing 'personality disorders', and the small but 
growing number of black teenage suicides may be seen as people who locate the 
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causes of their oppression within themselves. They are prey to an 
internalised oppression in which they come to assume personal responsibility for 
the oppressive political, social and economic circumstances of which they are, 
in fact, the victims. The solution to the problem is to annihilate the 
experience, to annihilate the self, or, both. 
The Achievement Escape 
The achiever's answer to the question 'why must we experience tribulation in 
this life'? ' is that we need not if we are prepared to transform the 
circumstances which bring about that tribulation by our own individual efforts. 
The achiever's motto could be 'I want my share, I want it here, and I want it 
now'. The achievers' solution is to find not an answer, but a way out by 
seizing the few educational and career opportunities which are available and 
then working and working and working. They may have something of the saints' 
commitment to behavioural conformity but they want their reward in this life, 
and unlike the Rastafarians they want it in this country. They are on their way 
out of the ghetto and up through the class structure. Their objective is higher 
status and the prosperity which accrues to that higher status. They are here to 
stay and they intend to carve a new place for themselves in the British social 
order. As a people who have been oppressed by the rules, achievers know the 
rules better than anybody else. Achievers combine a knowledge of what it takes 
to succeed in the white world with an knowledge of what it takes to survive in 
the black world. Achievers know the price of everything but unlike Oscar 
Wilde 's cynics they also know its value. Black achievers are more likely to be 
women than men because the roles which offer the possibility of social mobility 
to black people tend to be those, like the role of social worker or bank clerk, 
which have traditionally been occupied by women. Middle-class white men are 
more likely to admit black women to middle class 'womens " work roles, which by 
definition, place them in a subordinate position to middle-class men. To admit 
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black men to 'middle-class' jobs would put black men in direct competition with 
white middle-class men and this seldom happens. 
To be an achiever requires self denial, self discipline and a powerful 
sense of purpose. The bind for black: achievers is that they are under constant 
pressure to do better than their white counterparts knowing that any success 
will be claimed by their employer or profession as a vindication of its 
decision to employ and promote black staff while any failure will be attributed 
to their race. The black achiever's escape from the ghetto is an ambiguous 
endeavour. It is an escape from a very obvious oppression which is nonetheless 
cushioned by the proximity of those in a similar predicament. It is an escape to 
a less tangible or restrictive form of oppression which offers material rewards 
and higher status at the cost of estrangement from the white middle-class and 
the black working-class alike. The upwardly mobile black achiever cannot 
ultimately penetrate the cast-iron facade of the white British class system and 
is destined to exist alongside that system in an amorphous social space occupied 
by other successful exiles. The black achiever faces the dilemma of all those 
who have achieved individual success against the odds. In creating a personal 
solution to a social problem they opt for social homelessness. Their solution 
to the problem created by the achievement solution may be to reaffirm their 
political link with the ghetto and in so doing come to serve as its voice and 
its representative in a white world. 
The Del ingt.. uent Escape 
The perspective developed here locates ghetto delinquency amongst a range 
of solutions which are adopted by people experiencing the strain induced by 
their position in the social structure. The selection of subculturally 
available solutions will be determined by age, gender, reference group and the 
meanings imposed upon the individual's experience of relative deprivation within 
the family and the peer group. The impact of this structurally induced strain 
upon those who adopt the delinquent solution, loosens the moral bind, or the 
controls, which usually hold the subject to the conventional order. 
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Unlike achievers who struggled out of the ghetto into a bigger world, those 
who effect a delinquent escape conduct their struggle within the miniaturised 
world of the ghetto. Their problem, is to find a way out of a low status 
position in the ghetto in order to achieve a high status position in the 
ghetto. The means whereby this solution is effected is the hustle. To be a 
hustler is to straddle the conventional and the deviant life in a perpetual 
endeavour to 'keep ahead' and 'stay on top'. Dealing in dope, handling stolen 
property, and misappropriating the resources of the DHSS are only partly 
concerned with survival. The hustle is centrally concerned with becoming a 
'somebody' rather than the nobody you would be if you let the hostile social, 
economic, and political forces ranged against you simply 'happen' to you. Being 
a hustler concerns retaining one's potency, staying smart and being cool. 'You 
try to keep your balls when all around are losing theirs' as one of them 
remarked. 
At the time of the 1981 riots Michael Heseltine, with an uncharacteristic 
shaft of insight, observed that the subterranean activities of ghetto youth, if 
properly channelled, could in fact be their salvation. Heseltine divined that 
the skills and abilities which enabled some ghetto youth to be effective dope 
dealers, robbers and pimps, were precisely the skills required for commercial 
success in Mrs Thatcher's Britain. He advocated the infusion of private capital 
into the ghetto in order to excavate this rich but latent source of 
entrepreneurial energy. He realised that the delinquent activity of the ghetto 
was not a manifestation of a politically subversive counter-culture, but rather 
a clear reflection of the rampant acquisitive individualism of those at the top 
of the social and economic heap played out upon the miniaturised stage of the 
unemployed ghetto. This should come as no surprise because if the experience of 
relative deprivation is about anything it is about shared material goals and 
differential opportunities for their achievement'. 
What the delinquent and non-delinquent young black working class 
inhabitants of the Brixton Triangle want is similar to what the white middle- 
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class people who live around the corner in Clapham and Wandsworth want. The 
reality of these shared goals is evidenced by the enthusiasm which both groups 
share for BMW or Audi motor cars. Young black people tend to own much older 
models because they have to buy them themselves. The young upwardly mobile 
middle class car owners around the corner, by contrast, often receive theirs 
from employers as part of a package of massively lucrative tax-avoidable perks. 
Vorsprung durkc technic ('nice work if you can get it') as they say in the 
Railton Road. 
The hustle concerns the efficacious and apparently effortless manipulation 
of the world in the furtherance of one's ends. One must win and looI< cool at 
the same time. The hustle alone is not a sufficient means whereby the highest 
status can be achieved however. High status is also contingent upon 
demonstrated or perceived machismo and toughness. Like the residents of Cloward 
and Ohlin's (1960) disorganised slum the ghetto delinquent is engaged in a 
relentless struggle to maintain reputation and status in the eyes of a small 
localised audience. Feuds and vendettas are fiercely parochial while the 
victims of assaults and robberies tend, as we have seen, to be selected from this 
immediate audience. This accounts for both the symmetry, in terms of class, 
race, age and gender, between the offender and the victim and the low levels of 
reporting of ghetto crime. Those who 'grassed' would be immediately visible, 
and accessible to those upon whom they had 'grassed' or their associates. To 
report an attack at, robbery is to open up the possibility of further violence. 
In 1985, in New Cross in south east London, a 24 year old black man stabbed 
a 17 year old black youth to death in an argument about how fast the 24 year 
old's car could go. Two hours later a member of the 17 year old's family fire- 
bombed the flat of the 24 year old's family. In 1982 in the same area, as a 
result of an argument in a pub, a 19 year old white youth knocked at the from 
door of his adversary and when he heard footsteps in the hall fired both barrels 
of a sawn-off shotgun through the letter-box. Luckily the child who was coming 
to answer the door did not die. This is 'ghetto mentality', white and black. 
To perpetrate such horrific and irrevocable deeds for such apparently trivial 
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reasons must he explained in terms of the distortion of perspective which 
necessarily accompanies social, political and economic entrapment in the ghetto. 
The perpetrators of these acts were not intrinsically monstrous but their 
perception of the world was constructed out of an exaggerated form of the 
'normal' values of masculinity, dominance, aggression and machismo, and a set of 
personal, social and economic circumstances which left them with no other place 
but the ghetto in which to salvage some vestige of self-esteem in the only way 
available to themb. This is not to excuse these acts nor minimise their 
horror. The point is that violence of this order is a highly-structured, 'over- 
determined' and hence, inevitable outcome of an avoidable combination of social, 
political and economic determinants. Criminologists who speak of behaviour like 
this as if it were a tragic but completely idiosyncratic happening within an 
otherwise relatively innocuous and exotic working class youth culture have 
failed to grasp the point. Ghettoisation kills people. 
The delinquent solution is at best a temporary solution. The escape it 
appears to offer leads eventually to nothing and nowhere. Malcolm X writes: 
'hearing the usual stories of so many others. Bullets, knives, prison, 
dope, diseases, insanity, alcoholism - so many of the survivors whom I 
knew as tough hyenas and wolves of the streets in the old days now 
were so pitiful. They had known all the angles but beneath that 
surface they were poor, ignorant, untrained black men; life had eased 
up on them and hyped them. I ran across close to twenty-five of these 
old timers I had known pretty well who in the space of nine years had 
been reduced to the ghetto's minor scavenger hustles to scratch up 
room, rent and food money. Some now worked downtown, messengers, 
janitors, things like that'. 
p. 315-6 
Victimisation 
We have already noted the tendency towards symmetry between the victim and 
the of+ender.. Intra-class and intra-racial crime is by no means the end of the 
story however. The illegal manipulation of their market monopoly by the 
multinational drug corporations serves to impoverish the poor still further 
since their excessive profits force up the costs of the NHS and consequently 
depress the quality of the service. Unpoliced infringements of the laws 
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r e: cjul4tin3 'sharp' business practice costs the British public millions of pounds 
every day and it is the pocr"i'ho experience these crimes most acutely7. 
The likelihood of being victimised by the. drug companies is about 1007. 
whereas the likelihood of being burgled, robbed or assaulted, is substantially 
lower. Understandably, of course, it is these latter offences which we fear 
most although our fear of victimisation will not necessarily coincide with the 
likelihood of victimisation. As we have seen, by and large race, class, gender, 
age and geography will determine the likelihood of victimisation, but in certain 
parts of the city geography alone will be sufficient. It. may be that what is 
happening at the southern end of the northern line portends the shape of things 
to come. 
London Regional Transport announced in December 1986 that the most 
dangerous underground stations, those in which passengers or staff were most 
likely to be robbed or attacked were Oxford Circus, Clapham Common, Clapham 
South, Ba1ham and Tooting Common. With the exception of Oxford Circus these 
stations are all within or close by the Brixton triangle. The people attacked 
or robbed in or near these stations were not for the most part young, male, 
working class and unemployed . They were commuters and shoppers with goods, 
money and credit cards. Increasingly. the southern end of the Northern line 
serves the young upwardly mobile middle classes who live in #100,000 artisan 
terraces and fall victim to street and tunnel crime. Street crime and burglary 
are moving beyond the unemployed ghetto into the yuppie heartland where Sarah 
Ferguson once enjoyed a murky past. But this is no class war, the attacks are 
fast, apparently random, hit and run affairs. Proximity and opportunity are the 
keys to this nastiness at the end of the Northern line. It may well be that 
increasingly black and white young people, who have sought a solution to their 
problem through petty crime will turn away from the lean pickings of the ghetto 
to the immediately adjacent up and coming white middle class areas in which the 
accumulation of wealth and consumer goods becomes more and more conspicuous as 
the burglary clear-up rate drops lower and lower (Young J, 1977). Poyner (1983) 
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observes: 
'If burglary prevention was the only criterion for urban planning, the 
evidence ... such as it is, points to the minimisation of mixed or 
heterogeneous housing areas and the maximisation of the size of 
homogeneous housing areas, or püt more simply ... Areas of wealthy 
or middle-class/middle income housing should be separated as far as 
possible from poorer housing'. 
p. 36 
The signs of fortification are everywhere. Alarm systems, security guards, 
electronic surveillance, and electronically operated access gates are all 
appearing at the southern end of the Northern line. There are two nations in 
Lambeth and this reality is not lost upon the inhabitants of either. The 
evidence of relative deprivation, the key ingredient in the growth of crimes of 
poverty, is palpable here. As the wealthy, powerful and articulate grow more 
vociferous in their demands for police protection and the police force expands 
in response, ghetto unemployment rises and the value of social security payments 
plummets. This is the political economy of unsafe streets. 
Social Anticipation and Social Reaction 
As we have seen, we must link 'anticipation' with 'reaction' if we are to 
explain the consequences of the interaction between the state, its agencies, its 
agents, and the suspects, perpetrators and victims of juvenile crime. 
The policing of the unemployed ghetto is concerned with the apprehension of 
criminals and the prevention of offending, but more importantly, it is concerned 
with the maintenance of public order. The levels of petty crime which emanate 
from the ghetto are regarded by governments and the upper eschelons of the 
police force as a barometer, or early warming system, for future social 
disorder. 
Urban policing is increasingly organised around anticipation of the threat 
to public order from trades unionists, squatters, IRA terrorists and 'ethnic 
minorities'. This 'threat' has led, in some urban areas, to the reconstitution 
of the police force, into a quasi-military army of occupation. The deployment 
of this force in anticipation of social disorder becomes instead a significant 
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factor in the distillation of that social disorder9. 
The reconstitution of police forces and the redefinition of their role is 
partly led and partly fed by the burgeoning technology of riot control, 
developing in Europe and the USA. The vendors of this technology strive to 
redescribe civil policing as a tool for the maintenance of public order rather 
than the prevention or detection of particular criminal offences. This tendency 
is compounded by a political hostility to black citizens expressed by successive 
British governments through their immigration and race relations policies, a 
'hands off' policy towards the police and a consequent 'gloves off' policy 
towards 'militants', 'scroungers' and 'blacks'. In political rhetoric and 
policing theory it is these categories of people who are the 'enemy within'. 
'High profile policing' is a component in, and a potent symbol of, the 
oppression of the residents of the unemployed ghetto. The message expressed by 
this policing strategy is that this dangerous volatile people must be contained 
within the ghetto. 
Sivanadan (1982) writes: 
'Black youths, could not walk the streets outside the Ghetto or hang 
around the streets within it without courting arrest'. 
In 1975 the Metropolitan Police Special Patrol Group moved into Lewisham 
and stopped and interrogated 14,000 people on the streets. At the time a black 
young man gave this account of the experience: 
'To drive a car anytime in Lewisham or New Cross is a big joke, you 
might as well walk, and when you do that you might as well stay 
inside, and me no 'fraid of the wicked. I driving through Lewisham to 
New Cross and get stopped three times, the whole place full with road 
blocks, transit vans, police cars, the lot - curfew in this town'. 
Counter Information Service, 1976, p. 10 
John Lee and Jock Young (1984) have alerted us to the spiral in which 
higher levels of street crime evoke, in turn, higher levels of quasi-military 
policing but they have failed to emphasise or explore the extent to which 
anticipatory, as opposed to purely reactive, policing gives momentum to this 
spiral. Anticipatory policing by dramatically and publicly locating all 
black young people as suspects may well serve to dislodge some of them from 
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their position in the conventional order and propel them into the very behaviour 
of which they are persistently but usually wrongly accused10. 
The response of the criminal justice apparatus is, as we have seen, 
similarly conditioned by political ideologies, economic imperatives, vested 
interest, and party political commitments. Sir Michael Day, OBE (1987), Chief 
Probation Officer for the West Midlands writes: 
'A government will try to carry its penal philosophy into legislation 
and resource provision. The 1982 Criminal Justice Act, for instance, 
is a more judicial and less welfare orientated response to offending 
than its 1972 predecessor, with greater emphasis on penalties and less 
on training and treatment. Policy statements from the Home Office 
specifically The Yellow Book (The Criminal Justice System) and the 
National Statement of Objectives and Priorites for the Probation 
Service, make it clear that cost effectiveness is an important 
consideration in the continued resourcing of the Probation Service and 
should be demanded no more than any educational or social welfare 
provision. So the fear grows that services might be pared down to a 
narrow range of tasks of proven effectiveness and applied on a 
principle of offenders reduced eligibility and from considerations of 
social control'. 
p. 23 
The repertoire of possible reaction to offenders remains the same but the 
priority accorded each of them, and hence the amount of money spent on them by 
governments, effectively determines the form and quality of the state's response 
to the offender. Cutbacks in expenditure upon prison building and police riot 
equipment, constitutes a move towards liberalisation. A shift of expenditure in 
the opposite direction beckons a shift towards authoritarianism. The government 
through the financial control it exerts over the broad repertoire of responses 
to crime and criminals will determine in crucial ways the shape and quality of 
social reaction. 
In 1972 Mark Carlisle, the Home Secretary, announced that the Probation and 
Aftercare Service would constitute the central pillar of the Conservative crime 
control strategy for the next twenty years. So saying he increased probation 
officers' salaries by 30% and increased the number of trainee places in the 
service from 200 in 1972 to 600 in 1975. Between 1972 and 1973 the numbers of 
probation officers working in Great Britain was increased by X88 from 23,939 to 
4,327. By 1975 this figure had risen to 4,735 (Haxby, 1978). 
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By contrast the projected rise in the number of probation officers for the 
period September 1986 to March 1987 is 65. In the same period the numbers of 
additional officers and civilians in the police force will rise by more than 
3,000 (The Guardian, January 1987). Meanwhile the present government remains 
committed to the provision of an additional 6,613 prison places in the period 
1984-91 at an estimated cost of #2,462,004 (Home Office, 1984). Whatever 
position the probation service may occupy in contemporary crime control 
strategies, it is no longer a 'central pillar'. 
Social reaction to crime and offenders at local and national level is 
shaped by how much money the government is prepared to spend and what it is 
prepared to spend it on. It is also shaped by governmental postures which 
encourage or discourage professional groups within the justice system to develop 
their capacity for 'care' or 'control'. The present government through 
legislation and public utterance has encouraged police discretion while 
simultaneously attempting to curb the discretion of probation officers and 
social workers by enjoining them to enter 'a new partnership with the courts' 
(sic)11. 
It is only when we have understood the ways in which the reactions of the 
apparatus of justice and crime control are shaped politically that we can begin 
to make sense of the behaviour of the individual agents who help to operate the 
apparatus. To suggest, as powerful protagonists in the juvenile justice debate 
in the past decade have suggested, that the outcomes of the juvenile criminal 
justice system are simply a function of idiosyncratic decisions and choices made 
by the low level agents, the police officers, social workers and magistrates 
who operate the machinery is far too simplistic.., It is a little line suggesting 
that a factory which produces televisions does so because the workers on the 
production line like watching Dynasty. 
It is within the ebb and flow of changing governmental reactions to crime 
and deviance that the professionals and academics, who ply their trade in the 
juvenile criminal justice system, struggle to retain an enduring relevance. It 
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is this ideological ebb and flow which gives the impetus to the professional 
amnesia and theoretical novelty. It is upon this terrain, demarcated by 
governments, that juvenile justice radicals must fight. 
If we are searching for the ultimate origins of social reaction then our 
search must take us far beyond the discussion of the behaviour of low-level 
system agents which preoccupied the labelling theorists of the 1960s and 
preoccupies contemporary administrative criminology still. We can begin to 
throw some light upon the ways in which professional discretion is politically 
structured by undertaking the kind of analysis attempted in this book. In. this 
analysis we try to understand the percolation of ideology through the filters of 
politics, policy and bureaucracy into the patterned and consistent practices of 
system agents. 
Even when we are able to do this though we are still left with a profound 
theoretical and practical problem. It is a problem which is in many ways 
peculiar to Britain and sets Britain apart from most of its European neighbours 
(22). The problem is to account for our 'Punitive Obsession'12. 
The 'Punitive Obsession' 
In 1983 proportionately more people were imprisoned in the UK than in any 
other European country apart from Turkey. NACRO (1986) gives the following 
information: 
Country Number imprisoned 
in 1983 
Number imprisoned 
per 100,000 population 
Turkey 165,753 
United Kingdom 191,753 
Belgium 22,670 
West Germany 115,326 
Italy 103,196 
Holland 24,500 
France 86,362 
Portugal 13,924 
Spain 50,784 
Greece 7,054 
371.9 
340.4 
225.8 
187.2 
181.9 
171.5 
158.4 
134.6 
133.7 
88.7 
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The figures for the different countries of the United Kingdom were: 
England and Wales 152,414 307.2 
Scotland 35,469 688.8 
Northern Ireland 3,851 247.6 
In the juvenile justice system the numbers of children and young people 
held in institutions for offenders rose steadily from the mid 1960s and then 
leapt ahead in the wake of the implementation of the 1982'Criminal Justice Act. 
A survey conducted by the London Borough's Children's Regional Planning 
Committee in 1984 noted that there had been: 
'a huge increase in the use of youth custody (previously borstal) 
since the Criminal Justice Act came into force on 24 May 1983: though 
detention centre sentences increased only slightly, and care orders 
from criminal proceedings declined, the overall effect is very 
considerable. 
1982/3 1983/4 
Detention Centre 27 31 
Youth Custody (Borstal) 7 27 
7/7 Care Order 73 
TOTAL 41 61 
Overall this is a 49% increase in removal from the community. 
Specifically, it is a 200% increase in youth custody and, in fact, an 
even more substantial increase in the total length of youth custody 
sentences (assuming maximum remission) from 42 months to 135 months, 
or more than three times as long. Using 1982 Home Office figures for 
youth custody costs, at #191 per week, this implies a direct increase 
in cost due to the increase in youth custody sentencing of nearly 
#80,000, from #34,800 to #112,000. (This figure, of course, includes 
neither police nor judicial costs; nor the subsequent continuing costs 
of the extremely high (up to 85%) recidivism likely from youth custody 
institutions)'. 
Between the 1960s and the present day there has been a substantial 
reduction in the proportion of Dutch children and young people in trouble of 
various kinds placed in institutions. 'Placements decreased 667. in the 0-6 age 
group, 40% in the 6-13 age group and 157. among older youth' (Junger Tas J, 1984) 
(p. 134). 'Sweden', Pat Carlen (1983) writes, 'has also reduced its prison 
population; between 1971 and 1973 the number of prisoners fell from 4,600 to 
3,600 which was the lowest figure for 3 years' (p. 210). Emelia Romania, the 
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area surrounding Bologna, Italy, has a population of 15,000,000 people. Its 
'youth custody' population fell below 5 in 1987. In 1977, before the 
decarcerating policies of the local authority were instituted, more than 400 
boys lived in the 'youth custody centre'. 
In Holland, Sweden, and Emelia Romania, the problem of juvenile crime has 
been effectively depoliticised. In Britain, it has not. Depoliticisation is a 
process in which perpetrators of crime cease to be the objects of a political 
discourse and become instead the objects of a scientific or professional 
discourse. Depoliticisation usually involves a movement from an emphasis upon 
the free will of the actor to an emphasis upon the ways in which the offenders 
behaviour is constrained or determined. Often behaviour previously viewed as a 
sign of wilful badness is redescribed as unwitting or involuntary behaviour 
symptomatic of a more profound social or psychological disjunction. 
Theoretically, depoliticisation usually involves a conceptual movement from 
classical voluntarism to either the 'soft' determinism of Matza or the thorough- 
going hard determinism of criminological positivism. At the level of policy, 
depoliticisation has meant a shift towards systems which emphasise the concern 
for the welfare of the offender and de-emphasises a concern for formal justice. 
This is a shift which British governments since 1969 and their radical-liberal 
adverseries alike, in the field of juvenile criminal justice, have been 
unwilling and unable to make. 
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NOTES - CHAPTER 8 
1 Jacoby R, 1975, Social Amnesia identifies these processes at work on a 
grand scale in psychology and psychoanalysis. 
2 This is not a plea for a return to a radical or consensual structuralism 
but rather an insistence that we can entertain the notion that social 
events are structured without abandoning a'belief in human agency. This 
particular line of dialectical argument may be traced through the work of 
Kaut Hegel and Marx. 
'' It may seem unduly ponderous to restate what are, after all, the basic 
tenets of a sociology of social action but in this context, when so much 
has been forgotten by conventional administrative criminology it seems 
necessary to do so. 
4 Cloward R and Ohlin L identify this type of behaviour as 'recreativism'. 
According to first hand accounts the incidence of 'madness' amongst 
unemployed black male adolescents is increasing alarmingly. 
`' It is interesting that politicians and policy-makers tend to apply 
metaphors which are familiar to them. For Heseltine the ghetto is the free 
market. For the reformers of the War on Poverty of the 1960s the ghetto 
was the 'community' - of Moynihan D (1974), Maximum Feasible 
Misunderstanding. 
6 For an interesting discussion of the contribution of male socialisation to 
involvement in juvenile crime see Gregory Jeanne Sex, Class and Crime - 
Towards a Non-Sexist Criminology in Matthews R and Young J (1986). 
7 For a fuller account of these 'Crimes of the Powerful', cf, Peace F, 1976, 
Pluto. 
8 More recently bands of black and white Y youths have begun to hijack whole 
buses in Lewisham and Camberwell. 
9 See for example, the discussion of the emergence of these policing 
strategies in Hall S et al (1978), Policing the Crisis, and Mark R (1978), 
In the Office of the Constable. 
10 This is what labelling theory would indicate. For a fuller discussion, see 
for example, Becker H (1963), Outsiders, Free Press. 
11 
In Holland in 1981/2 the probation service attempted to redefine its role 
as a non-controlling resource to the offender. Its budgtet was 
substantially reduced by the Government. 
12 Perhaps we need to pursue this question using the tools of anthropology and 
semiotics rather than criminology. The phrase 'Punitive Obsession' was 
coined by Playfair 0 in the book of the same name, Gollancz, 1971. 
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Chapter 9 
Thinking About Change 
'It is tempting to think: that the government, the Home Office and the 
Department of Health and Social Security do not want an adequate 
evaluation of their juvenile justice activities'. 
David P Farrington 
'Oh, the leaves began to fall 
And the seas began to part 
And the people that confronted him were many 
And he was told but these few words 
Which opened up his heart 
If you cannot bring good news, then don't bring any' 
Bob Dylan - The Wicked Messenger 
The situation may be dire but the good news keeps on coming. Reformers may 
begin their arguments with a critique of the ideology, functioning, absurdities 
or cruelties of the britisch juvenile criminal justice system but they usually 
finish with positive suggestions for minor modifications which will get the 
machinery of justice back into efficient working order. Morris et al's (1980) 
assault upon welfare as a manifestation of creeping totalitarianism dwindles 
into a plea for a child's right to punishment. Thorpe D et al's (1980) 
startling exposure of the ways in which collusion between the juvenile bench and 
social workers jeopardises the liberty of working class young people, culminates 
in a blueprint for an Intermediate Treatment' curriculum which will appeal to a 
punitive magistracy. John Holt (1985) urges us to make 'a direct assault 
upon the rhetoric of law and order' but ends by enjoining social workers to 
abandon the language of treatment or punishment and to speak instead of 
reparation and atonement. 
s 
Right= 
The reformers' critique may start by addressing real social and political 
problems but the solutions' which follow concern modest extensions or 
-1 i 
limitations of the rights of the child or the rights of the court. Pat Carlen 
(1933) writes: 
'Unfortunately, their joint concerns serve mainly to demonstrate that 
the liberal concept of rights is still as impossible as ever. Thus, 
whereas Morris et al (1980) claim that punishment is society's and the 
child's right, Taylor et al (1979) more specifically, want rights for 
children against adults. Reynolds (1981) however, in criticising them 
both wants even more and differently located rights - this time for 
parents and teachers against both children and other adults! '. 
p. 206 
What begins as an assault upon the prison all too often ends as a plea for 
administrative change or modifications in the day-to-day practices of low-level 
agents of the juvenile criminal justice system. As the critique develops so its 
object changes from the structure, functioning and political environment of the 
system to the behaviour of its subjects and agents. 
The critique takes the form of a discourse on rights and the minimisation 
of intervention and penalties. It highlights anomalies and absurdities in the 
system as a prelude to the restoration of that system to optimal functioning. 
There is a concern with the ways in which the utility of penalties can be 
maximised to produce a system of rational, and hence minimal, punishment 
sufficient to chasten the offender, and deter those of us who hover on the 
margins of crime. 
This discourse on rights always has the free and equal citizen of civil 
society effecting a rational choice to do good or evil in the knowledge of the 
penalties or rewards which will attend his actions. This citizen is contrasted 
in the discourse with the socially, psychologically or biologically determined 
humanoid who is the object of a social intervention justified in terms of social 
need or 'welfare'. Needless to say, the freely-willing actor of classicism is 
presented as a model of the 'real' while the positivistic cabbage against which 
he is measured is presented as a figment of the social work profession's 
collective imagination. 
This tedious juxtaposition of fictitious caricatures is necessary if the 
discourse an rights is to be sustained because it hinges upon the absolute 
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rationality of the totally free actor. 
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There is however a very serious problem 
involved in attempting to represent juvenile offenders in this way because in 
reality they simply are not like that. An alternative view of human actors as 
neither wholly free nor wholly determined but constrained, and sometimes 
disabled by their social, economic, cultural and existential predicament is more 
plausible and points to the intellectual bankruptcy of positions which mustA 
retain these caricatures as the centrepiece of their arguments. -°' Matza's,, "'(1964) 
representation of the subject of the juvenile criminal justice system transcends 
this false dichotomy. 
'I do not propose a free or calculating actor as an alternative to 
constraint. Freedom is not only the loosening of controls. It is a 
sense of command over one's destiny, a capacity to formulate 
programmes or projects, a feeling of being an agent in one's own 
behalf. Freedom is self-control. If so, the, delinquent has clearly 
not achieved that state. The sense of self-control irrespective of 
whether it is well-founded exists to varying degrees in modern man. 
Those who have been granted the potentiality for freedom through the 
loosening of social controls but who lack the position, capacity or 
inclination to be agents in their own behalf I call drifters, and it 
is in this capacity that I place the juvenile delinquent'. 
2 
p. 29 
This lack of 'position, capacity, and inclination to be agents in their own 
behalf', this constraint, is-social. It is borne out of a lack of means, 
choices and opportunities or more specifically, a lack of power. The central 
problem with the discourse on' rights is that it fails to deal with the issue of 
the differential distribution of power. It not only misunderstands the nature 
of the deviant actor but it also misunderstands the nature of the social 
world he inhabits, and it should not. It should not because Emile Durkheim's 
most compelling criticism of classicism, the discourse on rights, was that in 
ignoring the enforced division of labour and the consequent maldistribution of 
social power, classicism elaborated a system of criminal justice upon a social 
fantasy of freedom and equality which gave legitimacy-to the activities of the. , .... r 
rich and compounded the misery of the poor. 
. a ý 
The notion of a deviant actor who is neither absolutely free and equal nor 
wholly determined presents a serious challenge to reformers who favour a return 
w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to the due process of law and the minimisation of social intervention. On the 
one hand, it erodes the philosophical rationale for a system of 'just desserts' 
since as Andrew von Hirsch (1978) has argued, it is difficult if not impossible 
to ensure 'just desserts in an unjust society'. On the other hand, the 
recognition of social powerlessness as a factor limiting personal culpability 
would, on the face of it, indicate the need for a social intervention to effect 
an equitable redistribution of power and wealth as a necessary moral precursor 
to the introduction of a 'just desserts' model. That we are not clear how this 
radical redistribution of power and wealth might be achieved simply means that 
until we find out it will remain a moral necessity to defend the children of the 
poor against the power of the machinery of justice and the penitentiaries it 
3 feeds 
Power 
If we wish to act in defence of the children of the poor both as victims of 
crime and as victims of our notoriously punitive juvenile criminal justice 
system then we must move beyond the discourse on rights and concern ourselves 
with changes in the distribution of power and wealth. 
Change is most likely to occur when private troubles become 'political 
problems'. 'P'olitical problems' may be distinguished from 'public issues' in 
that they pose a direct threat to power and wealth. Public issues like AIDS, 
acid rain, and nuclear waste, require all serious politicians and responsible 
citizens to hold a considered view. They do not, however, threaten to topple 
governments or force the 7% of the population which controls (approximately) 84% 
of the nation's wealth to get their cheque books out. Political 'problems' by 
contrast require, for their resolution, a redistribution of power and wealth4. 
Power and wealth are seldom given away. When power and wealth change hands 
they do so because the powerful and the wealthy anticipate even greater losses 
if the particular threat or demand is not met. Reform occurs not when power 
holders become aware of the right thing to do about a problem, but when the 
problematic situation offers them no alternative. In short, power and wealth is 
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relinquished, when and where it is, because the powerful and the wealthy believe 
that it is in their interest to do so. It should be added that this is seldom 
done before the alternative response to the threat, the demonstration of the 
coercive and controlling potential of power and wealth, has been tried and 
C 
failed`'. 
Back to the Brixton Triangle 
The task for those who wish to effect change is to locate the political 
'problem' which will trigger a redistribution of power and wealth. It is at 
least plausible to argue that what has happened, and anxieties about what might 
yet happen, in the unemployed ghetto of the inner city will give the impetus to 
social change because what happens in the inner city ghetto threatens most 
directly the existing pattern of social relations in Britain. 
Unemployment is higher than it has ever been but it is highest amongst the 
young people of the unemployed ghetto. Permanent unemployment is a structural 
feature of all western economies not least because in adopting the new 
technology these economies are effectively emancipating themselves from labour. 
Thus the unprecedented prosperity of most of those still in work is paralleled 
by the unprecedented poverty of most of those who are not. Politicians of all 
persuasions are alarmed by the explosive contradiction of an irrevocably 
unemployed and impoverished underclass subjected to bombardment by a 
governmental rhetoric which links worklessness with fecklessness in an attempt 
to cajole the 'workshy' into what must inevitably be a frustrating and fruitless 
search for employment. This transparent attempt to achieve political legitimacy 
for an economic and political system running out of control rubs political salt 
into the gaping wound of relative deprivation. 
The discrepancy between a rapid expansion in the productive capacity of the 
system and an equally rapid contraction in its capacity to distribute the 
benefits of a burgeoning technology in response to the simple survival needs of 
the poor, adds further fuel for the anticipated conflagration 
6. 
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Virtually all the social issues confronting British society are located 
within, or bear disproportionately upon, the unemployed ghetto of the inner 
city. At the epicentre of this coincidence of catastrophes are black children 
and young people in trouble and in need. 
The question of the reform of the juvenile criminal justice system has been 
politically ghettoised along with the professional workers who have championed 
the cause of the young offender. The 'political problem' of the black juvenile 
offender in the ghetto is quite another matter and offers a lever with which to 
prise apart the 'public issue' of juvenile injustice. It offers this lever 
because these children and young people are fixed in political rhetoric and 
popular imagery as 'social dynamite'. They have, by dint of this dubious 
attribution, become the instruments whereby the marginal public issue of 
juvenile justice is being transformed into the serious political problem of 
rioting, and unsafe streets. Nobody can afford to be the first British prime 
minister to preside over 'no-go' areas on the mainland. It is also becoming a 
political 'problem' in part because ghetto youth are finding. a political voice. 
As the crisis in the unemployed ghetto deepens a new generation of black 
intellectuals begins to assume, for the first time, a professional and political 
power previously denied them. As we have seen this intelligentsia cannot 
disappear into the white class system and so its impact cannot be dissipated by 
absorption. White intellectuals may arise from the working class and come to 
regard the destiny of white working class deviants as separate from their own. 
Black intellectuals cannot escape their origins and allegiances in this way7. 
The confrontation between black children and young people and the apparatus of 
justice is the actual and symbolic moment at which a usually opaque 
institutionalised racist oppression which bears upon-all black people is made 
transparently clear in the official interventions and judicial disposals to 
which black young people are subjected. Black politics emerges of necessity as 
an abolitionist politics of negative reform which on the one hand attempts to 
resist the violent incursions of the state into the black community while on the 
other it attempts to link the politically and economically marginal to the 
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mainstream of the political process. Black intellectuals have everything to 
gain and little to lose. Offered cold comfort elsewhere their prime 
constitutency will remain Britain's black population and their prime concern 
institutionalised racism. 
And the white and the powerful know this. The black intelligentsia will, 
whether they like it or not, be identified by the white and powerful as the 
'enemy generals' empowered to negotiate an end to hostilities on behalf of the 
army in the ghetto. They will be construed by the white and powerful, who see 
the urban problem in terms of the threat posed by black young men to the 
property and person of white families, as the holders of the key to the problems 
of the inner city. The white and powerful will be wrong but in asking the black 
intelligentsia to contain social dissent within the ghetto they may have to 
offer them the means whereby black people can break out of the ghetto. If this 
happens, then the issue of juvenile injustice will be taken out of the political 
ghetto with them. 
Neo Abolitionism and the Radical Professional 
In Gunter Grass' 'The Plebians Rehearse the Revolution' Berthold Brecht and 
the Berliner Ensemble are rehearsing a play about radical social change in a 
hall in East Berlin. It is the 17 June, 1953, and the people of Berlin are 
demonstrating in the streets against the Russian occupation. Brecht's ensemble 
decides that this uprising is of no real historical significance and so, instead 
of leaving the hall and joining the people, they stay inside and continue to 
rehearse a play about a revolution. Like the Berliner Ensemble radical 
professionals rehearsing the ritual of justice in the juvenile court have often 
been confounded by the where? when? how? and who? of a politics which could 
contest social injustice beyond the juvenile justice system. 
The political struggle in the unemployed ghetto combines a resistance to 
the predatory incursions of the state apparatus and its agents into the lives 
and liberty of black citizens with a demand for protection from crime and an 
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extension of adequate state services for the poor and the powerless. In doing 
this it moves beyond the liberal attempt to simply minimise the quantity of 
state intervention. It moves to a more sophisticated politics in which the 
quality of state services and the accountability of state agents to the 
recipients of those services is in question. This stance is epitomised in the 
demand for the transformation of the police force into a 'police service' 
through the creation of a system of popular democratic accountability. This 
model of politics resembles in many ways, what we might call the 'neo 
abolitionism' of the politics developed by NAPO. At its core is an assumption 
that the state should be accountable to, controlled by, and work in the 
interests of, the poor and the powerless. It is a politics predicated upon the 
contradiction that in as much as state resources may be deployed to suppress or 
placate the dissent emanating from those trapped at the bottom of the social 
structure, the struggle for control of those state resources is the only site 
upon which non-violent class conflict aimed at a redistribution of power-and 
wealth can be enacted in periods of economic recession and widescale 
unemployment. In the unemployed ghetto of the inner city state resources are, 
by and large, the only resources and this gives an added urgency to the 
struggle. More ominously of course the success or failure of this attempt to 
extend, and gain control over, State resources may well have a bearing upon 
whether, and to what extent, the conflict becomes violent. The white and the 
powerful believe this too and this is an important bargaining counter for the 
black intelligentsia. 
The new politics of the unemployed ghetto, this spontaneous neo- 
abolitionism, has implications for radicals working within the juvenile criminal 
justice system. As managers of this most politically ambiguous piece of the 
state apparatus the choices they make about the allegiances they will establish 
and the alliances they can form will be important ones for the children of the 
poor. If they decide that their primary allegiance lies with the poor and the 
powerless they must consider how they should use their power. 
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Information as Power 
Professionals in the juvenile criminal justice system have at least five 
different types of information which would add strength to the political 
rejoinder from the unemployed ghetto: 
1. Information about the structure and the intricacies of the juvenile 
criminal justice system which would enable non-professionals to understand 
the workings of the system. 
2. Information about the functioning of the system. If some form of system- 
monitoring has been instituted by the local authority social services 
department then it should be possible to ascertain the racial origins and 
antecedents of offenders and the police stations and benches where either 
diversionary or punitive initiatives are favoured. This type of 
information would allow non-professionals to identify discrepancies in the 
system. 
3. Information about abuses in the system. As we have seen, only rarely is 
s 
the routine brutality and lawlessness of the junior penal system subjected 
to public scrutiny. Professionals within the system are by contrast fully 
aware of the seamy side of penal 'and professional practices but they are 
usually unsure about where to take information which is almost always 
offered on the condition that the informant will not be identified. By 
taking all these instances of abuse to a non-professional public the 
possibility is opened up for the transformation of the sum total of these 
'private troubles' into a 'political problem'. This type of information 
would offer non-professionals an issue around which to organise resistance 
to the excessive imprisonment of their young people. 
4. Information gained from the thousands of interviews and discussions with 
young people about the impact of the juvenile criminal justice system and 
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its institutions upon the attitudes and identities of children and young 
people in trouble. This type of information would afford non-professionals 
the opportunity to appreciate, and therefore achieve a closer 
identification with, young offenders, by correcting unrealistic 
stereotypes. 
5. Information about alternative strategies for responding to children and 
young people in trouble and alternative methods of crime control. 
Increasingly professionals in juvenile justice are developing knowledge and 
expertise about pro-active crime-control strategies. This type of 
information allows non-professionals to consider the type of crime control 
they want in their neighbourhood. 
Policy as Power 
Clearly this 'political' information-sharing can never be an individual 
initiative. It must emerge from a collective decision on the part of a group of 
workers in the system to redefine the role, the political constituency, and the 
political commitment of their agency in a particular way. Unless this 
redefinition emanates from the policies of the local authority social services 
department on the issues of race, racism and juvenile justice workers could well 
find themselves politically beleaguered 
This could of course be a serious political stumbling block except that 
where and when social services departments have committed themselves to 
abolitionist policies on juvenile justice they have done so because radical 
professionals have organised it. This organisation involves a lengthy process 
of discussion and consultation involving at one end the director of social 
services who will have to present the policy to the council and at the other, 
basic-grade social workers who will have to implement it. Enough successful 
examples exist for us to see that policy change can be effected by the concerted 
actions of practitioners. 
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The implementation of abolitionist juvenile justice policies by local 
authorities has usually had the effect of moving IT from the margins to the 
centre of local juvenile criminal justice strategies. IT then becomes a base 
from which attempts to effect political change in other agencies are launched. 
This redefinition of the role of IT can release workers to engage with and act 
as facilitors for an effective abolitionist alliance which attempts to influence 
the functioning of all the agencies and all the agents of the juvenile criminal 
justice system at a local level. 
Horizontal and Vertical Alliances 
Mathiesen, 1974, speaks of the need to develop an abolitionist alliance 
along Horizontal and Vertical axes in an attempt to reconnect the 'expelled' to 
the political mainstream. The alliance between juvenile justice practitioners 
and local authority councillors to produce an abolitionist juvenile justice 
policy would be located on the vertical axis of the alliance. The move by rank 
and file members of NAPO to affiliate with the TUC in order to influence the 
policies of the national executive on crime and offending would be similarly 
placed. 
At the moment a temporary horizontal alliance orchestrated by the National 
Council for Civil Liberties and articulated by the Prison and Youth Custody 
Centre Branch of the Civil and Public Servants Association, the POA and NACRO is 
attempting to achieve a vertical alliance with European jurists. The jurists 
are expected to rule that the overcrowded conditions in british jails make 
imprisonment in Britain a cruel and inhuman punishment in which case any prison 
sentences imposed in the wake of this ruling will be in contravention of 
European Law and hence illegal unless the British government provided twice as 
much space or locked up half as many people. 
The diagram on the next page illustrates the scope for horizontal and 
vertical alliances which could be constructed around the issue of juvenile 
injustice in the umemployed ghetto. 
What becomes evident from a glance at the diagram is the extent to which 
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potential alliances and routes to political power and influence remain 
unexploited. Local authority IT sections do not, as far as I am aware, maintain 
a dialogue with black community groups. Workers who have the most frequent 
contact with young people who are expelled to penal institutions seldom attempt 
to link them into a political alliance with groupings beyond the prison., 
Black community organisations, black prisoners' groups and black social 
workers and probation officers are beginning to come together on the issue of 
imprisonment but it remains unclear which vertical connections this horizontal 
alliance will make. The social welfare trades unions, with the exception of 
NAPO, are effectively organisations which merely negotiate pay and conditions 
for welfare professionals yet it is clearly possible to mobilise them as 
pressure groups on social issues. This does not happen and so a potentially 
rich source of political pressure and support remains underused. The European 
Court has proved itself a remarkably effective source of pressure upon the 
British government and offers a focus for what have until now been disparate 
but potentially complementary reforming activities. Our ability to collectively 
formulate social issues as rights which can be translated into legal and social 
practices will in large part determine how effectively we will be able to get 
Euro-justice working for us. If we can do this then we may be able to get some 
help in shifting the European social, racial, and economic inequality mountains 
which have appeared in British cities in recent times. 
To specify the precise ways in which any abolitionist alliance would, in 
the event, unfold is not possible since these alliances are of necessity a 
pragmatic and ever-changing nexus of short, medium and, less often, long-term 
political interests. As a reactive and opportunistic politics 'neo- 
abolitionism' must be prepared to change faster and more often than the law and 
order state it confronts. As Castlereagh once remarked of Britain, it has no 
long-term allies, just long-term interests. 
What are we fighting for? 
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An alliance which attempts to address the inter-related questions of the 
victimisation of the poor by the poor, the criminalisation of the poor but 
innocent by the police, and the excessive punishment of the poor perpetrators of 
crimes against the poor by agents of the state will mystify the adherents of a 
'justice' model. The 'justice' model would have the victim of crime, the 
falsely accused citizen, and the correctly accused offender as individual moral 
actors engaged in discreet legal episodes in which social contracts between them 
(their rights and obligations) are violated. For those who see reform in terms 
of the manipulation of rights the programme which emerges from the unemployed 
ghetto will remain inconceivable and unworkable. It is inconceivable because it 
moves the issue of reform and change from a discourse on rights conducted 
between the theoreticians and practitioners of the criminal justice system to a 
struggle to impose some form of democratic control over the system of 
surveillance policing and punishment by the actual and potential subjects of the 
system. They believe, as Durkheim, Marx, Weber and Foucault believed, that 
'justice' is not a timeless moral entity against which human endeavour is 
measured but rather what those with the power to impose their definition upon it 
say it is.. The question is not whether 'justice will prevail in the state's 
response to the unemployed ghetto, but who's justice will prevail'. Nils 
Christie (1974) argues that radicals should reformulate the concept of justice 
on the basis of social morality rather than social utility. Such a 
redefinition of justice would require a substantial redistribution of power. 
This redistribution of power would have the following components: De- and re- 
politicisation, Civilisation, Popularisation and the redistribution of 
discretion, Decentralisation, democratisation and decriminalisation, and 
Prevention. 
De- and Re-Politicisation 
We need to depoliticise the young offender, 'who currently occupies centre 
stage in the hard-right populist theatre, and repoliticise the aetiology of 
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crime. A 'Brixton Triangle' will predictably generate patterned behavioural 
responses in the same way that an Eton, an Oxford or a Coldstream Guards will. 
As we have noted, young people in the Brixton Triangle are not propelled blindly 
into crime, but crime looms large in'the narrow repertoire of 'ways of being' 
available to them. 
We need to restate the obvious. If the rich, white and powerful really 
believed that conventional social and economic success in our society was simply 
a consequence of individual worth and effort rather than social environment they 
would not send their children to exceptionally expensive schools and colleges. 
Social and economic environment shapes behaviour because it delineates the 
opportunities we have to do particular kinds of things and hence, to become 
particular kinds of people. Whatever philosophy we may espouse most of us live 
our lives as if this were true. This is why parents of all social classes 
struggle to provide a better environment and the best opportunities they can for 
their children. Anybody will tell you, 'it's only natural'. 
The reintroduction of relative deprivation as a precipitating factor in the 
perpetration of crime and a mitigating factor in any assessment of culpability 
is both theoretically and politically necessary. The liberal justice lobby has, 
by its crude insistence upon the absolute rationality of the totally free actor, 
colluded with a right-wing law and order crusade which has succeeded in 
dismissing any consideration of structural social disadvantage from the debate. 
If we are to repoliticise the aetiology of crime we must stress that the social 
suffering which moves young people to the threshold of serious and persistant 
juvenile crime, and beyond, is avoidable and has a political remedy. 
Civilisation 
When I was a youth worker, a 15-year old I knew came to my office after a 
court appearance. He was not sure what he had been charged with. He said it 
sounded 'weird' but he could probably write it down. He wrote 'A salt and 
buttery'. Leroy's brush with the majesty of British Justice was marred to a 
considerable extent because he didn't know why he was in court. When I 
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translated the charge he was flabbergasted since in his view the 'geezer was 
asking for a smack in the mouth' and he thought he had 'sorted it out' with him 
anyway. The 'geezer' in question thought so too and was very surprised to hear 
about Leroy's court appearance. For Leroy this mystifying encounter with the 
justice system served only to compound his waning confidence in officialdom. 
In this story respect for the law is undermined because the whole episode 
has mystified the defendant. The 'victim' is similarly perplexed and gains no 
benefit from the process. The state has incurred considerable costs in order to 
intervene even though the defendant is unrepentant and the victim unconcerned. 
This type of minor skirmish, neighbourhood disputes, petty theft, and a great 
deal of 'criminal damage' could be redescribed, not as criminal action which 
causes affront to the state, but as inconsiderate behaviour which worsens social 
relationships in the neighbourhood. If we are concerned with the quality of 
social relationships in a neighbourhood there is an inherent absurdity in 
whisking wrongdoers out of that neighbourhood and into a juvenile criminal court 
in which their destiny will be decided by 'experts' who are not party to the 
dispute. There is a much more powerful argument for an intervention in which 
the young person who has caused offence is requested to appear at a 
neighbourhood tribunal at which some agreement about how he or she can make good 
the damaged social relationships to the satisfaction of the aggrieved parties 
may be reached. The endeavour is to transform the 'criminal' into the 'civil' 
in order to achieve a civilisation of juvenile justice. 
The tribunal, being an informal civil mechanism would impose no penalties 
but it would of course be able to refer the case to a family panel or a public 
prosecutor if agreement could not be reached. The argument for the lay 
tribunal is strengthened when we recognise that the juvenile court is in 
reality a place where working class children and young people go to admit their 
responsibility for usually trivial misdemeanours. Often the most serious thing 
they have done is to create anxiety and disruption within their families and 
their neighbourhoods yet the juvenile criminal court has no access to the place 
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where this aoxikty and disruption was generated. Civilised lay tribunals could 
deal cif+ectively with much of the work which is currently dealt with by the 
juvenile court. 
Lay tribunals, by encouraging greater participation by the parties 
concerned, would be able to explore a wider range of issues than is possible 
within formal settings. Being less dependent upon rules and procedures they 
would be in a position to challenge existing structures of legality. In 
accommodating groups as well as individuals they could provide a forum in which 
disputes affecting the community as a whole, pollution, transport, etc, could be 
explored. Probably its most important potential difference from formal courts - 
which are concerned either with retribution, causation and ascertaining 
responsibility arising from the past; or with therapeutic or rehabiliative 
concerns which are preoccupied with devising remedies for the future - lies in 
its ability to make a response which links past, present and future. It could 
respond to crime as process, rather than simply as an 'event' or 'case'. It 
would be in a position to monitor local patterns of crime through liaison with 
local police committees, schools and community organisations. It is widely 
agreed that informal courts are likely to be more effective in dealing with some 
forms of intra-class crime than formal processing. Thus an appearance at a 
community court, facing neighbours and being asked to justify ones actions to 
them may well be more effective than punishment. Such a process also gives 
community representatives a chance to confront those who have offended them and 
express a justifiable anger which probably has more meaning than the 
incomprehensible rituals of the formal court appearance. 
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tion and the Redistribution of Discretion 
Pat Carlen (1983) suggests how the members of local lay tribunals might be 
Selected: 
'Why not, therefore, harness the public concern about law-breaking to 
a social intervention programme on which, for a specified period, all 
persons over a certain age would be eligible for either voluntary or 
compulsory service? (Preparation for such service could be 
incorporated into social studies lessons in schools). 
'I am suggesting that local lay tribunals, operating under the 
auspices of the expediancy principle 'Why prosecute? ' should initially 
process all juvenile and most other 'crime' where an accused person 
admits to breaking the law'. 
p. 213 
Dr Hans Tulk: ens, 1979, head of the Dutch Prison Administration, cites the 
rointcrrpretation of the expediancy principle by Dutch public prosecutors as a 
major factor, in the dramatic reduction in the Dutch prison population. He 
writes: 
'As an example of policy development I would mention the remarkable 
change in interpretation of the law which the right to dismiss a case 
has undergone. The Act gives the Public Prosecutor the power to drop 
a charge if he considers that it is in the public interest to do so. 
Until about five years ago, the interpretation of this provision was: 
prosecute unless prosecution is not required in the public interest. 
Now the interpretation is: do not prosecute, unless required in the 
public interest. This change in the approach to cases illustrates the 
limited importance the Public Prosecutor attaches to a trial'. 
P. 69 
In July 1983, Commander Newman of the Metropolitan Police issued a 
directive to his police officers instructing them to avoid prosecution where to 
do =_o would be stigmatising for the child or where the prosecution was likely to 
result in an absolute or conditional discharge. This modest attempt to 
limit prosecution was unsuccessful but it flowed from a recognition of the 
fatuity of much formal processing. At the other end of the scale, when the 
police as prosecutors decide that they will not prosecute but will caution and 
divert instead, this produces the virtually custody-free zones of the type we 
are currently witnessing in Basingstoke, Southend, and Corby10. It is at best 
unlikE 1y, for the reasons outlined in Chapter 7, that these police-initiated 
diversionary strategies would be attempted as part of the policing of the 
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unemployea >3hetto and this reinforces the radical argument for an independent 
public prosecution service. 
A Public prosecution service operating the 'why prosecute' expediency 
principle could offer the government a means whereby it could limit the flow of 
case=_ through the courts and reduce imprisonment. This would have even greater 
political legitimacy if the prosecution service had the power to initiate non- 
punitive regulatory interventions. Such interventions might involve agreements 
that defendants would attend an alcohol abuse programme, a day centre or appear 
at a lay tribunal instead of being prosecuted. It would be naive to suggest 
that this might not at times appear, coercive to its subjects but they would have 
the choice End one of those choices would enable them to avoid criminal 
stigmati_atiun. Pat Carlen (1983". ) writes: 
'Punishment if successful intentionally causes pain and usually has 
disabling (physical, psychological or financial) consequences for the 
otfcan d&r. Regulatory intervention, on the other hand, need have no 
penal intent; it could be defined as being merely the authoritative 
rectification of the particular, social problems which both occasion 
and are occasioned by law-break: ing'. 
p. 2 13 
The public prosecutor could stem the flow of cases to the court yet as we 
have seen, in court the juvenile bench has displayed an alarming tendency to - 
ride roughshod over those legal caveats which enjoin them to use their punitive 
powers sparingly. This punitive profligacy is defended by governments in the 
nanle of the doctrine of the separation of powers which identifies two distinct social 
sphere:, one of which deals in politics and the other in justice. The doctrine 
maintains that justice must remain independent of politics but this independence 
is never seen to be violated by the addition of powers and penalties only by 
their erosion. 
DA Thomas (1974) indicates that the bench and the judiciary have 
effectively ignored 'bold exhortation' to leniency and subverted legal 
restrictions upon their power to imprison. Box and Hale (1986) offer an 
exhaustivci account of measures governments could deploy to limit judges and 
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magistrates enthusiasm for imprisonment but conclude that they will not 
intervene because governments: 
'faced with a population they perceive to be increasingly 
ungovernable, and realising that their economic policies may 
substantially exacerbate this, particularly amongst certain sections 
of the community, have not seen any pragmatic sense in alienating such 
a trusted and loyal ally as the judiciary, or abandoning prison as an 
iron fist of threat, control, and punishment'. 
p. 93 
Our alliance must reach up to Parliament because only Parliament can 
address this thorny constitutional problem. 
Decentralisation, Democratisation and Decriminalisation 
The architects of the 1960s juvenile justice legislation realised that in 
order to create a juvenile justice system which emphasised a concern for the 
needs and best interests of the child the juvenile bench would have to be 
effectively excluded from any significant decision-making role in the system. 
This was attempted initially, as we have seen, by the decentralisation of 
control of the apparatus of justice to local authorities with a parallel move to 
transform the juvenile court into a family panel where the opinions of lay or 
social/psychological experts would hold sway. The subsequent 1969 CYPA offered 
a much more modest version of this original initiative and yet had it been 
. 
implemented it would have ended imprisonment for young people below the age of 
18. 
The decentralisation of control remains the core issue in the debate about 
change in the British juvenile criminal justice system. The present government 
has attempted to exert increasing centralised control over the apparatus of 
juvenile justice and this endeavour has led inevitably to increases in juvenile 
imprisonment. 
Critics of the 1969 CYPA argue that it failed to offer children the 
protection of due process of law, thus rendering them vulnerable to excessive 
intervention or incarceration in the name of 'treatment'. This argument seems 
to suggest that an initial concern with social need and best interest of the 
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child must always and everywhere, as a consequence of professional 
entrepreneurism, degenerate into the violation of a child's rights. We cannot 
meet this criticism by a bland defence of treatment but we can point out that 
social deprivation as a precipitating factor in offending must constitute a 
mitigating circumstance. More generally we can argue that a system of juvenile 
justice which recognises social need, but, in the interests of the child, places 
clear limits upon the capacity of professionals to intervene on the basis of 
need is not unimaginable. There is no reason why a young person could not be 
offered a choice between a fine, a series of meetings with a family counsellor, 
or some form or reparation. The family panel might well express a view about 
which option they would see as most useful but the onus would be on the child 
and the family to choose. There is no reason why such a family panel should not 
have a legal adviser who refereed the session rather than chairing it and who's 
primary concern was to ensure proportionality and the defence of the rights of 
the child, a kind of in-situ public defender and rights watchdog. There is also 
no reason why the lay element on the panel should not be recruited in the same 
way as the jury. 
Like the neighbourhood tribunal described above, the family panel would 
serve to divert youngsters out of the justice system to local authority and 
voluntary facilities and services which can respond to their needs. Such a 
panel would ultimately be empowered to incarcerate some young people but not to 
imprison them. Incarceration would be undertaken in accordance with strict and 
detailed conditions regulating the type and severity of offences for which it 
was necessary and the duration of the period in incarceration. 
Prevention 
The lay tribunal and the family panel could serve as the base from which 
preventive and defensive strategies could be developed. Lloyd Ohlin, 1979, 
whose opportunity theory gave the impetus to the British and US poverty 
programmes, was subsequently engaged to research the Massachusett's experiment, 
the most throughgoing decarceration initiative we have so far witnessed. He 
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writes: 
I... our research indicates that the network of relationships which 
youth maintain in the community have a crucial impact on their ability 
to stay out of trouble after their release. In fact, it seems clear 
that the total community experience of the youth before and after his 
correctional experience may overwhelm even the most constructive 
elements of the correctional programme'. 
p, 22 
We live and work in a world where everyday the predicament of working class 
young people in the inner city is worsened. It is a world where the 'network of 
relationships' are under greater and greater stress. There can be no doubt that 
the systematic impoverishment of the inner city has strained all relationships 
and services and in so doing has increased the likelihood of the incarceration 
of the young. Young people from overcrowded homes, with unemployed or 
clinically depressed parents are at risk in a multiplicity of ways. Hostels for 
the young homeless house a high proportion of young people previously in care or 
who have unsuccessfully attempted to get admitted to voluntary care as a result 
of a breakdown of family relationships which are in turn a function of social 
stress. Work is a problem. Housing is a problem. Together they tend to propel 
young people into deviance and so into the expanding penal institution which is 
the substitute the law and order state offers for a minimum wage and adequate 
welfare services. Housing need and welfare rights loom as targets for a 
sustained intervention. Now is not the time to be saving money. To limit 
welfare expenditure now is not radical non-intervention, it is not even benign 
neglect, it is professional negligence. Following the logic of Ohlin's argument 
any programme of crime control and social defence must address the quality of 
services available to young people and their families in their worsening 
predicament. It must press for popular services untainted by association with 
law and order. It should be noted that in this way it would be possible to 
claim that one was taking the social nature of crime seriously. 
It is interesting that the techniques pioneered by the Wincroft project in 
the late 1960s (described in Chapter 4) have been resuscitated by projects 
concerned to combat crime. In their report on their three-year experiment the 
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NACRO Safe Neighbourhoods Unit concludes: 
'12.14 - This experience suggests that on estates with a serious 
crime/vandalism/hooliganism problem that is thought to be 
caused by indigenous young people, a detached youth worker 
with a specific job brief should be deployed with 
responsibilities both for the welfare of the young people, 
and for reducing crime and deterring the harrassment of 
tenants. 
12.15 - The worker should work closely with relevant agencies and 
would concentrate on the following: 
- fostering a positive attitude in young people towards their 
community 
- working alongside other agencies involved with young 
people, particularly estate-based ones 
- understanding the social structure of the young, getting to 
know as many as possible, and planning and undertaking 
activities with them'. 
Bright J and Petterson G, 1984, p. 41 
These initiatives suggest an intervention in the 'community' and yet 
'community', as we are often reminded, may have no negative connotations but it 
has little reality either in the classical sense and it would be naive of us to 
believe that this notional community existed as some kind of curative safety 
net. This indicates that workers must be imaginative in an attempt to identify 
the often conflicting and diverse needs and desires of people living in 
particular neighbourhoods. Perhaps our job is to enable these needs and desires 
to be articulated in order to establish a, not always polite, dialogue between 
these interests and to work with young people in order that they might become 
articulate participants in'such a dialogue. Robins and Cohen (1978) have 
indicated strategies which might be adopted within the youth service to 
enfranchise young people in neighbourhood debates. Their concept of a Youth 
Tenants Association remains an untried but potentially fruitful initiative (17). 
To talk out rather than act out the stresses, strains, and conflicts existing in 
deprived inner city neighbourhoods may not lead to reconciliation but could at 
least lead to a higher level of tolerance -a rare enough commodity, and it 
could also be a means whereby previously unarticulated political demands could 
emerge from marginalised populations. There is no reason why we should not 
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begin to work in these ways, and there is a need for, and an established body of 
expertise whereby such work could be undertaken. What interventions of this 
type do not do is save local authorities money, indeed they make increasing 
demands on local authority budgets. If we can move beyond a position which only 
consider the young offender, and ignores the impact of his behaviour, then youth 
workers and social workers may come to be seen by the victimised neighbourhood 
as taking crime seriously and therefore worthy of its support and encouragement 
in the development of non-punitive responses to young people in trouble. 
Since the 1960s official responses to the mistakes made by the children of 
the poor have become important symbols of political grit and determination. 
From the mid-1970s black children and young people have borne the brunt of this 
repoliticisation and in looking at them we see, in exaggerated form, what 
happens to all working class children and young people who fall foul of the law. 
In this period tolerance and compassion were ousted by force and coercion in an 
attempt to make the dubious political point that what is wrong with this country 
is exemplified in the bad behaviour of its poor children. 
EM Forster once wrote: 
'I realise that all society rests upon force. But all the great 
creative actions, all the decent human relations, occur during the 
intervals when force has not managed to come to the front. These 
intervals are what matter. I want them to be as frequent and as lengthy as possible and I call them civilisation'. 
p. 78 
Whether or not a society responds to the mistakes made by its poorest 
children with tolerance, compassion, and a willingness to do something about 
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their poverty is perhaps a good measure of its civilisation. 
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NOTES - CHAPTER 9 
Foucault (1975) said that the critique of the prison tends to collapse into 
a justification for certain forms of imprisonment. 
2 Matza fails to develop this idea of constraint and we are left with an 
entity which appears to be a 'mistake'. Matza's deviants seem to 
collusively misunderstand each other. Their access to opportunity or their 
position in the social structure is not dealt with beyond passing 
references to 'lower-class youth'. 
It is probably for this reason that the protagonists of a 'justice' 
position tend to play down the significance of social class and social 
inequality. 
4 
5 
v 
6 
7 
8 
9 
This is an 'elaboration of C Wright Mill's distinction between 'private 
troubles' and 'public issues' in 'The Sociological Imagination' (1969). 
Power as Bacrach and Baratz (1974) have shown is in large part the power to 
get issues onto agendas. Increasingly the Thatcher administration of 1987 
put Race and Crime on the top of their agendas. 
The unemployed ghetto is to this extent the 'eye of the storm' where the 
inherent contradictions in the capitalist mode of production become most 
evident. 
It is interesting that of the 'new' black MPs two of them, Boeteng and 
Grant, 'made their names' in the 1981 disorders and 1986 at Broadwater Farm 
respectively. When Boeteng said 'Today Brent, tomorrow Soweto' it seemed 
clear that he was speaking as a 'Black' MP to a 'Black' constituency. 
The reality is, of course, that most 
for a policy which will allow them to 
impact upon young people in trouble. 
local authorities 'are in the market' 
limit expenditure and make some 
Holland has not paralleled its decarcerating policies with the development 
of 'alternatives' and this throws doubt upon any necessary relationship 
between the attempt to empty the prison and the growth of community 
corrections. This challenges orthodox thinking in this country. 
10 
Whether the custody-free zone could be reproduced in central Lambeth given 
what has been argued so far in terms of the political significance of the 
'unemployed ghetto' is an open and contentious question. 
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